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When speakers in dialogue are faced with the need to repeatedly refer to the same 
items, they usually use the same references they or their partners had used before. 
These previously-used references act as precedents, standing in speakers’ memory 
as successful ways of solving that particular communicative need. From mechanistic 
models explaining this reuse as a consequence of low-level priming (Pickering & 
Garrod, 2004), to models assuming sophisticated partner-modelling processes (Clark 
& Marshall, 1981; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986), most theories assume speakers will 
maintain their referential choices throughout the dialogue. While references might be 
modified to discard superfluous elements (as in referential reduction, Krauss & 
Weinheimer, 1964; or simplification, Bard & Aylett, 2005), conceptualisations will be 
preserved. However, there are several reasons why speakers might need to change 
their previous referential choices: a context change might render the old reference 
insufficient to identify the target, or overly detailed, prompting the listener to wonder if 
additional meanings are implied. It might also be that the repetition of the task 
highlights a better referential alternative, or that additional information makes other 
alternatives more salient for the speakers. In this thesis, I present an investigation of 
the dynamics of reference repetition and change in dialogue, bringing together a 
theoretical analysis of the existing literature and 5 experiments that aim to clarify how, 
when, and why speakers might change their referential choices. 
Experiment 1 explores the dynamics of reference change when the repetition of a task 
creates additional pressures that were not evident in an initial exposure. The 
experiment compares pairs and individual speakers describing positions in two spatial 
contexts (regular or irregular mazes, as in Garrod & Anderson, 1987; Garrod & 
Doherty, 1994) that cue participants into using different referential descriptions. As 
the task is repeated over 3 rounds, an additional pressure for efficiency is created, 
pushing participants across contexts into using one of the two initial descriptive 
choices. Crucially, only interacting pairs of participants adapted to this additional 
pressure by switching to a more efficient alternative, while participants completing the 
task individually maintained their initial choices. Additionally, this chapter reports a 
pilot study of the same experiment in 4-person groups that showed a switching pattern 




Experiments 2 and 3 further investigate the drivers of linguistic change in referential 
choice and the relationship between interaction and adaptation found on experiment 
1. Experiment 2 explores the relationship between context change and linguistic 
change. Using the maze game paradigm, the experiment presented individuals and 
pairs of participants with either the same maze in each round of the task, or different 
mazes in the first and the second halves of the experiment. The results of Experiment 
2 offer some support to the conclusions of Experiment 1, as participants switched to 
Abstract descriptions as they gained experience in the task; however there were no 
significant differences between Interaction conditions, nor between Same or Different 
mazes. Experiment 3 was aimed at exploring which features of interaction were 
relevant for reference change. The experiment used the maze game in different 
interactive setups, in which participants played a first round of the game either as 
Matchers (in direct interaction with the Director) or Overhearers (having access to 
another pair’s dialogue), and three successive rounds as Directors with either the 
same partner as in the first round, or a new partner. Participants showed higher levels 
of adaptation as they gained experience in the task; while the different interactive 
setups did not significantly influence their reference choices. 
Experiments 4 and 5 further explore the relationship between reference change and 
participant role in interaction. Using a picture matching paradigm (Brennan & Clark, 
1996), Experiment 4 tested participants interacting with either the Same Partner 
throughout, a New Partner in the second half of the experiment, or an Overhearer 
(who had witnessed the first half of the experiment) in the second half. Participants in 
all conditions maintained previously used overspecific picture descriptions even when 
those detailed descriptions were not needed to identify the referents, pointing towards 
a predominance of speaker-centred factors in reference choice. Experiment 5 used a 
similar interactive setup, testing participants on a larger set of pictures. Participants 
maintained their overspecific descriptions only if interacting with the Same Partner 
they had on the first half of the experiment, or with the Overhearer, switching to 
context-appropriate basic-level descriptions if interacting with a New Partner. Taken 
together, both experiments suggest a complex balance between speaker-centred and 
audience-design factors in the potential change of reference choices, where speakers 
need to weigh their own effort against the communicative needs of their partner.  
These experiments highlight the crucial role of interaction in the adaptation of 
reference choices to changes in context, and show that individuals’ ‘conservative bias’ 
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that leads them to maintain their own previously used references can be overturned 




























People tend to reuse the same labels that have already been used in a conversation: 
their likelihood of using “the Psychology building” or “7 George Square” depends on 
which option their partner (or themselves) has used before. As this label is active in 
the speaker’s memory, it is not surprising it comes as an easier option when facing 
the need to refer to the same object or event. Indeed, most theories of dialogue 
suggest this repetition is crucial for understanding between interlocutors. However, 
there are circumstances in which the speaker will need to abandon this previously 
used label for a different option. A change in context, or a need to differentiate this 
referent from similar items, might push the speaker to adapt to these new 
communicative needs, switching from a known label to a new one. This thesis looks 
at both sides of this issue: the reuse of labels in conversation, and the adaptation 
process that allows speakers to change when a different alternative is needed. 
The first aim of this thesis was understanding the role of the context in the reuse or 
adaptation of referential choices. To look at this issue, I manipulated the perceptual 
context that speakers had to discuss, either making some aspects of the context more 
salient than others (Experiment 1), or having speakers refer to slightly different 
contexts in different rounds of a task (Experiment 2). Moreover, these experiments 
compared individual speakers, producing descriptions for an imagined future partner, 
and pairs of speakers in interactive dialogue, in order to understand how interaction 
affects reference use. The experiments’ results suggest speakers initial reference use 
is influenced by salient aspects of the context, but that they will abandon this initial 
choice to adapt to the communicative task, a process that is facilitated for speakers 
in interaction. A second set of experiments (Experiments 4 and 5) asked how a 
change from a more complex to a simpler context affected the likelihood of 
participants maintaining their original references (that were too specific in the new 
context), or switching to more basic labels, thereby adapting to the context change. 
These experiments showed speakers would preferentially retain the old labels, but 
may change them if this appears like an efficient choice. 
The second aim of this thesis was understanding how the different roles an individual 
can play in interaction affect the referential adaptation process. We usually think about 
dialogue as an interaction between two people, both of whom have full access to what 
is being said; but dialogues can have other participants, either involved in the 
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interaction but not directly addressed (side-participants), or not recognised as 
participants at all (overhearers). We asked how either being in one of these peripheral 
roles (Experiment 3), or talking to someone that was previously an overhearer 
(Experiments 4 and 5) affected the likelihood of retaining previously used references. 
The results suggest that speakers consider these peripheral roles similarly to how 
they consider their actual addressee, opting to retain previously used labels unless 
they were interacting with a completely new partner (and even then, they would adapt 
only in specific circumstances).  
Taken together, the experiments presented in this thesis suggest speakers are 
conservative when it comes to labels, but that they are always evaluating the fit 
between their reference choices and the actual circumstances of use of these 
references. This would explain why interaction facilitates the adaptation process, as 
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The last few decades of Psycholinguistics research have established the fact that 
people repeat each other in dialogue well beyond doubt. We tend to use the same 
labels our interlocutor has used to refer to the same objects or events, and we reuse 
the same syntactic structures, even more if similar semantic content is involved 
(Branigan, Pickering, McLean, & Cleland, 2007). Interacting speakers even tend to 
pronounce words similarly (Pardo, 2006). The whole business of using language in 
interaction seems to be defined by convergence and repetition, and, indeed, the 
evidence suggests repetition eases the effort of communication (Pickering & Garrod, 
2004). 
 
But this repetition has obvious limits. How else would we suggest a different 
conceptualisation, or mark a new perspective, or adapt to a new communicative 
situation, if not by introducing a change? The goal of this thesis is to study the 
relationship between repetition and change in the production of references in 
interaction. Specifically, my research aims at understanding referential adaptation, 
defined as the process by which speakers abandon a repeatedly-used reference to 
switch to a new formulation that is deemed a better fit for the communicative 
situation, usually entailing a different conceptualisation. In the chapters that follow, I 
will address some of the main components of this process: the role of context in the 
emergence and adaptation of referential conventions, the relationship between 
interaction and adaptation, and the modulation of reference use by the participant 
role of the speakers. While accepting that repetition accounts for most of the regular 
use of references in communication, I believe explaining how speakers manage to 
deviate from this norm can give us relevant insights on the nature of reference 




The idea that reference change in linguistic interaction might be seen as a window 
into the general process of language change is central to this thesis. In particular, as 
the selection of references can be understood as an attempt to find the alternative 
that best fits the communicative situation, the study of referential change in 
interaction should be able to inform more global processes of selection of linguistic 
and cultural variants in a population. Even though most of the processes studied 
under the ‘language change’ label can be described as unconscious (the 
accumulation of phonetic changes in the articulation of frequent words, the repetition 
of syntactic structures, etc.), the conscious choices of the speaker when producing a 
reference might also be relevant when studying the differential accumulation of 
lexical variants in a population over time. 
 
This thesis is also defined by a joint action view of dialogue, which understands the 
individual contributions of each speaker in a conversation in the context of the joint 
communicative act that is taking place between them. Moreover, I assume that this 
joint action is built from both intentional and unintentional aspects of communication; 
that is, that while the overall facts of the interaction (such as topic, participants, 
language, communicative intentions) can be said to be intentional, many other 
aspects are likely unintentional (such as tone, gestures, syntactic choices), with both 
shaping the actual linguistic output of the speakers (Garrod & Pickering, 2009; 
Tollefsen & Dale, 2012). Similarly, even though the mechanisms of joint action might 
involve both ‘low-level’ perception-action processes, and ‘high-level’ cognitive 
processes, it is likely that both levels work in integration (Galantucci & Sebanz, 
2009).  
 
In the same sense, the appeal to the consideration of the perceptual context in the 
production and comprehension of references is, even though ‘obvious’ in the sense 
that references point to a meaning in the world, relevant theoretically as context is 
intrinsically linked to the joint action being performed. As several of the experiments 
presented in this thesis will show, the evaluation that speakers perform of their 
context in dialogue is incorporated to their language production and comprehension 
processes, both intentionally and unintentionally. Even though there is a 
fundamental difference in the interactive coupling of individuals in joint action and 
their individual connection to the world, both aspects are inescapable in the analysis 
of dialogue as a situated process. 
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1.1 Repetition and change in reference production 
 
Besides the most abstract elaborations, most instances of linguistic communication 
involve a speaker trying to get an addressee to attend to a specific element in their 
common context. In order to specify which, of all possible items and 
conceptualisations that even the most sparing context has to offer, is the one she 
intends to guide the addressee’s attention to, the speaker needs to come up with a 
referential expression. Such a reference should ideally offer enough information for 
the addressee to identify the intended meaning without having to incur an extra turn 
to confirm it, and should not include too much information so as to make the 
addressee suspicious that other meaning is actually being considered. Now, their 
common context is not only formed by their material surroundings; it includes also 
their social and cultural memberships, their common history, and, crucially, their 
previous linguistic interaction(s), up to the very moment of production of the next 
utterance.  
 
A reference that has been proposed and accepted in dialogue will likely be repeated 
by both interlocutors, who will preserve its conceptual content while eliminating 
superfluous elements and generally streamlining its surface form. While different 
theories of dialogue have explained this repetition by appealing to more mechanistic 
processes like priming and entrainment, or more conscious processes like 
audience-design, it is commonly acknowledged that reusing their partner’s lexical 
and syntactical choices is both a ‘safe bet’ in terms of communication (as they are 
obviously understood by the first speaker), and an easy choice in terms of 
processing (as they were already active in both speakers’ memory). In reusing a 
precedent, speakers communicate their accepting of this choice, and through this 
mutual ratification, a local convention is established. 
 
However, as we suggested previously, repetition cannot account for the whole of 
reference use, as there are many instances where the communicative situation 
would cue the need for a change. A change in context might render a previously-
used reference underspecific, prompting the speaker to expand it or change its 
specification level, e.g., going from “the dog” to “the white terrier” when other dogs 
are included in the context. Repetition of a task might push speakers to find a more 
efficient alternative, e.g., moving from idiosyncratic descriptions like “two along and 
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then two up, at the very corner” to a system of coordinates like “row 2, column 3”. An 
overly detailed description might be abandoned if the context is simplified, either 
reducing accessory elements or switching to a different specification level. A new 
task-prompted perspective on an object might push speakers into abandoning a 
previously used label associated to a different conceptualisation (Ibarra & 
Tanenhaus, 2016). 
 
Considering this, it might be thought that referential adaptation is a process 
determined solely by the speaker, who chooses to either maintain their previous 
reference or switch to a new one. However, on the one hand there are many 
aspects of the production process that occur below conscious control. Even those 
aspects that might be considered explicit might escape speakers’ awareness until 
the very moment of utterance (including the ‘decision’ to change in the first place). In 
this sense, even though the process is carried out by the speaker, it cannot be said 
to be completely determined by her. 
 
On the other hand, speakers in dialogue mutually influence each other’s choices not 
only through their linguistic output, but through a myriad of intentional and 
unintentional behaviours that are interpreted in an integrative fashion. In this 
process, the frontiers of what comes from the inside, as egocentric processing 
needs or cognitive constraints, and from the outside, as explicit feedback, hedges, 
subtle changes and even the time-course of a response, might be blurred. Even in 
dialogues with no face-to-face interaction, such as the ones described in this thesis, 
speakers manage to influence each other in a range of levels, and even silences (or 
delays, in written chat communication) can be said to be included in their dynamic 
evaluation of the communicative situation. 
 
 
1.2 Individual and interactive processes in dialogue 
 
As Schober and Clark (1989) stated, the social process of interacting in 
conversation plays a central role in the cognitive process of understanding. But how 
much of the outcome of a communication event can be explained by interactive vs 
individual processes is a hotly debated matter. Some accounts have favoured 
egocentric processing as the main force behind both the production and 
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comprehension of references, showing how individuals will prioritise their own 
perspective when interpreting or designing an utterance, even when the perspective 
of their interlocutor would point to a different meaning (Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003; 
Lin, Keysar, & Epley, 2010). These accounts argue that audience-design, or 
perspective taking, is a costly process that is not really needed in most 
communicative situations, as speakers are usually able to take their own 
perspective as proxy for their interlocutor’s, considering common factors such as a 
common context, cultural group membership, etc.  
 
Other accounts have focused on the integration of speaker-centred and partner-
specific processes, claiming that the addressee’s knowledge and needs (or the 
speaker’s, in comprehension) can be taken into account from the earliest moments 
of processing. These accounts emphasize the integration of both sources of 
information, however, the discussion they present is also centred on the time-course 
of processing, reflecting a compromise with a linear view of information integration 
(Brennan & Hanna, 2009; Hanna, Tanenhaus, & Trueswell, 2003). 
 
A recent view proposing that the integration of sources of information can be best 
explained through a dynamical systems approach might be closer to the 
epistemological stance of this thesis. Dale et al. (2018) propose a model where the 
information from sources acting on different timescales (such as ‘fast’ egocentric 
processing and ‘slow’ other-centred processing) is integrated in a flexible and task-
relevant way. As the authors explain, an other-centred perspective can come after 
an egocentric perspective in time, but its pervasiveness might be crucial in 
determining the communicative outcome. In this sense, the traditional discussion 
that tries to determine a hierarchy of processes might be misled, focusing on ‘what 
comes first’ instead of on the most stable patterns of outcome. Degen and 
Tanenhaus (2016) similarly call for a dynamical integration of sources that argues 
that the idea of ‘fast’ and ‘slow’ processes is not really relevant when we consider 
production and comprehension are situated in a context that might differentially 
guide speakers’ evaluation of the communicative situation. 
 
In this thesis, I look at the linguistic choices of speakers in interaction (or in 
individual settings with a communicative intent), with the aim of establishing the 
relative importance of factors affecting their production: the perceptual context, the 
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participant role their partner has previously had, the interactiveness of the task. 
However, I believe that none of these factors can be completely isolated analytically, 
as a robust interpretation of their contribution is only possible if we acknowledge all 
other elements the speakers are having to consider both intentionally and 
unintentionally. 
 
In the experiments summarised in the following chapters, I address the factors 
involved in the production and adaptation of references using two classic paradigms 
in psycholinguistics: the maze game (Garrod & Doherty, 1994; Garrod & Anderson, 
1987), and the picture-matching task of Brennan and Clark (1996). Both paradigms 
have been described as prototypical tasks in the language-as-action tradition 
(Trueswell & Tanenhaus, 2005); however, their instantiation in written form through 
the use of chat-based software makes additional layers of information available to 
the researcher that are not so easily extracted from regular conversation, such as 
detailed time-stamps of production and turn-taking, pairing of task movements 
(mouse clicks and maze navigation) and linguistic production, etc. Even though the 
scope of this work does not allow for a detailed analysis of all these features, the 
integration of new digital tools and classic communication paradigms opens new 
possibilities for analysis, carefully controlling interaction channels while maintaining 
the rich environments and situations that this tradition has supported. While it might 
be criticised that written chat communication does not allow for the full spectrum of 
communicative signals that are exchanged between individuals in face-to-face 
interaction, it allows us to focus exclusively on their linguistic output, eliminating the 
need to control for other sources of information (such as looks, or subtle tone 
changes) that might partially explain speakers’ behaviour in other situations. 
 
 
1.3 Thesis aims 
 
This thesis aims to shed light over the process of referential adaptation, by which 
speakers abandon previously used references and switch to a different alternative in 
order to adapt to some feature(s) of the interaction context. Specifically, I address 
the influence of three main factors over this process: the perceptual context (the 
scenario in which the speakers’ references are to be interpreted), the interaction 
situation (whether the speakers are interacting directly with a partner), and the 
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participant role of the interlocutors (whether they are interacting continuously with 
the same partner, or with a new partner, or with other individuals with different 
degrees of involvement in the interaction). The general goal of the research project 
is to try to understand what leads people to abandon entrained lexical choices, in 
order to shed light on the process of conventionalisation (or routinisation) of 
linguistic alternatives in a community, and how this relates to the overall process of 





This thesis describes 5 experiments that deal with the issues surrounding the 
emergence and adaptation of referential choices, together with an analytical 
summary of the relevant literature. Chapter 2 presents a literature review, aimed at 
clarifying what are the factors that speakers consider when proposing a reference, 
and what are the conditions under which they would be inclined to change it. It also 
covers the impact different production circumstances might have on this process, 
particularly the participant role of the speaker; and establishes a link between 
change at the psycholinguistic level –the focus of this thesis– and language change. 
 
Chapter 3 reports the first experiment, aimed at understanding the role that the 
perceptual context plays in the choice of referential descriptions, and at establishing 
the differences in processing of speakers working individually vs in interactive 
dialogue. Using a maze game paradigm, the experiment measured pairs and 
individual speakers in their use of abstract and systematic or concrete and figurative 
descriptions to identify a position in the maze, along with their alignment in 
description scheme use and speed in the task. Participants’ choice of descriptions 
was found to be affected by the perceptual context, while interaction appeared as 
crucial to overcome contextual effects in order to switch to a more efficient 
alternative. An appendix to this chapter includes the results of a pilot experiment that 
applied the same design to small communities of speakers.  
 
Chapter 4 presents Experiments 2 and 3, which used the maze game paradigm 
aiming to understand which aspects of interaction are most relevant in referential 
adaptation and change. Experiment 2 explored the influence of a context change 
8 
 
over the adaptation of referential choices, presenting individuals and pairs of 
participants with either the same maze layout in each round of the task, or different 
mazes in the first and second halves of the experiment. Results show this 
manipulation was not enough to drive different patterns of responses in the 
experimental conditions, with participants switching to more adaptive descriptions as 
they played more round in the task, across conditions. Chapter 3 explored the effect 
of participant role on referential adaptation, using the maze game paradigm while 
manipulating the role participants had to perform (Matcher or Overhearer) and the 
identity of their partner (Same Partner vs New Partner). The experiment showed that 
again participants across conditions switched to the more efficient Abstract 
descriptions as they gained experience in the game, pointing to the need for 
stronger experimental manipulations that could overcome the generalised influence 
of experience on referential adaptation. 
 
Chapter 5 describes Experiments 4 and 5, which used a picture-matching game 
(Brennan & Clark, 1996) to address the interplay between speaker-centred and 
audience-centred factors in the production of references. In the task, the pictures 
described in the first half of the experiment are shown in a different context in the 
second half, which renders the references previously used overspecific in this new 
context. Experiment 4 had participants playing with either the same partner 
throughout the task, a new partner in the second half of the task (who had not 
witnessed their interaction in the first half), or an overhearer (who had witnessed 
their interaction in the first half). Participants across conditions maintained their 
overspecified descriptions in the second half of the game, pointing towards a 
predominance of speaker-centred factors in reference choice. Experiment 5 used a 
larger, monochrome set of images with the same participant conditions, and found 
that participants maintained their previously used descriptions when interacting with 
the same partner or the overhearer who had witnessed their previous interaction, 
but switched to more appropriate basic-level references when interacting with a new 
partner. Taken together, the results of both experiments point to a dynamic 
evaluation of the factors influencing reference production, where speakers take into 





The closing Chapter 6 presents the overall conclusions from this body of work, 
considering the evidence presented by the experiments, and critically assessing the 
points that could be improved in future research, both in terms of methodological 












When a speaker chooses a reference, several factors come together: the influence 
of frequency and recent use over the availability of lexical alternatives, the 
perceptual and linguistic context, the identity of her interlocutor and their common 
history of interaction, her communicative goals, etc.  The goal of this chapter is to 
describe how each of these elements affects the production of references in 
interaction. Specifically, the chapter will cover the factors that influence initial 
reference choice, the dynamics of conventionalisation in repeated use, and the 
factors that usually motivate reference adaptation and change. Additionally, it will 
briefly review the state of the art on the link between selection at the dialogue level, 
and language change.  
 
Section 2.1 will cover the role of imitation and convergence in communication, 
describing briefly the two main models explaining repetition in dialogue: the 
interactive alignment model (Pickering & Garrod, 2004), and the collaborative model 
of H. H. Clark and colleagues. Section 2.2 will discuss the production of references 
in dialogue, specifically the use of the linguistic and non-linguistic context in this 
process. Section 2.3 will focus on common ground and coordination processes in 
dialogue. Section 2.4 will discuss the differences in participant role in conversation. 
Section 2.5 will address the establishment of linguistic conventions and their 
consolidation or change; and section 2.6 will deal with the link between convention 
formation in dialogue and language change. Additionally, section 2.7 will address 
the similarities and differences between adaptation and change in linguistic vs non-








2.1 Imitation and convergence in communication 
 
Imitation is widespread in human behaviour. Human beings tend to imitate each 
other during social interaction, at many levels. This behaviour ranges from the 
imitation of facial expressions and body postures (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; 
Louwerse, Dale, Bard, & Jeuniaux, 2012; Shockley, Santana, & Fowler, 2003), to 
syntactic and lexical repetition in conversational partners (Branigan, Pickering, & 
Cleland, 2000; Pickering & Garrod, 2004, 2013). While the specific mechanisms that 
explain each of these behaviours might involve both conscious and automatic 
processing, it has been suggested that most imitative behaviours are not 
consciously controlled by those who perform them (Chartrand & van Baaren, 2009; 
Heyes, 2011). 
 
Imitation has been linked to benefits in different areas of social interaction. On an 
affective level, imitation has been associated to increased affiliation (Chartrand & 
Bargh, 1999; Lakin & Chartrand, 2003; van Baaren, Holland, Steenaert, & van 
Knippenberg, 2003); a finding that has been replicated in non-human primates 
(Paukner, Suomi, Visalberghi, & Ferrari, 2009). Imitation can also aid in linguistic 
comprehension. Adank, Hagoort, & Bekkering (2010) showed that imitating the 
accent of an interlocutor aids in the comprehension of spoken sentences. Imitation 
can make it easier to predict subsequent actions of the imitated subject, both in 
terms of motor sequences (Wilson & Knoblich, 2005) and language (Pickering & 
Garrod, 2007), and overall, it reduces the effort of dialogue, as the items that are 
processed in the comprehension of an utterance are the same items that will be 
employed in production, demanding no additional activation (Pickering & Garrod, 
2004). 
 
Imitation in natural dialogue has been extensively studied, particularly in order to 
explain speakers’ tendency to repeat each other’s choices in terms of words, 
syntactic structures, conceptual schemes, etc. Two main theoretical standpoints can 
be identified: 1) a mechanistic approach around the alignment model (Pickering & 
Garrod, 2004), proposing that this convergence is reached through mechanistic 
priming on the most basic levels (speech rate, word similarity, syntactic structures, 
lexicon, etc.) that “percolates” towards more complex levels (semantic, situation 
model) without guided intervention; and 2) a collaborative approach focused on 
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the interactive coordination of speakers and usually requiring some form of 
intentionality1. In this category, I draw together both the classic common ground 
approach of Clark and colleagues (Clark & Brennan, 1991; Clark, 1996) with the 
more recent interpersonal synergy models of Fusaroli and colleagues (Fusaroli, 
Raczaszek-Leonardi, & Tylén, 2014; Fusaroli & Tylén, 2012).  
 
The alignment model (Pickering & Garrod, 2004, 2006, 2013) states that a shared 
interpretation of the set of concepts and ideas that are being discussed (that is, a 
common understanding of the referents that are being discussed, even if 
perspectives on those referents are not shared), that is, an alignment of situation 
models, forms the basis of successful dialogue. This high-level alignment is built up 
from mechanistic alignment in lower levels, such as syntax, tone, speech rate, etc., 
where the imitation of the interlocutor’s output via priming plays a key role. As such, 
the whole process rests on a principle of input-output coordination, where the 
linguistic output of the interlocutor primes the speaker, leading to the reuse of the 
same items in their own turn. This reuse mechanism eases the effort of the 
conversation, since the items that were used in the comprehension of the previous 
utterance are already active in processing when they are reused in production, 
avoiding the need for new activations. In this sense, the basic mechanism of 
alignment is automatic (Garrod & Pickering, 2007), even though it can be modulated 
by speakers’ beliefs (Branigan, Pickering, Pearson, McLean, & Brown, 2011). The 
authors argue that this low-cost mechanism is responsible for most of successful 
dialogue, with more sophisticated and costly mechanisms (such as audience 
design) only coming in place if understanding cannot be reached through this 
simpler process. 
 
The collaborative approach can be defined around the idea of dialogue as a joint 
action that is consciously approached by the interlocutors, where imitation aids in 
the effort of reaching a joint understanding of the concepts and ideas being 
discussed. In these models, imitation occurs as a consequence of the need for 
mutual understanding, in the sense that the repetition of a linguistic item both eases 
the effort of the conversation (according to the principle of least collaborative effort, 
                                               
1 The Speech Accommodation theory (Giles, Coupland, & Coupland, 1991) shares with the 
collaborative approach an intentional stance, where speakers are actively modulating their 
output to accommodate to the perceived needs of their interlocutors. However, as it is 
focused on social aspects of communication that are beyond the scope of this thesis, it won’t 
be discussed further. 
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Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986) and ensures to the conversational partner that the 
meaning of the item is shared, and will from then on be considered as part of their 
common ground. As the idea of common ground requires the information that is 
shared to be mutually known to be shared, using the same linguistic items the 
interlocutor just used communicates both the acceptance of that reference and its 
adoption as shared between the speakers. Contrary to the alignment model, the 
collaborative model requires that speakers maintain a model of their addressee’s 
state of mind, with both interlocutors working together to ease the effort of the 
conversation. 
 
The idea of interpersonal synergy, central to the most recent developments of this 
approach, puts the emphasis not on imitation but on complementary performances 
by interdependent interlocutors, which may employ imitation but are not defined by it 
(Fusaroli & Tylén, 2016). While this approach considers coupling between the 
interlocutors (in terms of their interdependent linguistic and non-linguistic joint 
actions), interpersonal synergy should not be considered an automatic 
phenomenon, as the complementarity of the speakers is dependent on the 
communicative intention and semantic/pragmatic content of their utterances. 
 
Though much of the experimental support for imitation models in language comes 
from ‘one-off’ tasks, where participants are primed to reuse a lexical item or 
syntactic structure by either another participant or a confederate having used the 
same structure previously (see for example Branigan et al., 2000; Branigan, 
Pickering, McLean, & Cleland, 2007), in more naturalistic settings this repetition can 
be recurrent. Speakers who have agreed on a specific reference or ‘label’ for a 
given item will usually repeat this same label throughout a conversation, as 
changing it would be assumed to indicate a change in meaning (i.e. if a speaker has 
referred to a figure as “the slender one”, suddenly referring to it as “tall and thin” 
would cause conflict in the hearer, who might need to look at the context to check 
whether a different figure is been referred to, as in Barr & Keysar, 2002; Metzing & 
Brennan, 2003; Senay & Keysar, 2009; Shintel & Keysar, 2007; for the general 
‘Principle of Contrast’ see E. Clark, 1987). Through this repetition, a convention will 
be formed: the reference that was used will be maintained not only because it was 
primed by its previous use(s), but because it has been established as a successful 




In this review, I will investigate the literature on the emergence and establishment of 
referential conventions in dialogue (with occasional references to both monologue 
and multi-party conversations), considering the influences of context and participant 
role, and the possibility of change of an established convention. While it will be 
explicitly stated when an element pertains to one of the above mentioned theories 
exclusively, the chapter’s focus combines elements of both approaches, as it deals 
with dialogue ‘anomalies’ that are, by definition, not considered by the alignment 
model (Pickering & Garrod, 2004). 
 
 
2.2 The production of references in dialogue: Historical and ahistorical 
factors  
 
Dialogue is the most natural setting for language use. Usually, interlocutors engaged 
in dialogue share a physical and social setting, which is used as background to aid 
in the interpretation of the meaning of words and phrases being uttered. Moreover, 
non-concurrent context can also be brought to the production and comprehension 
processes, if both speakers knowingly share a past history of interaction or a group 
membership (cultural co-presence or community membership; Clark & Marshall, 
1981). The following section will consider both the factors that influence the initial 
production of references (particularly salience in context and level of specification), 





When a speaker in dialogue produces a reference, she is looking for an effective 
and efficient way to communicate a meaning (even though she might not be aware 
of this search). She will aim at a reference that is at the same time easy enough to 
produce and specific enough as to avoid the effort of having to engage in additional 
explanations or repetitions to repair a misunderstanding (Grice, 1975; Schegloff, 
Jefferson, & Sacks, 1977). To do this, she will consider both purely linguistic factors, 
like lexical availability (derived from the word’s frequency, syntactic position, and 
previous use, among other factors, see Anderson, Garrod, & Sanford, 1983; Bock & 
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Warren, 1985; Ferreira & Dell, 2000), and more contextual factors, like 
informativeness in context (discriminativeness between the target and other possible 
referents; Brennan & Clark, 1996), and perceptual salience (salience of possible 
referents in the immediate context; Tarenskeen, Broersma, & Geurts, 2015; Vogels, 
Krahmer, & Maes, 2013).  
 
As Tarenskeen et al. (2015) have suggested, the basic idea behind salience is 
intuitive: speakers tend to select attributes of an object or situation according to the 
degree to which their attention is attracted by them. Communicatively, this is a 
sensible strategy, as it is likely that those attributes will also attract the attention of 
their interlocutor (however this need not be a conscious aim). In this sense, a 
speaker choosing which attribute(s) to highlight when referencing an object (e.g. 
“the big square bag” vs “the fake-leather bag” vs “the square white bag”) is, 
consciously or not, assuming that their focus can be shared with little or no effort by 
their interlocutor, which would make the use of those attributes relevant in the 
process of correctly identifying the referent (Clark, Schreuder, & Buttrick, 1983). 
However, the inclusion of salient features in an item’s reference can sometimes 
override the aim for a sufficient but not overly informative description, as the most 
salient attributes of the item are not necessarily the ones that are enough to 
distinguish it successfully in its context (Brennan & Clark, 1996). 
 
Salience is also related to the surprise value of the object or attribute considering 
both its context and its known features (Itti & Baldi, 2009). In this sense, a different 
object in a context of similar ones would have high salience, as well as an 
uncommon feature in a common object (a square plate, or a blue rose). Salient 
entities or attributes are also assumed to be more accessible in memory than less 
salient ones (Vogels et al., 2013), which improves the likelihood of their mention 
contributing to the successful identification of the referent. Vogels et al. (2013) 
manipulated both the linguistic salience of referents (by having referents in either 
subject or object position in a phrase) and their visual salience in accompanying 
images (by having referents in either foreground or background of a picture), and 
found that visual salience, but not linguistic salience, had a reliable influence on 
speaker references, with visually salient entities chosen as main referents 
significantly more than less salient entities. 
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Overall, the evidence seems to confirm that contextual salience is perceived as a 
shared starting point that modulates the likelihood of certain aspects of the scene to 
be chosen in the construction of a reference. This process, where the speaker uses 
their own salience judgment as a basis for the attribution of a similar judgment to 
their interlocutor, can be linked to epistemic egocentrism, the use of the individual’s 
own mental state as a template for their modeling of others’ minds (Keysar, Lin, & 
Barr, 2003; McClung & Reicher, 2018). 
 
However, salience on its own cannot explain the inclusion or exclusion of 
information from a reference, as the communicative needs of the speakers might be 
more or less detached from the attentional landscape of their context of interaction. 
If the speaker needs the addressee to identify a specific referent, she has three 
alternatives in terms of information inclusion: speakers might underspecify their 
referential descriptions, producing potentially ambiguous references, or descriptions 
that do not uniquely specify a referent among a set of options (Ferreira, Slevc, & 
Rogers, 2005). Alternatively, speakers might overspecify their references, including 
more information than is needed to uniquely identify the referent (but see Rubio-
Fernández, 2016, on why an efficiency-based analysis might be better than 
standard pragmatics to discuss reference production). Naturally, speakers might 
also include exactly enough information as to allow the addressee to identify the 
referent (but even this might be sub-optimal in some contexts, see Clarke, Elsner, & 
Rohde, 2013).  
 
In natural language use, overspecification is much more common than 
underspecification (Ferreira et al., 2005; Sedivy, 2003; van Deemter, Gatt, van 
Gompel, & Krahmer, 2012), as the latter is more likely to increase the overall effort 
of the conversation by requiring repair sequences or additional turns. 
Overspecification, on the other hand, is particularly abundant with respect to intrinsic 
properties of objects such as colour or number, which are generally assumed to be 
least likely to cause processing problems (Brown-Schmidt & Konopka, 2011). 
Sedivy (2005) showed that speakers do not always assume contrastive 
interpretations of modifiers (particularly in the case of colour adjectives), relying 
instead on communicatively based expectations, when interpreting references to 
objects in an elicited-production and comprehension task. Sedivy’s results suggest 
overspecified references can be interpreted as simply as basic-level descriptions, 
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without invoking additional objects that would justify the inclusion of additional 
referent properties (Engelhardt, Bailey, & Ferreira, 2006).  
 
Even though overspecification is frequently produced in cognitively undemanding 
contexts, it is more frequent when the importance of the task is high, and the 
overspecified attributes could potentially help referent identification, suggesting goal-
directed use (Arts, Maes, Noordman, & Jansen, 2011; note however that this is not 
indicative of conscious control, see Wardlow Lane, Groisman, & Ferreira, 2006). 
Other factors that could contribute to the production of overspecified references are 
incremental production, division of attention, failures in the determination of 
redundancy, and expected identification difficulty (Arts et al., 2011). 
 
The overspecification of colour in descriptions where colour is not needed to identify 
a referent is particularly common in natural language (Tarenskeen et al., 2015). In 
spontaneous mention, Sedivy (1999) found that more than half of references to 
common objects included colour when this was not needed for identification. 
According to Rubio-Fernández (2016), colour is likely overspecified due to its 
saliency (making it more likely to grab both speakers’ and listeners’ attention) and 
contextual contrast properties (other elements in context are likely to have different 
colours, with this feature therefore acting as potential discriminator). Even in studies 
that showed a detrimental effect of overspecification, colour was found to have a 
much smaller negative effect on referent identification than size overspecification, 
which caused a negative effect twice as big (Engelhardt, Demiral, & Ferreira, 2011). 
One side of this issue pertains to the context-dependency of features used in 
overspecification: while size is usually expressed as a scalar adjective (e.g. “the tall 
glass” in comparison to either other co-present glass, or an implicit standard of glass 
sizes, or ‘the smallest size available’), therefore requiring some form of co-present 
or implicit comparison standard, colour is generally expressed in absolute terms, 
and is therefore independent of other elements in context. As such, it should be 
possible to overspecify colour by default without risking misleading the hearer into 
assuming a comparison class. 
 
The question of whether overspecification is beneficial, neutral, or detrimental for 
comprehension has been hotly debated in the last decade. While Engelhardt et al. 
(2011) found a comprehension delay related to the inclusion of overspecific 
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adjectives (though this effect was likely partially driven by predictability), others have 
found processing benefits. Both Paraboni & van Deemter (2014) and Clarke et al. 
(2013) showed how overspecification can benefit the hearer if it facilitates a spatial 
search, by including additional information that can help the hearer narrow down the 
search space. Paraboni, van Deemter, & Masthoff (2007) showed that speakers are 
more likely to produce the same types of overspecification that hearers find 
beneficial, thereby closing the link between production and comprehension. In 
spatial search tasks of different difficulty levels, they found speakers produced more 
logically overspecified spatial descriptions when the spatial search task was harder 
for the addressee, who would benefit from the additional information in the search 
(e.g. a speaker would produce “picture 2 in part B” instead of “picture 2” alone when 
there was only one picture 2, if the search space included more subsections). In 
terms of listeners’ expectations, Engelhardt et al. (2006) found that listeners do not 
consider overspecified descriptions to be any worse than appropriate descriptions, 
suggesting there are no significant additional processing costs associated to their 
comprehension (however, they used a task where subjects had to judge the 
effectiveness of an instruction to move an object in producing a desired outcome, 
which might give different results compared to an interactive task where the 
instructions were actually used in communication). 
 
Taken together, most studies agree that context is crucial in determining whether 
speakers are likely to overspecify a reference or not: if the context is cluttered or 
items are hard to identify, speakers are more likely to include additional information 
(Clarke et al., 2013). On the other side, in extremely simple contexts (such as two-
figure displays of geometrical shapes) overspecification might cause comprehension 
delays as speakers do not naturally overspecify in these contexts (Rubio-
Fernández, under review), which might prompt hearers to attribute additional 
meaning to overspecific references. Overall, most researchers agree 
overspecification is not usually detrimental for the listener and might be even 
beneficial in contexts where the overspecific features are not present in other 
competitor objects (Rubio-Fernández, 2016; Paraboni & van Deemter, 2013).  
 
Contextual and perceptual factors affect reference choice in multiple ways. Not only 
the perceptual properties of the referent and the context might guide speaker’s word 
choice, but they also influence their conceptualisation of the object, making it more 
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likely that they will choose one perspective over others if specific properties are 
more salient (Anderson & Garrod, 1987). This is particularly true when there are 
multiple possible perspectives on an object, such as in the case of the maze game 
(Garrod, Anderson, & Sanford, 1984; Garrod & Anderson, 1987; Garrod & Doherty, 
1994): mazes can be conceptualised as sets of rows and columns, paths from one 
point to another, figurative structures, etc., and the reference choices of the speaker 
facing a specific maze will reflect the conceptualisation they are using to interpret 
that maze.  
 
When a speaker chooses words to refer to an object, they are portraying a specific 
perspective on the object, a conceptualisation that will communicate to the hearer 
which aspect of the object is to be observed, or how is the object to be understood 
(E. V. Clark, 1997; Van Der Wege, 2009). In that sense, the relationship between 
the reference and the object is mediated by this conceptualisation, such that when a 
speaker uses the reference to communicate a specific perspective on the object to a 
hearer and the hearer accepts it, it is the perspective that is being accepted by the 
hearer. Indeed, perspective choices reflected in references affect how people 
remember objects (Carmichael, Hogan, & Walter, 1932). In a communication study, 
Wilkes-Gibbs (1995) showed that people are slower to identify an object if they were 
primed to refer to it with references reflecting different perspectives (such as “the 
flagman” or “the angel” to refer to the same tangram figure). The choice of repeating 
a reference or not, therefore, implies a decision with respect to the acceptance of 




When a speaker introduces a referent to a conversation, their choice of referring 
expression will create a link between the chosen linguistic expression and the 
referent that will stand in the interlocutors’ memory as part of their mental model of 
the discourse, acting as an attractor for subsequent references to the same or 
similar items (Arnold, 2008). This first reference, if accepted by the interlocutor, 
constitutes a precedent for subsequent interactions, that is, an alternative that has 
been established as valid by its successful use in a previous interaction. As a link 
between the expression and the referent has been created and accepted (explicitly 
or tacitly) by the interlocutor, both the original speaker and listener will expect that 
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the same referring expression should be reused whenever the same referent is 
brought to the conversation, as this precedent stands out as a salient option against 
other unattested alternatives (Kronmüller & Barr, 2015; Metzing & Brennan, 2003).  
 
A recent review of the work on precedents and the impact of a change in reference 
use (Kronmüller & Barr, 2015) has shown that there is strong evidence that listeners 
expect references to be maintained (that is, that the same linguistic expressions will 
be used to refer to the same referents), which is consistent with most dialogue 
models. Recent studies have also found comprehension is facilitated if speakers are 
consistent, that is, if they use the same references for the same objects over time 
(Horton & Slaten, 2012; Kronmüller & Barr, 2015). 
 
The most problematic aspects of the discussion pertain to the effects of speaker 
identity in maintaining or breaking a precedent. While most studies agree there is an 
advantage for the listener if the same references are used for the same referents, 
there seem to be additional effects associated with the identity of the speaker. 
Comprehension appears to be facilitated if the same speaker maintains the same 
references, compared to a different speaker using the same references, though the 
strength and duration of this effect is not clear, appearing to be brief and 
concentrated on the earliest moments of comprehension (Kronmüller & Barr, 2015). 
The breaking of a precedent, on the other hand, while costly to the listener, appears 
to be less costly if produced by a new speaker, versus the same speaker that had 
previously used the reference (a ‘different speaker advantage for broken 
precedents’, Metzing & Brennan, 2003).  
 
However, Barr & Keysar (2002) have suggested that the main driver behind the use 
of precedents is not that they are mutually known, but that they are egocentrically 
available. According to their model, speakers rely on a fast and automatic egocentric 
heuristic in the use of information to process linguistic input, coupled with a slower, 
optional ‘common ground’ system that specifies (if needed) the perspective of their 
interlocutor. Much of the reported benefit of maintaining linguistic referents is 
assumed to derive from memory-related (egocentric) processing, such that any item 
that has been previously used (by any speaker) presents a processing advantage 
over a new item. This idea assumes speakers will rely on any available information, 
independent of source, to constrain and ease the effort of language understanding. 
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However, this benefit is assumed to be modulated by a generation effect, according 
to which the speaker producing the linguistic item may have better memory for what 
has been said in conversation, compared to listeners, since they ‘generated’ those 
references (Slamecka & Graf, 1978; Knutsen & Le Bigot, 2014; Knutsen, Le Bigot, & 
Ros, 2017). 
 
Overall, it can be assumed that, if a reference has already been used successfully in 
conversation, the same item will be reused by those involved in the conversation. 
The degree to which speakers adhere to this precedent has been related to the role 
they performed in the dialogue, with more precedent use being associated to a more 
central role in the dialogue (as a speaker or addressee, as opposed to side-
participant or overhearer) (Branigan et al., 2007). However, precedents are also 
strengthened by the frequency of their use, with a higher frequency of use in a task 
being associated to a stronger precedent (Garrod & Doherty, 1994; Brennan & 
Clark, 1996). Frequency of use has been described as a direct influence on ease of 
activation of a representation in memory, both at a local level (i.e. the frequency of 
use of an expression in a conversation, Brennan & Clark, 1996) and at a language 
level (Rayner, 1998). As such, the likelihood of use of a precedent should be directly 
related to the frequency of its past use, establishing a cumulative measure of 
precedent use.  
 
While most of the factors reviewed so far pertain to the domain of individual 
processing, the needs of the addressee are also considered in reference production. 
In an image-sorting experiment, Brennan and Clark (1996) showed that participants 
were more likely to retain their previously used references if they were talking to the 
same partner as before, compared to talking to a new partner, even when these 
references became overspecific due to a change in context. If talking to a new 
partner, speakers would either reduce their descriptions to a basic-level label, 
removing the overspecific information, or expand their references including more 
information as before. The same study showed that the likelihood of maintaining the 
same reference that had been previously used was related to the number of times 
the reference had been used with that partner. 
 
In order to produce a communicatively adequate reference, the speaker needs to 
consider what the addressee is likely to know (information that should be considered 
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common ground between the interlocutors), and what constitutes new information. 
To do this, she needs to establish global and local assumptions about the 
addressee, derived respectively from the general status of the addressee (cultural 
membership, age, gender, etc.) and his specific knowledge about the conversational 
topic and context (Arnold, 2008). While many studies have shown that speakers 
adapt their linguistic production to the assumed needs of their partners (Isaacs and 
Clark, 1987; Fussell & Krauss, 1992), there is a logical limit to this process, derived 
from the cognitive load of the additional assumptions required to create a detailed 
representation of the addressee’s knowledge (Bard & Aylett, 2005). In the next 
section we will analyse the establishment of common ground and the constraints on 
its use in reference production.  
 
 
2.3 Common ground 
 
The term common ground is used to describe the mutual knowledge that is 
established between speakers during a conversation, which they update as the 
conversation develops (Stalnaker, 1978; Clark & Carlson, 1981; Clark, 1996). In its 
broader definition, it includes all their common knowledge, beliefs, and suppositions 
(plus their awareness of their commonality), even if these do not immediately enter 
the linguistic interaction (Clark, 1996). The derived concept of grounding is used to 
refer to the process by which speakers in interaction affirm their mutual acceptance 
of stated or implied knowledge, usually through various forms of acknowledgement, 
backchannels, and repair (Clark & Brennan, 1991; Fusaroli, Tylén, Garly, Steensig, 
Christiansen, & Dingemanse, 2017). The idea of grounding also implies that both 
interlocutors believe they have understood what the contributor meant, and that it 
can be used from then on in the conversation as part of the common ground 
between them (Clark & Schaefer, 1989). 
 
The idea that common ground plays a role in comprehension is generally accepted, 
however, there is no clear consensus on how this knowledge is represented, used, 
and stored in conversation. Specifically, there are conflicting accounts of how 
comprehenders use their knowledge of their common ground with the speaker in 
interpreting their utterances (Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Paek, 1998). As experimental 
work has shown that listeners will consider information explicitly not known to the 
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speaker when interpreting the speaker’s expressions (Keysar, Barr, Balin, & 
Brauner, 2000; Keysar et al., 2003), some accounts have suggested that the use of 
common ground in interpretation comes after (in processing and in time) an initial, 
purely linguistic, stage (Kronmüller, Noveck, Rivera, Jaume-Guazzini, & Barr, 2017); 
cf. Hanna, Tanenhaus & Trueswell, 2003). Keysar and colleagues (in their 
Perspective Adjustment model, also referred to as anchoring and adjustment model; 
1998, 2000) suggest egocentric linguistic associations constitute the main tool for 
the determination of possible interpretations for a reference, with common ground 
accessed only if needed, in a slower and more complex second stage of processing. 
 
Barr & Keysar (2002) showed experimentally that the benefit of common ground is 
primarily related to the availability of the previously used linguistic items 
(precedents) for the speaker, and not to an association with a specific interlocutor 
(mutual knowledge or conceptual pacts). However, their crucial test involved 
speakers inhibiting a precedent when faced with a new interlocutor. Metzing & 
Brennan (2003) argue that speakers do not inhibit a precedent just because they are 
speaking to a new partner, and show that speakers are aware of the entrained terms 
they are maintaining with each partner, reacting if these precedents are broken (i.e. 
an old partner using a new term for a previously named referent). Kronmüller and 
colleagues (2017) have recently suggested that the use of common ground in 
comprehension is not activated immediately, instead appearing after an initial 
‘speaker-independent’ processing in which the benefit of a precedent is not linked to 
any particular speaker. In a similar line, Horton & Keysar (1996) suggested that 
considering the perspective of the addressee only occurs after an ‘egocentric’ first 
stage, showing that speakers under time pressure did not consider their partner’s 
perspective, but speakers who had more time did.  
 
A more nuanced view is held by Brown-Schmidt and Hanna (2011), who argue that 
common ground is one of many partial constraints on comprehension that are 
resolved by the hearer through weighing different sources of evidence, and that 
those weights can vary according to context and speakers’ goals (Brown-Schmidt, 
Yoon, & Ryskin, 2015). In the same line, Yoon, Koh, & Brown-Schmidt (2012) 
suggested speakers consider their addressee’s knowledge more strongly when they 





A memory-based account, put forward by Horton and Gerrig (2005, 2016), suggests 
most of the processing usually attributed to common ground demands is better 
explained by memory-general processing of event information (episodic memory), 
which registers the identity of the speakers along with all other relevant information 
about the event. According to the authors, the demands of the traditional common 
ground literature (diary-like representations, co-presence evaluation for each 
speaker-addressee-referent combination, etc.) would be too cognitively costly to 
constitute the default method of retrieving referential information. In their view, the 
identity of dialogue partners is associated to the reference expressions used with 
them, such that the activation of those expressions will be stronger when interacting 
with the same partner than with a different partner. Thus, it is more likely that the 
same references will be reused if the same partner is re-encountered, as these 
expressions become more readily accessible in memory through resonance 
(Ratcliff, 1978; Knutsen et al., 2017). Importantly, the strength of the activation 
would be modulated by use, with more use being associated to a stronger posterior 
activation. 
 
Even though most of the literature has focused on the definition of a default 
processing mechanism that could explain why some processes appear to be fast 
and automatic while others are slow and ‘costly’, more recent work has questioned 
this view. Dale and colleagues (Dale et al., 2018) argue that perspective-taking 
requires the continuous integration of information acting at different timescales, with 
no ‘default’ mechanism that could explain the final outcome. While some processes 
might be faster than others, integration is performed on the basis of relevance in 
context, meaning ‘slow’ processes might be more cognitively pervasive than ‘fast’ 
ones.  In a similar tone, Degen and Tanenhaus (2015, 2016) argue for a situated 
approach, where the integration of information is constrained (and thus facilitated) 




When a reference is first used in conversation, the addressee is expected to signal 
whether it is accepted or not. According to Clark and colleagues (Clark & Carlson, 
1982; Clark and Schaefer, 1987, 1989), the Principle of Responsibility implies that 
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continuing the dialogue can be assumed to signal that all past references are 
accepted as such by both interlocutors, as it would be the responsibility of whoever 
encountered a problem to indicate the occurrence of a misunderstanding. As 
dialogue is inherently repetitive (Tannen, 2007), particularly in terms of entities, 
places, or activities (Healey, Purver, & Howes, 2014), references used in 
conversation tend to be reused, leading to a process of simplification or reduction. 
 
The repeated use of a label in referring to an item usually entails a dynamic process 
of referential reduction (Krauss & Weinheimer, 1964, 1966; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 
1986; Metzing & Brennan, 2003), where a longer initial description (usually an 
indefinite descriptive phrase) is reduced to its main constituents (usually a definite 
noun or noun phrase). This phenomenon has been traditionally analysed as a 
consequence of the interactive grounding process between speakers, which entails 
a move from the reference as a description (pointing to a meaning in the world), to 
the reference as a sign that points to its own past use, that is shared between 
speakers (Garrod, Fay, Lee, Oberlander, & Macleod, 2007). As such, this reference 
doesn’t require the amount of detail that would be needed to retrieve the referred 
item among the alternative options in a visual scene, but only enough to identify the 
previously used description that was successful between the speakers to refer to 
this item. Therefore, the speaker can ‘drop’ the elements in the reference that were 
useful when it was pointing to the context, such as details or modifiers, but which 
are no longer required when it refers to its previous use: a successful use of “the 
white leather bag with the golden handle that’s over the table” to refer to a specific 
bag can become “the white bag” on subsequent references. 
 
This dropping of hedges and other modifiers is taken to mark the conceptualisation 
as accepted, as hedges and modifiers communicate uncertainty about the definition 
that is being used (e.g. “a kinda reddish lab” becomes “the red lab” once the 
speaker can be certain the reference was understood)  (Brennan & Clark, 1996; 
Metzing & Brennan, 2003). As a whole, references tend to become shorter and 
more efficient as they are used by an interacting pair, compared to a speaker talking 
to a recorder or to an imagined partner (Van Der Wege, 2009). 
 
The referential reduction process has been characterised as a move from an 
indefinite to a definite reference (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986), or from a description 
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to a label. But what is it exactly that is being ‘reduced’ in this process? Using an 
online tangram game, Hawkins, Frank, and Goodman (2017) showed that function 
words were eliminated more frequently than content words. In their description of 
the process, references in an initial stage are characterised by an uncertainty on the 
part of the speakers that translates into multiple partially redundant phrases, which 
are dropped as the game progresses and the ambiguities are solved. The evidence 
points to a move towards the minimum-length label that is enough to indicate to the 
interlocutor that a previous reference is being activated. 
 
Similarly, referential expressions are simplified with repeated mention as their 
antecedents become more easily accessible in memory (Ariel, 1990), for example 
going from a full nominal phrase “my friend’s big brother” to a pronoun “him”. 
According to Bard and Aylett (2005), egocentric processing explains most of this 
simplification. In their analysis of the dialogues in the HCRC Map Task Corpus, they 
showed that neither listener’s co-presence nor feedback affected the rate at which 
speakers simplified their referential expressions, which were simplified mainly as a 
result of repeated mention.  
 
In graphical communication, a similar process explains the evolution of graphical 
symbols from icons that get their attributed meaning from their similarity to the 
represented objects, to symbols with a conventional meaning. As a referential 
relationship is established between an icon and the meaning it stands for, the locus 
of information shifts from the sign as a direct representation of the meaning towards 
the users’ memory of the past usages of the sign, that is, towards the meaning-
symbol relationship they have grounded through interaction (Garrod et al., 2007). In 
this process, the sign’s iconicity gives way to its abstraction as a symbol of itself, 
requiring only enough information as to signal its status as convention pertaining to 
the interlocutors’ common history. The similarities and differences between these 
simplification processes in linguistic and non-linguistic communication will be further 








2.4 Interaction and participant role in conversation 
 
So far we have described conversation as an experience of two participants, each of 
whom performs the role of speaker or hearer interchangeably throughout the 
dialogue. However, dialogues frequently include other participants, who might be 
actively involved in the conversation, or only listening to it without taking an active 
part. Moreover, as participant role is defined according to the speech act that is 
being performed, a conversation can have the same individuals in different 
participant roles at different points: a speaker can be an active interlocutor for one 
topic of the conversation, but become a side-participant when a new interlocutor 
introduces a different topic. Clark and colleagues (Clark & Carlson, 1982; Clark & 
Schaefer, 1987) proposed a classification that is based primarily on accountability: 
side-participants, who are not addressed by the speaker, are accepted as 
participants in the conversation and have rights and responsibilities as such, like 
being expected to share the common ground that is established in the conversation; 
while overhearers are not considered to be participants in the conversation even if 
they have access to it, and are not expected to respond to it in any way nor 
accumulate common ground as a participant would do. Further, eavesdroppers are 
non-participants whose presence or capacity for listening in is not acknowledged by 
the participants of the conversation. 
 
Participants in a dialogue adapt their expectations of what can or cannot be 
comprehended by an individual according to the role she has played in the dialogue: 
while side-participants are expected to share most of the common ground built 
during a dialogue, overhearers are not (Clark & Carlson, 1982; Wilkes-Gibbs & 
Clark, 1992). According to Wilkes-Gibbs and Clark (1992), speakers assume side-
participants who are acknowledged as participants in the conversation (even if not 
directly addressed) should share common ground with them as much as direct 
participants in the conversation, in opposition to overhearers who are not expected 
to share this common ground even if they had access to the same conversation. 
However, this capacity has been questioned (Branigan, 2006; Branigan et al., 2007), 
as side-participants have limited options to either confirm or disconfirm their 




The evidence suggests differences between side-participants and overhearers are 
to be expected in comprehension tasks, but that this would be mediated by access 
to referents and other contextual elements in the conversation. In a task where 
speakers described tangram figures to hearers accompanied by side-participants or 
overhearers with different levels of access to the main interaction, Wilkes-Gibbs and 
Clark (1992) found that overhearers took longer to identify the referents of 
descriptive phrases, compared to side-participants, and produced more identification 
errors. Similarly, Schober and Clark (1989) found that overhearers who just listened 
to the recorded interaction made more errors than addressees in identifying 
referents in a tangram identification task. While no research so far has identified a 
direct cause for these comprehension failures, the acknowledgement side-
participants get from speakers might involve some form of audience design that 
includes them as listeners, even if they are not addressed directly. 
 
With respect to alignment, side-participants and overhearers have been also shown 
to behave differently. Working with syntactic alignment, Branigan and colleagues 
(Branigan, Pickering, MacLean, & Cleland, 2007) showed that both addressees and 
side-participants align with the speaker in conversation, but addressees align 
significantly more than side-participants. Behnel, Cummins, Sichelschmidt, and De 
Ruiter (2013) found a significant, but low, alignment effect in overhearers who were 
not involved in the task the main participants were performing, and a much higher 
effect in overhearers who were involved in the task by having access to the same 
perceptual context the main participants were exposed to. Taken together, these 
results suggest alignment is modulated by participant role and involvement in the 
interaction, as the same linguistic exposure bears different alignment and 
comprehension consequences for participants in the dialogue than for non-
participants. 
 
Dialogue vs monologue 
 
Even though we assume dialogue to be the most natural setting for language use, 
and monologue to be almost entirely absent in everyday activities, there are some 
advantages to the study of the specificities of language use in dialogue vs 
monologue. Particularly, the trajectories of language in use in a dialogue, in terms of 
conservation and change of referential choices mediated by the interaction of 
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speakers, might be quite different from the trajectories of language in use without 
interaction.  
 
Two features of language in use that allow for comparison between dialogues and 
monologues have been studied: the referential reduction process (described in the 
previous sub-section), and the comprehension benefit to third parties in language 
extracted from dialogues vs monologues. Hupet and Chantraine (1992) employed a 
referential task similar to Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs (1986) with participants describing 
tangram figures to a future participant in two conditions: a same listener condition, 
where they believed all their descriptions would be delivered to the same person, 
and a different listener condition, where they believed their descriptions would be 
received by different people. Afterwards, they compared these results to the 
outcome of the same task performed by interacting pairs (Hupet, Seron, & 
Chantraine, 1991). Their results showed speakers in the Same Listener condition 
used fewer definite references and labels than speakers in dialogue, and did not 
reduce the length of their descriptions, while speakers in the Different Listener 
condition used almost no definite references or labels; in fact, speakers in this 
condition used more words to describe each figure as they advanced in the game, 
and required at least the same time to complete the task in the last rounds as they 
needed in the first rounds.  
 
Fox Tree (1999; see also Rogers, Fay, & Maybery, 2013) suggested that there is a 
comprehension benefit that stems from dialogue, as opposed to monologue, such 
that an overhearer would be better able to identify a referent from a dialogue rather 
than a monologue, even if the monologue was more detailed in its descriptions. 
However, it was not clear whether this benefit stemmed from a property of 
interaction (feedback, pace, etc.), or from the higher number of perspectives that is 
usually associated with natural dialogue. To clarify this point, Fox Tree and Mayer 
(2008) designed a task that was balanced between monologues and dialogues in 
the number of perspectives each description presented, and found that the 
comprehension benefit was attributable to the number of perspectives alone, across 
monologue and dialogue conditions. However, a later study by Branigan, Catchpole, 
and Pickering (2011) showed that the grounding of a perspective (whether it has 
been accepted by both speaker and addressee) constitutes a more important factor 
in the comprehensibility of the message for third parties. Using a similar tangram 
30 
 
description task, Branigan and colleagues found that overhearers were more 
accurate in their identification of the figures when the description they heard had 
been produced in a dialogue setting, even when the description itself only included 
one perspective (descriptions from later rounds, in which a perspective has already 
been grounded). Taken together, these results highlight the relevance of the 
interactive grounding processes in the establishment of a conventional reference 
that is useful not only to the interlocutors but also (at least potentially) to others, in a 
process that usually includes negotiating different perspectives, but that might not 
depend on this factor. 
 
 
2.5 Conventions and change 
 
Language is conventional in a broad sense, as the relationship between signals and 
meanings in any given language is largely arbitrary (though the impact of iconicity in 
language evolution, acquisition, and as a general property of language is still under 
discussion, see Dingemanse, Blasi, Lupyan, Christiansen, & Monaghan, 2015; Imai 
& Kita, 2014; Perniss, Thompson, & Vigliocco, 2010). As a consequence of this 
arbitrariness, pairings of signals and meanings need to be learned by the speakers 
before they are able to use a language communicatively. But linguistic conventions 
also develop in a narrower sense through the use of language in interaction, in 
specific conversations, or among particular groups of speakers. These linguistic 
conventions are defined, in Lewis’ terms (1969/2002; see also Croft, 2013), as 
stable coordination equilibria that people create to solve recurrent coordination 
problems: if two speakers need to refer repeatedly to some aspect of the context, 
they will develop a conventional reference that will be considered as the default 
option to deal with this need.  
 
Garrod and Pickering (2013, see also Garrod, 2011) use the term routinisation to 
describe the process by which a specific word(s) and meaning combination 
becomes conventional in a pairwise conversation or group of people. This 
routinisation process eases the processing effort of the speakers by eliminating the 
need to evaluate alternative expressions to communicate the same meaning (“the 
pointy bit” of a figure could also be referred to as “the sharp end”, etc.), or alternative 
meanings that are linked to the same expression (if we both use “the teacher” to 
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refer to a specific individual in a conversation, we don’t have to think about all the 
other “teachers” that we know). In this sense, the process shifts the locus of 
information of the chosen expression, from a meaning in the world, to the speakers’ 
memory of its past use, making it at the same time easier to process for the 
speakers and more opaque to outsiders (Garrod et al., 2007). 
 
Conventions or routines are generated frequently in conversations of some length, 
as the repetition of topics and referents is common in natural language (Tannen, 
2007; Garrod & Pickering, 2013). As such, they might or might not outlive the 
conversation, depending on the likelihood of repetition of a topic for that specific pair 
of speakers. An expression repeatedly used between speakers might become a 
convention or routine, as its surface form becomes lexicalised for the speakers 
through the setting down of new memory traces that link the expression with that 
particular meaning (Garrod & Pickering, 2013). As such, the strength of the 
convention will vary according to its frequency of use with that same meaning by 
those speakers, showing that, even though there is an automatic, mechanistic 
aspect of priming, usage modulates its impact (Oben & Brone, 2016; Pickering & 
Garrod, 2013; see also Brennan & Clark, 1996). This cumulative effect of priming in 
the formation of conventions or routines can explain the link between the dialogue 
level and language change, which will be discussed in the next subsection. 
 
Even though use modulates the strength of a convention between pairs of speakers, 
in a broader sense the strength of a convention depends on the existence of a 
community of speakers that can be expected to maintain it even if a specific 
pairwise interaction does not abide by it. In this sense, two speakers can only 
sustain a local convention, which is susceptible to being replaced, as the use of any 
other alternative undermines the certainty of the speakers in its status. As Lewis 
(1969/2002) stated, each instance of a regular behaviour that solves a common 
coordination problem adds up to the belief that that is what members of this 
community or group do when they face that coordination problem. As such, a 
convention represents the standard that members of a community can look to, 
knowing that all other members expect that convention to be used. In that sense, it 
relies on a community level representation, as the individuals base their choice on a 





However, experimental work has shown that explicit community-level knowledge or 
assumptions are not necessary for the emergence of conventions (in a natural 
language setting, Garrod & Doherty, 1994; in larger populations through web-based 
communication, Centola & Baronchelli, 2015). Work on simulation models has also 
shown that conventional behaviour can emerge without explicit community-level 
knowledge or central control, as an emergent outcome of dyadic interactions 
repeated over time (Baronchelli, Felici, Loreto, Caglioti, & Steels, 2006; Barr, 2004). 
In these models, the information each agent holds is updated on the basis of the 
success or failure of its current interaction, and then used to predict what other 
agents will do when facing the same situation (from an initial random variation, the 
result of the interactions adds weight to one or other alternative behaviours). The 
community-level convention would be sustained, in this framework, by a sequence 
of dyadic interactions, without the need for explicit or global coordination. 
 
In real life communication, though, speakers are usually aware of the identity of their 
interlocutor, and have enough memory to maintain a rough idea of how common a 
given convention is, as a result of their interactions with different members of the 
community (though their estimates are usually egocentrically biased, see Krauss & 
Fussell, 1991). Pairwise conventions are therefore linked to the identity of the 
interlocutor, as we saw in section 2.3. As such, speakers can sustain different 
conventions to refer to the same meaning when interacting with different 
individuals/groups, such as a speaker using different jargon to refer to her sports 
club when with her teammates vs. when with her family. This flexibility serves as a 
reminder of the arbitrary nature of conventions, as the same meaning can be 
communicated through completely different signals, and even an established 
convention can be abandoned for a new alternative in the right context. 
 
Adaptation and change 
 
Although most research on reference in dialogue deals with the ways in which 
speakers repeat each other and/or converge into unique, pairwise choices, there are 
several reasons and scenarios in which speakers will change the reference they 
were previously using. Changes in context, linguistic repetition, or role differentiation 
are some of the common causes behind changes in conventional pairwise 
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references. Brennan and Clark (1996) have suggested that references in pairwise 
conversation are always provisional, as they can be changed or abandoned in the 
right context even if a precedent was established, since each instance of a 
reference acts as precedent for the next. This argument can be linked to the 
observation by Lewis (1969/2002) that a convention between two people is always 
weaker than a group convention, as there is no possible appeal to the group choice 
that could stabilise the conventional option when one individual changes their 
choice.  
 
One side of this issue pertains to the question of perspective or topic differentiation. 
One of the critiques of alignment as a main explanation for sense-making in 
conversation is that of Healey and colleagues (Healey et al., 2014; Healey, Mills, & 
Eshghi, 2016), who argue that the repetition usually associated with alignment does 
not explain the ‘forward momentum’ found regularly in conversation, as speakers 
need to diverge and introduce new perspectives and topics for a dialogue to be 
meaningful. In their analysis of syntactic structures in corpus dialogues, they found 
speakers repeat each other less than what could be expected by chance, diverging 
from one another in their use of syntactic constructions and not even repeating their 
own structures. Even though their results clash with most experimental work in 
syntactic alignment (Branigan et al. 2007; 2011; etc.), their use of natural 
conversations (where there is no predefined topic and which might be varied in 
length, aim, degree of acquaintance of the speakers, etc.) might open a window into 
the interplay of alignment and other forces in natural conversation, particularly 
complementarity and divergence. 
 
In some situations, complementary roles are required to maintain the flow of 
conversation (either by task demands, or naturally in the course of a dialogue), 
shifting the behaviour of the interlocutors away from repeating a conventional 
choice. Coco, Dale, and Keller (2018) have suggested that alignment on its own 
should not be considered a proxy for effective communication, insofar as the 
demands of the communicative task might require different behaviours from the 
interlocutors. Experimental studies have found that indiscriminate local alignment 
was linked to lower performance on a collaborative task, as opposed to selective 
alignment of task-relevant expressions (Fusaroli et al., 2012). Similarly, Garrod and 
Clark (1993) found that children working on a maze game task would converge on a 
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superficially similar description scheme without a common interpretation of it (e.g. 
they would both use “the top line” to refer to a position, but one would mean the top 
overall row, while the other would mean the first complete row), with younger 
children (7-8 years) showing more repetition of their partners’ expressions but less 
task success than older children (11-12 years). 
 
The other side of the issue is change in reference choice. Usually, these changes 
are produced to accommodate to a change in context, to respond to varying 
communicative needs, or to adapt to the requirements of the task. When a 
conversational situation changes, established conventions may no longer be 
appropriate, and successful coordination might require speakers to adapt their 
referential behaviour dynamically to better fit the new situation. Speakers can and 
quite frequently do change the way that they refer to referents in natural 
conversation (Healey, 2008), even though this is assumed to be costly for the 
speaker (and the listener, depending on the context) (Brennan & Clark, 1996; 
Kronmüller & Barr, 2015; Metzing & Brennan, 2003).  
 
Ibarra and Tanenhaus (2016) used two different tasks employing the same items in 
order to test the flexibility of speakers in their use of conventional references. In the 
first task, participants described different unfamiliar objects, establishing common 
references to identify each object (e.g. a long, flat object would be called “the 
wrench”); while in the second task, the same objects would be employed in the 
construction of a structure in which each object had to be placed in a particular 
position (e.g. the same object would now be used as the leg of an animal). Their 
participants would abruptly abandon their entrained references in order to switch to 
task-relevant references (e.g. moving from “the wrench” to “the leg”), usually without 
negotiation, and without any explicit instruction to do so. The authors discuss these 
results highlighting the role of task goals in reference choice, suggesting even a 
grounded conceptual pact can be abandoned if the task requirements change. 
Moreover, their results suggest speakers can flexibly use and maintain in their 
memory different conceptualisations for the same items. 
 
Reference change might also stem from production needs, as in lexical 
differentiation. Lexical differentiation explains why speakers use a different 
reference when naming a second object that belongs to the same category as a first 
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object, even if the two are not in the same context and therefore not competing for 
the same label (Van Der Wege, 2009; Yoon & Brown-Schmidt, 2014): If a speaker 
has called an object “the shirt” when shown in a context of other, unrelated images 
(a car, a plant, etc.), they will call a different shirt, shown afterwards in a new 
unrelated context, “the striped shirt” or “the blouse”, even though the same basic 
label “shirt” could be applied successfully in this second scenario. Van Der Wege 
(borrowing from Clark and Clark, 1979) call this phenomenon “pre-emption by 
similar form”: speakers will avoid giving two different items the same label, even in 
two different scenarios (when it would not be contextually maladaptive), as the first 
use of the label establishes a link with the item that prevents any other item being 
associated to the same label in the conversation. Similarly, Garrod and Anderson 
(1987, see also Garrod & Doherty, 1994) discussed how participants in a maze 
game task will change the names they use to identify reference points when 
switching to a different counting convention, e.g. moving from “top line” to “top row”. 
These changes in reference choice show that references are associated to specific 
conceptualisations, and that the link between reference and conceptualisation that is 
established during dialogue frequently inhibits the reuse of the same linguistic 
choice for a different meaning. 
 
Further changes in referential choice might come from task expertise, with speakers 
in dialogue switching to more appropriate alternatives as they evaluate the fit of their 
previous expressions to deal with the communicative demands of the task (Healey & 
Mills, 2006). But likely the single most important source of change in reference 
choice is the addressees themselves, as a referential expression is only reused if 
there is sufficient evidence of understanding of its previous use. Usually, this 
evidence comes in the form of explicit, full-turn feedback, or backchannels, which 
can either explicitly signal acceptance or indicate that the conversation is to 
continue, thereby establishing the assumption that previously used expressions 
have been understood (Clark & Carlson, 1982). Experimental evidence has shown 
that interrupting feedback channels has important consequences over linguistic 
choices in dialogue. Healey and colleagues (Healey, Mills, Eshghi, & Howes, 2018; 
Mills & Healey, 2006) have shown that artificially making feedback requests more 
general tends to drive speakers towards the use of more abstract 
conceptualisations, suggesting change in reference choices is at least partially 




Similarly, the effect of feedback on speakers’ reference production has been shown 
to influence the change and evolution of these references. Different studies have 
suggested the absence of feedback in the production of references from individuals, 
compared to pairs of interacting speakers, might explain their maintenance or 
lengthening of referential phrases, in contrast to the reduction in length that is 
common in interactive reference (Krauss & Weinheimer, 1966; Hupet & Chantraine, 
1992). When referring in natural dialogue, feedback from a partner might amount to 
the co-construction of a reference, or to its change to a different conceptualisation, 
as the act of referring is in itself a collaborative process that requires some form of 
acceptance by the addressee to be completed (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986). 
Brennan and Clark (1996) showed how interacting speakers collaborate in the 
construction of a conceptualisation they both agree on even when the roles of 
speaker and addressee (Director and Matcher, in their experimental design) are pre-
defined, with addressees even proposing alternative conceptualisations when the 
speakers’ were not satisfactory. Moreover, Brennan and Clark showed how 
addressees directly influenced the length and level of detail of the speakers’ 
descriptions by using silences or interruptions to mark their understanding or 
misunderstanding of a reference. 
 
Taken together, these results seem to confirm that the use of conventional 
references in pairs of speakers is flexible and opportunistic, with speakers adapting 
to changing contexts by either expanding their previous references or changing 
them altogether, considering both their own processing needs and those of their 
partners (Brennan & Clark, 1996; Van Der Wege, 2009). 
 
 
2.6 Relationship between selection at the dialogue level and language 
change 
 
The subjects known as language evolution and language change can be seen as 
representing different time-frames for a single problem, namely, the dynamic 
process by which a community transforms its communication system through use, 
adapting it to their communicative needs. Due to the dynamic nature of language as 
a phenomenon, the process by which language change is produced, selected for, 
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and propagated in a population can be said to be a permanent feature of the 
system, which is reorganised continuously through use (Haselow, 2018). As with the 
biological evolution of organisms, it might be difficult to identify the moment in which 
a variant becomes established, since its establishment itself can be better 
conceived, in a human life time-scale, as a statistical event that can be measured as 
a change in proportions of use, rather than an absolute fact with a defined timing. 
On a broader scale, however, as with species in biological evolution, it is easier to 
establish the appearance or disappearance of a variant, and therefore to analyse 
the process of linguistic change as such.  
 
However different these two timescales are —the scale of language use, when a 
variant is produced, and the scale of language change, where a variant is said to 
have been selected and incorporated into the language—, their interaction 
constitutes a continuous process, in the sense that linguistic change emerges from 
the accumulation of instances of selection of variants in language production 
(Bybee, 2006; Garrod & Pickering, 2013). Therefore, it makes sense to analyse the 
dynamics of language change in linguistic interaction as a window into the broad 
process of language change. 
 
As the use of a variant activates a cumulative process of priming (for both the 
speaker and the addressee), the repetition of the same variant in a conversation as 
a convention between the interlocutors and the accumulation of instances of use of 
that same variant in a population can be seen as a continuous process, by which a 
signal-meaning pairing that is used conventionally in a conversation is acquired by 
other members of the population through interaction. Malt and Sloman (2004) have 
shown how reference choice in conversation has long-lasting effects. In their study, 
participants who had used one name (out of at least two equally likely alternatives) 
as a reference in interaction maintained the same name in subsequent interactions 
with other speakers. They argue that each instance of name use strengthens the 
association between that name and the object it refers to, and that that 
strengthening is not limited by the end of the dialogue but might extend over multiple 
interactions in (at least) a span of days (see also Markman & Makin, 1998). 
Moreover, each of these naming instances contributes to the overall naming 
preference for that object, as they not only increase the frequency count that the 
speaker maintains for that reference (a form of statistical learning), but also affect 
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the cognitive representation of the reference, as it becomes associated to its 
successful use.  
 
A similar additive effect was observed by Brennan and Clark (1996), who showed 
that the use of referential expressions was tied to the frequency of their past use, as 
expressions who had been used more often (in 4 trials vs 1) were maintained 
significantly more and for longer periods of time in subsequent interaction. This 
effect was independent of which speaker (Director or Matcher) had originally 
proposed the conceptualisation. More strikingly, Gurevich, Johnson, and Goldberg 
(2010) found that speakers remembered and were able to recall sentences after 
only one incidental exposure (while reading 300-word texts, and with no explicit 
instruction to memorise), adding to the argument that each instance of use affects 
representation and subsequent use. In their experiment, participants were more 
likely to describe a scene using the same sentences that they were exposed to (on a 
verbatim criterion), compared to alternative sentences with the exact same meaning, 
even when the testing occurred 6 days after the initial exposure. 
 
Frequency has been also defined by Croft (2013; see also Bybee, 2006) as one of 
the main drivers in the shaping of speakers’ use of grammar. In this sense, a 
speaker’s use of language is at least partly determined by the frequency of words 
and structures in the language she has been exposed to (including her own 
production). In this sense, grammatical change can then be seen as the process by 
which changes in the accumulated frequency speakers are exposed to (due to the 
accumulation of changes that are naturally produced in language use) change the 
speakers’ own production, which in turn contributes to changing the overall 
production frequencies for that language2. However, as Haselow (2018) suggests, 
language is not processed as unstructured input, but as concrete communicative 
experiences, therefore co-occurring regularities and transitional probabilities are 
incorporated as intrinsic properties which define the grammar an individual uses not 
                                               
2 Even though actual change in reference choice –the selection of a variant that is not the one your 
interlocutor produced– is most likely a conscious decision (at least as a reflective process), most 
instances of language change occur below the consciousness threshold. Different studies have 
addressed the accumulation of minor changes in pronunciation or phonetic realisation of words and 
sounds, concluding that frequency is a main driver of change also in this domain. Bybee (2006) has 
showed how the higher frequency of a word will impact its phonetic realisation by leading to the 
shortening or attenuation of the articulatory gestures that form that word, thereby affecting both the way 




as random frequencies, but as a structured set that is continuously re-structured as 
we use it. 
 
To the speaker, linguistic structures look relatively stable, as the community appears 
as a conservative buffer around the most frequently used alternative, shielding the 
user from the influences of individual changes through the appeal to an established 
convention, but in the real-time accumulation of minute changes to the system, 
change is continuously in-the-making (Haselow, 2018). This accumulation builds up 
over time through routinisation, either in local communities (cultural groups, jargons, 
trends, etc.) or gradually throughout the language community, where each new 
alternative that increases its usage might potentially overthrow the previously ‘ruling’ 
convention.  
 
However, conventionalisation is not a direct, mechanistic outcome of a high 
frequency of use. Speakers use language to communicate meanings, and those 
meanings (incorporating, among other features, the intentionality of the utterance, 
the identity of the interlocutors, etc., see Brown-Schmidt et al., 2015) are integrated 
into the dynamic re-organisation of linguistic structure that derives from their 
accumulation. As conventions are created as solutions to frequently encountered 
communicative tasks, what is accumulated is not an abstract count but a meaningful 
measure of using that token to solve a recurrent communication problem.  
 
Experimentally, the relationship between the two timescales –that of language use 
in interaction and that of language change– can be tackled by comparison between 
iterated learning experiments and dialogical interaction experiments. While iterated 
learning recreates the effects of several generations of language users on linguistic 
structure, interactive experiments show how these changes can be observed in the 
course of repeated interaction between the same or different speakers (Winters, 
Kirby, & Smith, 2018). The work of Smith and Wonnacott (2010) and Smith, Fehér 
and Ritt (2014) can be used to compare these two settings, as they used the same 
experimental task in iterated learning transmission chains and interacting pairs, 
respectively. In both experiments, unpredictable variation was eliminated as a 
consequence of use, with similar changes being brought by repeated interaction 
within the same pair of speakers and by vertical transmission along a series of 
individual users, where the output of each speaker is used as input for the next 
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speaker to learn from. Even though the two experiments are not directly 
comparable, their results suggest the effect of interaction amplifies what vertical 
transmission would achieve in a much longer time3.  
 
Similarly, Tamariz and colleagues have compared iterated chains and dialogue in 
two conditions of the same experiment (Tamariz, Roberts, Martínez, & Santiago, 
2018). In their setup, both interacting pairs and individual speakers in iterated chains 
had to use an artificial language to designate either round, cloud-shaped figures, or 
pointy, star-shaped figures. Only in the interacting pairs did the language became 
more iconic, resembling the attributes of the figures that were described. As iconicity 
is thought to increase communicative success (particularly in artificial languages that 
have no past history of use), this move might be seen as the result of interlocutor 
negotiation of new conventions that better fit their communicative needs. 
Considering how frequency shapes linguistic structure, we might assume repetition 
of these type of tasks should strengthen the association between those particular 
solutions to the problem in the speakers’ memory, turning these ‘better’ signs into 
communicative conventions. 
 
When brought to the community-level scenario, this preference for ‘better’, more 
efficient signs would be related to the evaluation of the sign ‘fitness’ as the best tool 
to communicate a meaning in a given context. Tamariz, Ellison, Barr, and Fay 
(2014) modelled real micro-societies data and concluded that the final distribution of 
sign use corresponded to a combination of an egocentric bias (a conservative bias 
to use the same sign the speaker was already using) and a content bias (an 
extrinsic bias related to the functionality of the sign in use), which could drive a 
change from the egocentric sign to a different one. Fay and colleagues (Fay & 
Ellison, 2013; Fay, Garrod, & Roberts, 2008) similarly found that sign selection in 
small groups was subject only to guided variation, causing signs to become simpler. 
Variation in larger groups, however, was subject to both guided variation and a 
content bias, which, on a considerable sized group acting as a selection pool of 
competing variants, caused usage to select the form that best suited the 
communicative needs of the broader population. Considering that in linguistic 
                                               
3 Differences between transmission and interaction might be observable in other features of 
language, such as syntactic structure. Kirby, Tamariz, Cornish, and Smith (2015) found that 
interaction alone was not able to promote increased structure in an artificial language (but 
see Winters et al., 2018, for a different pattern of results). 
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interaction the initial signs used to communicate a meaning can be interpreted more 
easily than in graphical communication, this move towards ‘better’ signs can be 
linked to change in reference choice, where speakers abandon established choices 
in their search for better alternatives that ease the effort of the interaction in context. 
An extension of this idea to the language level is put forward by Lupyan and Dale 
(2010, 2015; see also Perfors & Navarro, 2014) in their Linguistic Niche hypothesis, 
which argues that the selective pressures that operate on language in use produce 
languages that are adapted to their circumstances of use, such that “a particular 
grammar can be viewed as an adaptation to a particular environment” (Lupyan & 
Dale, 2015: 292). 
 
 
2.7 Conventionalisation in non-linguistic communication 
 
While psycholinguistics has looked at the conventionalisation and change of 
references in dialogue, another relevant line of research is the conventionalisation 
and change of non-linguistic signs explored by experimental semiotic studies (see, 
for example Galantucci, 2005; Garrod et al. 2007). In these studies, interaction has 
been linked to the evolution and abstraction of graphical signs, such that signs 
employed later in the interaction would be more abstract/symbolic and show less 
iconic resemblance to their referents than signs used earlier on. These evolved 
signs would be simpler in form, but less transparent to outsiders (Garrod et al., 
2007; Schober & Clark, 1989). Importantly, the start of this evolutionary process was 
not necessarily the first sign used to communicate a given meaning, but rather the 
one which both participants in a pair had converged upon, showing that the process 
is more closely related to a referential reduction process, operating onto a grounded 
signal-meaning pair, than to mechanistic repetition of any arbitrary sign. 
 
Galantucci (2005) showed how, when the use of conventional signs of any kind is 
not permitted, pairs of interacting participants would consider the successful use of 
any signal-meaning pairing as a precedent for communication in the next games, 
thereby creating a pairwise convention out of an otherwise arbitrary signal. 
Galantucci terms this learning by using, and links it with the emergence of linguistic 
conventions in that the successful signals act as precedents for future instances 
where a similar coordination need is faced. However, in his work, the non-changing 
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context and the low number of elements that needed to be remembered provided no 
incentive for evolution or change in the convention (which was generally arbitrary in 
origin, and therefore not necessarily ideal for the task). Impeded from 
communicating in any other way, participants will converge on anything that 
happens to be successful, and will not change it nor perfect it as in Garrod and 
colleagues’ studies. A follow-up study (Galantucci, Rhodes, & Kroos, 2006) revealed 
that, faced with a changing context, participants’ communication systems adapted to 
become more combinatorial, with participants combining elements from different 
signs in order to improve their communication success. 
 
In a recent study, Misyak and colleagues (Misyak, Noguchi, & Chater, 2016) showed 
that, in a communicative context, a convention can be created instantaneously as 
speakers consider the communicative context when interpreting a signal, and will 
extract from the same ‘sign’ a different or opposite meaning, if the context points to 
a different interpretation. In this sense, it could be argued that the convention is not 
the sign-meaning pairing, but the conceptualisation that speakers are attributing to 
the pairing, which could include more than one traditional meaning. The authors 
refer to this process as ‘joint inference’, where speakers would jointly interpret the 
meaning of a communicative signal considering the context, the common ground 
between them, and the signal space their interlocutor had access to (which would 
render a different result than interpreting the signal from an individual point of view, 
even taking precedence into account). 
 
Trying to explain the differential effects of alignment and partner feedback in the 
establishment of graphical conventions, Fay and colleagues (Fay, Walker, 
Swoboda, & Garrod, 2018) tackled both factors separately in their experimental 
design, allowing for an independent evaluation of the contribution of each factor to 
communication success. Their design used a Pictionary task where participants took 
turns communicating a meaning from a given set to their partner by drawing on a 
whiteboard. Participants were either forbidden to use the same signs as their partner 
(thereby preventing sign alignment) or forbidden to give or receive feedback. Their 
results showed that sign alignment was more closely related to communication 
success than feedback, while contingent feedback was key in the abstraction 
process (sign symbolization). Even though this separation does not occur in natural 
dialogue (nor are speakers denied the possibility of aligning with their partners), their 
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results shed a light on the dynamics of conservation and change in the use of 
referential conventions.  
 
Fay et al.’s (2018) results might be interpreted as favouring a more dynamic and 
flexible approach to alignment, that adds speakers’ evaluation of the context and 
requirements of the communicative situation to the traditional mechanistic account. 
Considering alignment is proposed to stem from low-level processes as priming, and 
the fact that it cannot be inhibited in natural communication as it was in this 
experimental setting, we could conclude that a drive for conservatism of linguistic 
choices is central to our communicative success, while adaptation and evolution of 
forms are a consequence of the back-and-forth processes of dialogical interaction. 
In this sense, conservatism would be the default, ‘safe’ choice, while adaptation and 
change would occur if there is a significant amount of dialogical exchanges between 
speakers. 
 
In the following chapters, I will describe a set of experiments that were designed to 
shed light on the interaction between conservatism and adaptation in reference 
choice. These experiments tackle both the influences of the context over the 
referential choices of speakers, and the impact that different participant roles, and 
the history of interaction between them, can have over the prevalence of 







Chapter 3. Interaction promotes the adaptation of referential conventions to 









For people to communicate effectively, they must coordinate their use of language so 
that speakers express their meanings in ways that their addressees can easily 
understand. Imagine describing a rendezvous point in a city for an interlocutor. If 
meeting in central New York, two obvious possibilities suggest themselves –you could 
exploit the salient grid-structure of Manhattan to describe the meeting place (“the 
corner of 55th and 7th”) or alternatively use salient landmarks as reference points (“two 
blocks south of Carnegie Hall”). Some of these expressions may be easier than others 
to produce and understand, as they refer to more salient aspects of the city –for 
instance, describing a location in Edinburgh’s historic Old Town in terms of grid 
locations or even city blocks is unlikely to be a successful strategy, since the 
arrangement of the Old Town streets reflects historical happenstance rather than a 
grid-like organization.  
 
How do speakers choose among alternatives? Considerable previous research has 
emphasized the role of precedents and conventions: Speakers tend to re-use choices 
–in our example, a grid-based versus landmark-based description strategy– that have 
previously been successful, and with repeated re-use these choices become 
established as conventions. But this research does not tell us why a particular choice 
was made in the first place. More critically, this emphasis on conservatism in dialogue 
implicitly assumes a conversational context in which relevant features (e.g., the 
physical context) do not change, and where no new pressures are imposed over the 
                                               
1 This chapter has been submitted as an article to Cognitive Science, with the authors Lucia 
Castillo, Kenny Smith, and Holly Branigan. Lucia Castillo designed the study, ran the 
experiments, and performed the analyses; while Kenny Smith and Holly Branigan acted as 
supervisors throughout the process and edited the manuscript. The appendix to this chapter 
was not included in the article submitted. 
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interaction.  In the real world, however, conversational contexts and speaker goals 
change, so that sometimes a previously successful communicative choice may no 
longer be optimal, undermining rather than supporting coordination. Instead, the need 
to coordinate may push speakers towards change –and these new choices may 
themselves then act as precedents in subsequent interaction.  
 
Successful communication therefore requires a balance between repetition and 
change, the old and the new. But little is known about the mechanisms that determine 
this delicate balancing act. Moreover, the importance of interaction for this process is 
also understudied. Faced with the pressure of a dynamic context, will an individual 
speaker adapt in the same way as a speaker who is interacting directly with a partner? 
In this study, we explore how the context of communication shapes referential 
conventions as they initially emerge, and whether and how these initial conventions 
change through repetition and/or interaction. 
 
 
3.1.1 Alignment and the development of conventions 
 
Many studies have suggested that during interactive dialogue, people solve the 
problem of how to coordinate by re-using their partner’s previous linguistic choices. 
For example, in classic experimental work on coordination in dialogue, experimental 
participants were required to repeatedly describe locations for each other while 
navigating two-dimensional grid-like ‘mazes’ (Garrod & Anderson, 1987; Garrod & 
Doherty, 1994). When faced with the choice of how to describe her position in the 
maze, a speaker might choose to refer to a section in the maze as “the right indicator” 
or as “the one sticking out”, depending on which expression her partner previously 
used to describe this element.  More generally, she might tend to use the same 
underlying scheme to describe different positions in the same way, for example 
choosing to refer to positions in terms of column-row coordinates rather than as salient 
points in a holistic configuration. In such cases, she would align with her partner’s 
precedent with respect to a particular description scheme rather than a particular 
expression (e.g., using “C4” following her partner’s use of “D2”), forming a shared 




Re-using a partner’s previous choice makes sense as a strategy for effective 
communication. The shared experience of the partner’s original successful use of that 
label or scheme is part of the pair’s store of shared knowledge  or common ground 
(Stalnacker, 1978; Clark, 1996). Speakers can appeal to this knowledge when 
subsequently formulating references for their addressee (i.e., engaging in audience 
design; Clark & Carlson, 1981), as it represents a safe option (because both speakers 
agree on its meaning) and it is easily accessible (because it has been recently 
activated in the conversation; Brennan & Clark, 1996; E. V. Clark, 1997). With 
repeated re-use, this reference becomes a local convention between the pair, 
whereby both partners hold a mutual expectation of its subsequent use (Lewis, 
1969/2002). This concordant mutual expectation is also strengthened by higher-order 
expectations between the speakers: Each speaker knows that the other speaker 
expects them to use this convention. The alignment of referential choices between 
interlocutors may also have a basis in an automatic and resource-free priming 
mechanism that leads to interlocutors converging on shared alternatives at different 
linguistic levels (lexical, syntactic, semantic, and situation model; Garrod & Anderson, 
1987; Pickering & Garrod, 2004), which in turn entails a common interpretation of the 
task and facilitates mapping the reused expressions to their referents in the world 
(Shintel & Keysar, 2009).  
 
While these accounts explain how conventions are initially established through 
interaction, they do not address the two questions which are central to this paper: 
what determines the form of the initial convention, and when and why are conventions 
sometimes overturned?  
 
 
3.1.2 Determiners of initial conventions 
 
Alignment might explain how interacting partners develop a conventionalized scheme 
for referring to things on the basis of one speaker’s initial choice and its subsequent 
repetition. But it does not address the question of why the speaker initially chose that 
scheme rather than another.  
 
In the absence of previous linguistic context, the initial selection of a description 
scheme might plausibly be shaped by the non-linguistic context. For example, in 
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spatial tasks (such as describing locations in a city or an experimental maze), the 
perceptual context of the communicative situation might play a role in determining 
which linguistic alternative is preferred. Specifically, salient landmarks or locations 
can act as either starting points or references to locate other objects or trajectories, 
constituting a kind of pre-linguistic common ground between interlocutors (Wilkes-
Gibbs & Clark, 1992). If our speaker assumes that her interlocutor shares her 
evaluation of the salience of specific elements in the maze, she might choose to rely 
on those concrete landmarks to describe her positions (e.g. “the long column on the 
left”, “the one sticking out”). Alternatively, if there are no such landmarks that she can 
rely on, or if the environment provides another salient conceptualization (e.g., of the 
maze as a grid), she might opt for a more abstract approach (e.g. “first column, third 
square down”), depending on her evaluation of the fitness landscape that the 
perceptual context provides for her descriptions. Importantly, this evaluation would 
yield similar results whether the speaker was interacting directly with a listener or 
addressing a future (non-present) interlocutor. 
 
Early in an interaction, we should therefore expect environmental factors (perceptual 
context, speaker identity, etc.) to outweigh historical factors (current or previous 
interactions between the same pair) in determining description scheme choices. 
However, as the interaction progresses, referential expressions that have been 
successfully used as a coordination tool become salient in the eyes of the 
interlocutors, shifting speakers’ evaluation of the task from a pre-linguistic analysis of 
the context to an analysis of their common history regarding that context (Garrod et 
al., 2007; Vogels et al., 2013). Successful references then become precedents that 
speakers can call upon, leading to the development of local conventions. In the same 
way, an individual speaker lacking concurrent feedback from an audience would 
become entrained with their own previous expressions, as the self-monitoring process 
generates priming effects on the speakers’ own production that are equivalent to the 
effects of priming from an interlocutor’s speech (Pickering & Garrod, 2004).  
 
If the communicative situation does not change, the conventions that interlocutors 
develop should therefore be relatively well-adapted to effective communication, 
because the original description which served as the basis for the convention will 
generally fit that situation. These initial conventions can then provide a basis for 
subsequent fine-tuning, which refine or economize initial conventions over the course 
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of repeated use. A well-known example shows how the descriptions of tangram 
figures, repeatedly exchanged by interlocutors over the course of a game, maintain 
their core while dropping other attributes, for example going from “a man who looks 
like he might be pushing something to the right” to “pushing man” (Brennan & Clark, 
1996; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986). Research in graphical communication has 
similarly shown that the signs developed in interaction are usually abstracted and 
refined until an optimal trade-off between ease and economy of production and 
comprehension has been reached (Fay, Ellison, & Garrod, 2014; Fay et al., 2008; 
Garrod et al., 2007), and even when interlocutors maintain the same conceptual 
framework, more efficient ways of interaction can be achieved (Garrod & Doherty, 
1994; Mills, 2014). 
 
 
3.1.3 Alignment and change 
 
The accounts of convention-formation reviewed above imply that, once established, 
interlocutors will not abandon existing precedents in favour of new alternatives: While 
the form of the conventions might be streamlined, the conceptual pacts they reflect 
will be preserved. For example, if two experimental participants come to refer to a 
salient point in a maze as “the right indicator”, they will both expect their interlocutor 
to continue using this convention (Brennan & Clark, 1996; Clark, 1997), assuming the 
communicative situation remains constant.   
 
But communicative situations frequently do change: New referents may come into 
play, the perceptual context may alter, or the task itself may impose new demands. 
As the conversational situation changes, established conventions may no longer be 
appropriate, and successful coordination might require speakers to adapt their 
referential behaviour dynamically to better fit the new situation. Speakers can and 
quite frequently change the way that they refer to referents in natural conversation 
(Healey, 2008). Nevertheless, such changes come at a cost: Even though previous 
research on conventions suggests that a pairwise convention should not be as strong 
as a community convention, and so might be defeasible (as the lack of other 
individuals privy to the convention eliminates an external pressure for conformity; 
Garrod & Doherty, 1994; Lewis, 1969/2002), all experimental evidence points to a 
cost associated with abandoning a precedent (Brennan & Clark, 1996; Kronmüller & 
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Barr, 2015; Metzing & Brennan, 2003). In such situations, then, the pressure for 
change conflicts with a pressure to maintain established precedents.  
 
However, experimental evidence has shown that interlocutors are able to dynamically 
adapt to changing circumstances, taking into account both the context and their 
shared history of interaction. For example, interlocutors use more informative, 
disambiguating terms as more similar (and therefore confusable) referents are added 
to the context (Brennan & Clark, 1996; Van Der Wege, 2009), and can even change 
the meaning of a conventionalized sign altogether if the information that might be 
extracted from the context allows for different interpretations of the same sign (Misyak 
et al., 2016).  
 
Perhaps surprisingly, individuals faced with similar tasks do not seem as flexible as 
interacting pairs. In both classic figure description studies (Krauss & Weinheimer, 
1966) and in graphical communication games (Garrod et al., 2007), individual 
participants did not reduce the length or complexity of their descriptions over time. 
Similarly, Van Der Wege (2009) found that speakers producing references to 
imagined addressees were more likely to overspecify their descriptions than speakers 
producing references for co-present addressees, and also less likely to adapt their 
descriptions to the communicative situation. How then would an isolated individual, 
producing references for a future (imagined) addressee, differ from interacting pairs 
in dealing with the pressures for maintaining or breaking a precedent? One possibility 
is that the absence of a co-present interlocutor would relieve the pressure for 
coordination and therefore free individual speakers of the commitment to a precedent, 
allowing them to switch easily to better alternatives on a moment-to-moment basis. If 
this were the case, then individual speakers should adapt more rapidly than 
interacting pairs to pressures from the context. On the other hand, if adaptability is 
related to a dynamical evaluation of the fit between the favoured reference and the 
task, then the feedback that pairs provide to each other should play a more substantial 








3.1.4 The current study 
 
We have argued above that successful collaborative interaction entails a dynamic 
evaluation that links the speakers’ linguistic choices to the demands of the joint action 
being performed, and to the choices of their co-speaker (Fusaroli & Tylén, 2012). 
Importantly, these factors may sometimes exert conflicting pressures: A perceptually 
salient choice might not be communicatively efficient, and repeating a partner’s 
linguistic choice does not ensure optimal adaptation to the task. Thus, the emergence, 
establishment, and evolution of linguistic conventions are likely to be the product of 
multiple competing pressures. 
  
We now report an experimental study that addressed these issues. Specifically, we 
sought to test the influence of non-linguistic context on speakers’ linguistic choices, 
and the effect of interaction over these choices. Additionally, we sought to explore the 
relationship between communicative alignment2 and adaptation to the task. We used 
a maze game (Garrod & Anderson, 1987; Garrod & Doherty, 1994) to provide a simple 
and controlled context, in which Individuals and Pairs of participants had to solve a 
recurrent coordination task. The task required participants to communicate the 
positions of tangram figures, distributed quasi-randomly in a ‘maze’ (a series of 
connected squares), to their partners (co-present in the Pairs condition, and an 
imagined future participant in the Individuals condition) and –in the Pairs condition– 










                                               
2 By ‘alignment’ we mean here the semantic convergence that participants in the maze game 
can achieve through the reuse of the same description scheme as their partner previously 
used. As nearly all possible descriptions in the maze game belong to one out of four different 
description schemes, alignment will be coded as the reuse (or not) of the same description 




















Fig. 3.1 Mazes for Player A (upper left) and B (upper right) in a round of the game, as it 
appeared to players – players also saw a window featuring the chat tool interface which they 
could use to communicate with their partner (lower left and right). The player’s own position in 
the maze is indicated by the dot, and there are 6 tangram figures randomly positioned within 
the maze – note that the two players have the same tangrams, but in different positions. This 
maze has a high regularity score of 0.821; see Figure 3.2 for irregular mazes.  
 
 
Participants communicated via an online chat tool, and each participant completed 3 
rounds of the game. The maze layout and the tangram figures were held constant 
across all 3 rounds (thereby repeating the same cues in terms of context and items to 
be described), but the positions of the tangrams were different at each round (thus 
forcing participants to describe a changing set of positions in the maze at each round). 
We manipulated the regularity of the maze layout between participants: Half of the 
participants played on mazes with a regular grid-like configuration, and the other half 
played on mazes with an irregular configuration featuring salient sub-components. 
  
The experimental setup therefore presented participants with a recurrent coordination 
problem: Even though the mazes were structurally the same from round to round, the 
tangrams’ changing positions meant that participants had to describe different 
positions on each turn. Hence although they could re-use tangram references and an 
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overall conceptualization of the maze, they could not re-use specific position 
descriptions. By presenting participants with this recurrent problem, we aimed to push 
them towards establishing a consistent description system in order to facilitate 
processing position information, though participants were not explicitly told to do so. 
Participants in the Individual condition had to sequentially describe tangram positions 
for a future participant, and hence received no feedback or input in this process; in 
contrast, participants in the Pairs condition had to take turns describing and confirming 
with each other the position of each figure in their respective mazes. 
 
Additionally, our manipulation of maze regularity provided spatial contexts that we 
expected to promote different solutions to this problem. Regular mazes were 
especially compatible with conceptualizations that emphasized the use of an abstract 
and invariant element in interpreting positions, namely an imaginary 7x7 grid 
(Anderson & Garrod, 1987; Healey, 1997). Schemes based on these abstract 
conceptualizations should be easily generalized to new situations (e.g., new positions 
within the same maze, or indeed new mazes). In contrast, we expected Irregular 
mazes to promote the use of conceptualizations that emphasized specific features of 
the maze or trajectories between salient positions, thus generating schemas that are 
dependent on the particular disposition of the maze being described and therefore 
more difficult to generalize (Healey, 1997). 
 
With this set-up, we sought to understand, first, what determines people’s initial 
linguistic choices, and what role does perceptual context play? If people’s initial 
references are influenced by properties of the physical context, then we might expect 
that Regular mazes, with their visual cues to a consistent underlying structure, would 
prompt participants to use abstract, systematic descriptions, whereas Irregular 
mazes, with their visual cues to salient distinct components, would prompt participants 
to use concrete, figural descriptions (Anderson & Garrod, 1987; Garrod & Anderson, 
1987; Garrod & Doherty, 1994). If layout regularity does influence the initial use of 
Abstract versus Concrete descriptions, this would show that non-linguistic (in this 
case, spatial/perceptual) context plays an important role in determining how people 
initially conceptualize, and hence decide how to refer to, the world. 
 
Second, how does interaction affect participants’ adaptation to context? If a repeated 
need for coordination promotes the use of more efficient descriptions, then we would 
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expect that interacting Pairs of speakers would increasingly come to use descriptions 
that could be generalized across situations, in other words, they would show an 
increasing tendency to use Abstract descriptions, even though this might mean 
abandoning an established precedent; and that they would be faster and require fewer 
turns to complete the task if they did so. This move towards Abstract descriptions 
should be particularly marked in speakers playing on Irregular mazes, who might 
initially use Concrete descriptions (influenced by the maze layout) but then –under 
the pressure to repeatedly coordinate– should transition to using Abstract 
descriptions. In contrast, Individual participants working alone, who repeatedly 
described positions but did not have to coordinate with a partner, should be less likely 
to change their description strategy. This conservative behaviour of Individual 
speakers would be expected both under a priming-based model of referential choices, 
as self-monitoring implies speakers prime themselves through monitoring of their own 
speech, and under an audience design model, as maintaining the same description 
scheme would be a good strategy to ensure comprehension by a future interlocutor 
in the absence of in-the-moment feedback (Pickering & Garrod, 2004; Clark & 
Carlson, 1981; Horton & Gerrig, 2002). 
 
Finally, and more speculatively, how does linguistic alignment interact with other 
aspects of communication? Specifically, we explore whether alignment in one aspect 
of a conversation (exchanging descriptions of positions) would be affected by 
convergence in a different aspect (jointly constructing a figure’s descriptive 
reference). Thus we tested whether successful referential contraction, where 
speakers maintain the core of their description but simplify additional details, would 
be associated with higher alignment levels in the description schemes of Pairs. 
Including repeated reference to tangrams also acted as a check of our interaction 
manipulation, by allowing us to compare the canonical tangram effect in Pairs versus 
Individual participants. Following previous research (Branigan et al., 2011), we 
anticipated that Pairs of speakers would shorten references to tangrams over 













128 participants, comprising 32 Pairs of participants (52 females, 12 males; mean age 
21.5 years) and 64 Individuals (50 females, 14 males; mean age 22.3 years), all 
University of Edinburgh students, took part in the experiment for payment. All 
participants were native English speakers. Participants read and signed an informed 
consent form before taking part in the experiment. 16 Pairs and 32 Individuals were 





We generated four mazes with a maximum size of 7 vertical squares and 7 horizontal 
squares each (Fig. 3.2). Two mazes were Regular (high regularity score) and two 
mazes were Irregular (low regularity score). Maze regularity was measured using the 
following algorithm: For each square in a maze we calculated the proportion of 
occupied neighbouring squares, considering all 8 (6 for edge squares) surrounding 
squares (i.e. a square surrounded by occupied squares would obtain a score of 1, a 
square with only a single neighbour would obtain a score of 0.125), and then took the 
mean over all squares in the maze to produce a maze regularity score. With this 
method, mazes that are highly clustered and leave few spaces between squares 
obtain high regularity scores, while mazes where squares are distributed more loosely 
throughout the 7x7 space, leaving empty squares in between, obtain lower regularity 
scores.  To ensure our manipulation was linked to regularity differences and not to 
other properties of the mazes (such as filled vs empty space), Regular and Irregular 
mazes had the same number of squares (± 1). Controlling the number of squares in 
the maze in this way ensures that any differences in description schemes between 
Regular versus Irregular mazes cannot be attributed to difficulty/cognitive load (cf. 
Anderson & Garrod, 1987, where a ‘regular’ maze comprising a full 6x6 grid totalling 
36 squares was compared with an ‘irregular’ maze comprising 24 squares distributed 
over the same 6x6 grid). Each Individual or Pair was assigned to one of the four 





Fig. 3.2 Regular (top) and Irregular (bottom) mazes. Regular mazes have regularity scores of 
0.864 and 0.821, while Irregular mazes scores are 0.672 and 0.668 (e.g. a regularity score of 
0.864 indicates that on average, 86.4% of the neighbours of a square in that maze are 
occupied, i.e. roughly 7 out of 8). As the figure shows, Irregular mazes contain more spaces 
between occupied squares, which leads to multiple salient configurational features 
(protrusions, indentations and clusters).  
 
  
We also selected 6 tangrams which were to be the target of description in all 
conditions. These tangrams were chosen from a set of 30 tangrams that was pre-
tested to evaluate the dispersion of their emergent descriptions. Using an online 
survey, we asked 30 participants (all University of Edinburgh Psychology 
undergraduates, who took part in exchange for course credit) to describe each figure. 
Tangrams that elicited the use of the same concept in more than 75% of descriptions 
were discarded, as this implied they would be too easily identified during interaction 
in the main experiment. The final set (Fig. 3.3) was chosen among the figures that 
were described as “dancing” by at least 20% of participants, which ensured that the 
tangrams in the set had common features, but that were described using other 






Fig. 3.3 Tangram set 
 
In both conditions participants provided descriptions using a text-based chat tool 
(based on the DiET chattool software, Healey & Mills, submitted) which was 
configured to show one turn of dialogue at a time. This restriction was intended to 
roughly simulate the fading property of spoken dialogue, and to ensure participants 
would maintain a continuous interaction, instead of delivering all their information in 
one turn. Each participants’ chat window displayed information about the typing status 
of the other participant (if present), remaining round time, and text of the current 
dialogue turn. Turns did not fade until the next turn by any participant was submitted. 
 
The experiment code presented the mazes and tangrams and recorded participants’ 





We used a 2 x 2 x 3 mixed design with the factors Interaction (Individuals vs. Pairs; 
between-participants); maze Layout (Regular vs. Irregular; between-participants); and 





Participants came to the lab in pairs; we ensured that members of a pair did not know 
each other in advance. They were randomly assigned to an Interaction condition and 
maze Layout (Individual vs. Pairs, Regular vs. Irregular maze). They were given 
verbal and written instructions together, then seated in individual sound-proofed 
booths equipped with a network computer. In the Individual condition, participants 
were told that they would be providing written descriptions for a future participant to 
follow, and that they should aim to make each figure and its position individually 
identifiable. In the Pairs condition, participants were told they could communicate 
freely through the online chat tool, that they would exchange descriptions of the 
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figures and their positions, and that they should aim to make the figure and its position 
identifiable to their partner.  
 
Individuals and Pairs of participants played three rounds on the same Regular or 
Irregular maze; they were informed that both members of a Pair would have identical- 
looking mazes. The mazes contained 6 tangram figures in quasi-random positions; in 
the Pairs condition, the position of the tangrams differed for each partner, but 
participants could only see their own figures and placement icon (red dot, see Fig. 
3.1), and had no other clues about the position of the figures and icon in their partner’s 
maze. The same tangram figures appeared in each round, but in different positions. 
All participants had the same starting point in each round, where their placement icon 
was positioned. Each participant’s screen displayed the current maze to be solved, 
and a chat window showing the last turn of text submitted by any participant and the 
remaining round time. In the Pairs condition, the chat window additionally displayed a 
server message that appeared when the other member of the dyad was typing 
(“Participant X is typing”). 
 
In each round, participants worked through the set of 6 tangrams in any order they 
chose. For each tangram, participants had to describe its position so that a future 
player (Individuals condition) or their current partner (Pairs condition) could move their 
icon to that position in the maze (by moving through the paths connecting the 
squares). In the Individual condition, participants chose a tangram and described its 
shape and position; they then moved to that position and pressed a key, at which 
point the selected tangram disappeared from the maze, and they then repeated this 
procedure until they had cleared all tangrams from the maze. In the Pairs condition, 
participants agreed on which tangram to choose and exchanged descriptions of its 
location in their respective mazes, such that each player could move to the position 
where the other player’s tangram was located. After placing their icons in these 
complementary positions, both participants pressed a key to ratify their choice, at 
which point the selected tangram disappeared from the maze, and they moved on to 
describe and select a new tangram. If the icon was placed in a wrong location (that 
is, not where the partner’s corresponding tangram would have been located), the 
tangram figures did not disappear, but no other feedback was given to participants. A 
round was finished when the participants managed to make all their tangrams 
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disappear, or when the allocated time of 25 minutes was up (6 Pairs ran out of time 
in the first round, and 1 Pair in the second round; no Individuals).  
 
 
3.2.5 Coding of transcripts 
 
Participants’ utterances were initially coded into three categories: tangram 
description, position reference, or other (greetings, jokes, etc.). The coding of the 
description schemes used for position references is based on a simplification of the 
original four description schemes defined by Garrod and colleagues (Garrod & 
Anderson, 1987; Garrod & Doherty, 1994): Figurative (references based on salient 
points or elements, e.g., “The sticking-up bit on the right”), Path (references based on 
a trajectory between a salient point or element and a goal, e.g., “Two down and one 
left from the sticking-up bit”), Line (references based on vertical or horizontal elements 
in the maze, e.g., “The second horizontal row, all the way to the right”), and Coordinate 
(references established as the intersection of a vertical and a horizontal element, e.g., 
“2nd column, 4th row”) . All the descriptions that participants produced were variants of 
these four alternatives, sharing their main conceptualizations.  
 
For modelling purposes, each description by a participant was coded as either 
Concrete or Abstract. Figural and Path descriptions were classified as Concrete 
(‘Type 1 sub-language’ in the terminology of Healey, 2008), as they require each 
position to be described in relation to a specific element in the maze, and are therefore 
dependent on the actual configuration of the maze. Line and Coordinate descriptions 
were classified as Abstract (‘Type 2 sub-language’ in Healey, 2008), as they rely on 
an abstract grid-like pattern which is independent from the actual configuration of the 
maze, and could therefore be applied to any maze without change. All position 
descriptions were coded, totalling 1634 descriptions from 32 Pairs, and 1035 
descriptions from 64 Individual participants. Descriptions that were ‘incomplete’, that 
is, not containing enough data to single out a specific maze square, were coded 
considering the conceptualisation they depended upon to obtain full meaning (e.g. “on 
the same column” would be coded as Abstract, while “the second one after that” would 




Each position description was coded for alignment, i.e. whether it used the same 
description scheme (Figurative, Path, Line or Coordinate) as the preceding 
description produced by the other participant, in the Pairs condition, or by the same 
participant, in the Individual condition (i.e. a Figural description followed by another 
Figural description would be counted as alignment, but a Figural description followed 
by a Path description would not); we used this finer-grained set of contrasts to obtain 
a more detailed appreciation of convergence over time. For Pairs, if the same speaker 
made more than one consecutive position reference, the comparison was 
nonetheless performed against the partner’s previous reference (i.e., we did not 
consider self-alignment in Pairs). For Individual participants, alignment was measured 
as reuse of their own previous description scheme. 
 
Timestamps were recorded automatically by the software. Time per round was 
measured from the onset of the first typing activity by any participant, to the 
submission of the last utterance in that round. Rounds were ended when participants 
registered a correct selection for their final tangram, or when the allocated limit of 25 
minutes was reached. 
 
Length of tangram descriptions (total number of words per description) was measured 
by Pair, since it was unlikely that a participant would describe a tangram that had 
already been described by their partner in the same round (for the same reason, we 
could not analyse alignment in tangram descriptions). However, since descriptions 
were frequently co-constructed by both participants in a Pair (particularly in the first 
rounds), all descriptions related to the same tangram in a given round were registered 
as one, no matter if they came from one participant or both. An example of a co-







Box 3.1 Example of co-constructed tangram description by two participants, A and B. All words 
in bold are counted as one description. 
 
 
A: I have one where the character has both hands facing to the right 
A: and kinda is skipping a bit 
B: i think i have one like that, looks a bit like it's lunging 




3.2.6 Differences between written and oral referential communication 
 
Text chat is a common medium of communication in most of the industrialised world. 
Millions of people interact through written chat daily, either through a computer or a 
smartphone. For university students (our experimental cohort), this is a medium they 
are highly familiar with, and which they use regularly, especially for informal/social 
interactions. However, this does not rule out the possibility that there are differences 
in the way references are built or maintained in written dialogue, compared to a more 
natural face to face interaction.  
 
Text chat has been described as interactionally incoherent (Herring, 1999), as the 
interactions between speakers are usually fragmented, agrammatical, and 
interactionally disjointed. However, our experimental task promotes a type of goal-
directed dialogue where participants need to take turns in order to fulfil the task, 
creating a framework in which the structure of the dialogical exchange is partly 
determined by the nature of the task. Particularly, the issue of feedback, which might 
substantially influence speakers’ referential choices in oral dialogue, is constrained 
by the written medium in two ways: On one hand, most written communication 
formats, including the software used in this experiment, only deliver to the addressee 
any full turns submitted by the speaker, unlike the real-time flow of speech that 
characterises oral communication. In this sense, there is no opportunity for the 
addressee to influence the speaker’s choices before these choices are expressed in 
a full turn. On the other hand, written chat neutralises almost any form of extra-
linguistic information that the speakers could employ or interpret as feedback, as even 
delays in responding (which could be considered as equivalent to silences in oral 
communication) cannot be clearly interpreted communicatively. Taken together, these 
issues point to a more controlled exchange that might be less pervious to partner 
influences than oral dialogue. 
 
Even though these differences might subtly affect the speakers’ experience in the 
exchange, the software we have used in this experiment, the DiET chat-tool, has been 
used extensively in written versions of known experimental tasks, and all results to 
date can be considered equivalent to their spoken-version counterparts. According to 
Healey and Mills (submitted), results from different tasks such as the tangram task 
(Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986) and the maze task (Garrod & Doherty, 1994) show that 
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DiET chat samples have local and global patterns that are comparable to those 





We present our results in four sub-sections. We first consider how our main 
experimental manipulation (Regular vs Irregular maze layouts) influenced 
participants’ use of Abstract vs. Concrete descriptions. We then investigate the 
relationship between their use of Abstract vs. Concrete descriptions and their time 
taken to complete the task. We next examine how participants’ use of descriptions 
was influenced by their partner’s previous behaviour (i.e., whether they aligned on the 
same description scheme their partner had used before). Finally, we examine how 
participants’ tangram descriptions were affected by interaction and repetition.    
 
 
3.3.1 Choice of description schemes 
 
Our experiment presented Pairs and Individual participants with 3 rounds of mazes in 
either a Regular or an Irregular maze layout. Figure 4 shows the proportion of use of 
Abstract versus Concrete descriptions in the three rounds of the game for Pairs and 
Individual participants in Regular and Irregular mazes. 
 
We used a logistic multilevel model (lme4 package in R, Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & 
Walker, 2015) to evaluate the effect of our layout manipulation on the use of Abstract 
or Concrete description schemes. We included Interaction condition (Pairs vs 
Individuals), Layout regularity and Round number as fixed effects, plus their 
interaction. The random structure was the maximal structure justified by our design 
(following Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013), including random intercepts for 
Pair/Individual and for Participant nested in Pair3 (to account for the initial variation 
between pairs and between subjects), and random slopes for Pair/Individual over 
Round number (to account for the differential effect of round number over the different 
Pairs or Individual participants). P-values were obtained through likelihood ratio tests 
                                               
3 Individual participants were assigned a unique ‘Pair’ number, to allow for the fit of the same 
model over Pairs and Individual participants. 
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for each parameter against a model without that parameter, using the function mixed 




Fig. 3.4 Proportions of positional descriptions which used Concrete (light shaded) vs. Abstract 
(dark shaded) description schemes, over three rounds of interaction, in the Pairs (left panels) 
and Individuals (right panels) conditions, for Regular mazes (upper panels) and Irregular 
mazes (lower panels). 
 
There was a significant main effect of Interaction condition (Pairs vs 
Individuals) on the use of Abstract vs. Concrete descriptions (χ²=14.00, p<0.01): 
Participants in Pairs were more likely to use Abstract description schemes than 
Individual participants. Critically, there was a significant effect of Layout (χ²=10.86, 
p=0.001): Participants tended to use significantly more Abstract descriptions in 
Regular layouts than Irregular layouts. Round number also had a significant effect on 
the use of Abstract descriptions (χ²=7.14, p=0.008), with participants using more 
Abstract descriptions as they played more rounds. Moreover, we found a significant 
interaction between Interaction condition (Pairs vs Individuals) and Round number 
(χ²=8.87, p=0.003): Participants in the Pairs condition were significantly more likely to 
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use Abstract descriptions as they played more rounds, compared to the Individual 
condition. No other interactions were significant. 
 
Table 3.1 Results of model of description scheme use 
Predictor Log-odds Betas SE X² and p values 
Intercept  -0.2575 0.6904 - 
Interaction condition 4.7828 1.6181 14.00, p=0.0002*** 
Layout    4.4647 1.5353 10.86, p=0.0010** 
Round number      0.8925 0.2581 7.14, p=0.008** 
Interaction condition * Layout 0.4912 2.6813 0.03, p=0.86 
Interaction condition * Round 
number 
1.9346 0.8422 8.87, p=0.003** 
Layout * Round number 0.7604 0.7237 1.62, p=0.20 
Interaction condition * Layout * 
Round number 
0.4779 1.0304 0.21, p=0.65 
Log-odds betas, Standard Error, Chi-squared and P-values from Generalized Mixed Model 
fitted using mixed function from the afex package. Intercept represents grand mean at Round 
1. Model is fitted with deviation-coded variables Interaction condition (Individuals-Pairs) and 
Layout (Irregular-Regular). Round is coded as a numeric predictor, therefore model shows a 
linear effect of increasing 1 round.  
 
 
3.3.2 The effect of maze layout and description scheme on time taken to 
complete the task 
 
Time analyses were conducted separately on Pairs and Individuals, due to the 
different time demands of the task for the two conditions (exchanging descriptions in 
Pairs, producing descriptions individually in Individuals). 
 
For the Pairs condition, we ran a linear model to predict the overall time taken to 
complete the task (i.e. all 3 rounds) from the Layout participants were assigned to and 
their Use of abstract descriptions (using the mean proportion of Abstract descriptions 
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produced by each Pair as a numeric value4), plus their interaction. To avoid a high 
correlation between the main predictor and the interaction term, Use of abstract 
descriptions was centred on its mean. Layout was deviation-coded.  
 
In the Pairs condition, there was no main effect of Layout (F(1,28)=2.3217, p=0.138).  
There was however a significant main effect of Use of abstract descriptions 
(F(1,28)=12.946, p=0.001), with participants who used more Abstract descriptions 
being faster overall. Moreover, there was a significant interaction between Layout and 
Use of abstract descriptions (F(1,28)=4.3293, p=0.046), suggesting that participants 
who used more Abstract descriptions in Regular layouts were significantly faster than 
participants who used more Abstract descriptions in Irregular layouts.  
 
To test the possibility that time taken to complete the task was affected by alignment, 
we ran a further model that predicted total time per Pair (3 rounds) from Use of 
abstract descriptions, Alignment rate per Pair, and their interaction. There was no 
main effect of Alignment rate on the time taken to complete the task, F(1,28)= 0.0666, 
p=0.7982. 
 
Table 3.2 Results of model of time taken to complete task, Pairs condition  
Predictor Betas SE F and p values 
Intercept  35.63 104918 - 
Layout 5.32 209835 (1,28) 2.3217, p=0.138 
Use of abstract descriptions  -22.54 375874 (1,28) 12.946, p=0.001 *** 
Layout * Use of abstract descriptions      -26.06 751748 (1,28) 4.3293, p=0.046 * 
Betas and Standard Error (from linear model lm in the lme4 package), and Chi-squared and 
P-values (from likelihood-ratio tests using anova function). Time estimates are shown in 
minutes. Model is fitted with deviation-coded variable Layout (Irregular-Regular). Use of 
Abstract Descriptions is mean-centred. 
 
In the Individual condition, there were no significant main effects of Layout 
(F(1,51)=2.0428, p=0.159) or Use of abstract descriptions (F(1,51)=0.02, p=0.888), 
                                               
4 Concrete descriptions were coded as 0 and abstract descriptions as 1. The numeric value 
used in this model is the mean value of the Abstract column per Pair/Individual, which goes 
from 0 to 1, reflecting the use of more Concrete descriptions (values closer to 0) or more 
Abstract descriptions (values closer to 1).  
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nor was there a significant interaction between Layout and Use of abstract 
descriptions (F(1,51)=0.1147, p=0.736).  
 
Table 3.3 Results of model of time taken to complete task, Individual condition 
Predictor Betas SE F and p values 
Intercept  25.69 73877 - 
Layout -3.51 147754 (1,51) 2.0428, p=0.159 
Use of abstract descriptions  -0.39 166783 (1,51) 0.02, p=0.888 
Layout * Use of abstract descriptions      -1.88 333566 (1,51) 0.1147, p=0.736 
Betas and Standard Error (from linear model lm in the lme4 package), and Chi-squared and 
P-values (from likelihood-ratio tests using anova function). Time estimates are shown in 
minutes. Model is fitted with deviation-coded variable Layout (Irregular-Regular). Use of 





Fig. 3.5 Time taken to complete the experiment (i.e., 3 rounds) for Pairs (left panel) and 
Individuals (right panel), as a function of the proportion of Abstract and Concrete descriptions 
they produced (x axis goes from absolute use of Concrete descriptions on the left, to absolute 
use of Abstract descriptions on the right, for each panel). Each point represents an Individual 
or Pair, and points are coloured according to the maze Layout they played on (Regular: dark 
shaded, Irregular: light shaded).  
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3.3.3 Alignment of description schemes 
 
We ran a binary logistic mixed-effects model predicting alignment on position 
description schemes (i.e., whether participants used the same description scheme as 
used in their partner’s previous description, in the Pairs condition; or their own 
previous description, in the Individual condition) based on Interaction condition, 
Layout, Round number, and their interaction; we used the same random effect 
structure and coding scheme as reported in section 3.3.1.  
 
We found a main effect of Interaction condition (X²=6.87, p=0.009): Individual 
participants were more highly aligned than participants in Pairs (though recall that 
Individual participants were self-aligning, whereas Pairs were aligning with their 
interlocutor); and a main effect of Round number (X²=22.34, p<0.001): Alignment 
scores increased significantly with each round played. No interactions were significant 
(see table 3.4).  
 
An additional analysis of the data for each Condition separately revealed a differential 
response by Pairs and Individuals. Whereas Individuals showed only a significant 
main effect of Round number (X²=15.12, p<0.001), Pairs showed both a main effect 
of Round (X²=9.29, p=0.002) and a (marginal) interaction between Layout and Round 
(X²=3.87, p=0.05), with Pairs in Regular layouts showing a greater increase in 
alignment as they played more rounds, compared to Pairs in Irregular layouts. 
Although this effect was not strong enough to appear in the full model, it reflects the 
difference in the alignment trajectory of Pairs according to their initial conventions: 
Pairs in Regular layouts maintained their initial conventions, consistently increasing 
their alignment levels as they played more rounds, but Pairs in Irregular layouts 
abandoned their initial descriptions, temporarily misaligning as a consequence (see 





Fig. 3.6 Proportions of non-aligned (light shaded) and aligned descriptions (dark shaded) over 
three rounds of interaction, in the Pairs (left panels) and Individuals (right panels) conditions, 




















Table 3.4 Results of model of aligned descriptions 
Predictor Log-odds Betas SE X² and p values 
Intercept  2.3392 0.2590 - 
Interaction condition -1.1605 0.4568 6.87, p=0.009** 
Layout    0.3055 0.4435 0.47, p=0.49 
Round number      1.2883 0.3534 22.34, p<0.0001*** 
Interaction condition * Layout 0.4678 0.8860 0.28, p=0.60 
Interaction condition * Round 
number 
-0.3060 0.4211 0.57, p=0.45 
Layout * Round number 0.4985 0.3994 1.62, p=0.20 
Interaction condition * Layout * 
Round number 
1.2866 0.7883 2.62, p=0.11 
Log-odds betas, Standard Error, Chi-squared and P-values from Generalized Mixed Model 
fitted using mixed function from the afex package. Intercept represents grand mean at Round 
1. Model is fitted with deviation-coded variables Interaction condition (Individuals-Pairs) and 
Layout (Irregular-Regular). Round is coded as a numeric predictor, therefore model shows a 
linear effect of increasing 1 round.  
 
 
3.3.4 Tangram description length  
 
Figure 7 shows the average tangram description length per round, measured in 
number of words per description; within each round we plot the description length of 
the 1st to 5th tangram described; the 6th tangram was typically not described, since it 
was by that point the only remaining tangram. 
 
We ran a linear mixed-effects model to predict the (log-transformed) number of words 
used per tangram description per Pair5 or Individual participant, with Interaction 
                                               
5 Because participants either built a joint description of each tangram (more likely in the first 
rounds than later rounds), or simply agreed with/accepted their partner’s description, number 
of words per tangram is measured per Pair. 
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condition, Round number, Layout regularity, Tangram number (1 to 56) and their 
interactions as fixed effect predictors. We included a random intercept for 
Pair/Individual and a random slope for Pair/Individual over Round number (the 
inclusion of a random slope for tangram number resulted in failure to converge). P-
values were obtained from the mixed function in the afex package. 
 
We found a significant main effect of Round number (F(1,243)=144.62, p<0.001), with 
participants using fewer words to describe tangrams with each new round played; and 
a significant main effect of Tangram number (F(1,781)=6.10, p=0.01), with 
participants using fewer words to describe each additional tangram within each round. 
There were no main effects of Interaction condition or Layout. Importantly, we found 
a significant interaction between Interaction condition and Round number 
(F(1,243)=168.82, p<0.001): With each new round played, Pairs’ descriptions 
shortened while Individuals’ did not. The interaction between Interaction condition and 
Tangram number was also significant (F(1,781)=25.35, p<0.001) : Descriptions of 
each new tangram in round 1 were shorter in the Pairs condition, but not in the 
Individual condition. Notice however that there was also a 3-way interaction between 
Interaction condition, Round number, and Tangram number (F(1,778)=31.82, 
p<0.001): Pairs’ descriptions were shorter for each new tangram on round 1, but this 
effect did not appear in later rounds. 
 
There was also a significant interaction between Round number and Tangram number 
(F(1,778)=13.55, p<0.001): tangram number had a larger effect at round 1 than at 
later rounds, since descriptions shortened during round 1 but were relatively flat within 
subsequent rounds; and between Interaction condition and Layout (F(1,93)=6.01, 
p=0.02): Pairs in Regular layouts produced longer descriptions than Pairs in Irregular 
layouts in round 1, tangram 1, compared to Individuals. As this effect disappeared 
after a few descriptions, it suggests the additional linguistic coordination needed to 
establish an abstract description system initially affected participants’ verbosity.  
 
                                               
6 Participants decided arbitrarily the order of the tangrams they described; there was no pre-






Fig. 3.7 Mean number of words per tangram description per round, in Pairs (upper panels) 




















Table 3.5 Results of model of tangram description length 
Predictor Betas SE F and p values 
Intercept  2.888795 0.0810 - 
Interaction condition 0.039335 0.1621 (1,93) 0.06, p=0.81 
Layout -0.067410 0.1621 (1,93) 0.17, p=0.68 
Round number -0.488446 0.0406 (1,243) 144.62, p<0.001*** 
Tangram number -0.048489 0.0196 (1,781) 6.10, p=0.01** 
Interaction condition * Round 
number 
-1.055468 0.0812 (1,243) 168.82, p<0.001*** 
Interaction condition * Tangram 
number 
-0.197663 0.0392 (1,781) 25.35, p<0.001*** 
Round number * Tangram 
number 
0.055621 0.0151 (1,778) 13.55, p<0.001*** 
Interaction condition * Layout 0.795354 0.3243 (1,93) 6.01, p=0.02* 
Layout * Round number 0.016914 0.0812 (1,243) 0.04, p=0.84 
Layout * Tangram number -0.014376 0.0392 (1,781) 0.13, p=0.71 
Interaction condition * Layout * 
Round number 
-0.036401 0.1624 (1,243) 0.05, p=0.82 
Interaction condition * Layout * 
Tangram number 
-0.076559 0.0784 (1,781) 0.95, p=0.33 
Interaction condition * Round 
number * Tangram number 
0.170473 0.0302 (1,778) 31.82, p<0.001*** 
Layout * Round number * 
Tangram number 
-0.003211 0.0302 (1,778) 0.01, p=0.92 
Interaction condition * Layout * 
Round number * Tangram 
number 
-0.014080 0.0604 (1,778) 0.05, p=0.82 
Betas, Standard Error, F-statistics and P-values (from mixed function in the afex package). 
Descriptions are considered to be co-constructed by both members of a Pair, therefore each 
data point is derived from a Pair (in Pairs condition) or Individual (in the Individual condition). 
Intercept represents grand mean at Round 1 and first tangram. Model is fitted with deviation-
coded variables Interaction condition (Individuals-Pairs) and Layout (Irregular-Regular). 
Round and Tangram number are coded as numeric predictors, therefore model shows the 





In a final exploratory analysis, we carried out a partial correlation between mean 
length of tangram descriptions and alignment score (on positional descriptions) per 
round, controlling for round number, to investigate whether there was a relationship 
between the referential contraction process and participants’ alignment with their 
partner’s previous description scheme use (Pairs condition) or their own previous use 
(Individual condition). This revealed no significant relationship between mean length 





A substantial body of research has considered how dialogue promotes conservatism, 
with speakers tending to repeat their own and others’ previous choices. In contrast, 
there has been much less consideration of why these choices were made in the first 
place, why a nascent convention may sometimes be abandoned in favour of an 
alternative, and more generally how speakers in dialogue balance competing 
pressures for conservatism and innovation. We addressed these questions through a 
task in which Pairs and Individuals faced a recurring coordination problem, requiring 
them to repeatedly describe the position of tangram figures within mazes that differed 
in their spatial regularity. We examined two aspects of participants’ referential 
behaviour: how they referred to individual tangrams (i.e., choice of an [independent] 
referential expression), and how they referred to positions in the maze (i.e., choice of 
a systematic description scheme). 
 
Our results showed that when interacting Pairs of participants repeatedly referred to 
the same tangrams, they reduced the length of their referential expressions, whereas 
Individual participants did not. When participants (both interacting Pairs and 
Individuals) referred to positions in the maze, their choice of description scheme was 
influenced by the regularity of the maze layouts: Overall, participants used 
significantly more Abstract descriptions when faced with Regular mazes than when 
faced with Irregular mazes. However, Pairs and Individuals differed in the consistency 
with which they used one or other scheme: Whereas Pairs used increasingly more 
Abstract descriptions as they played more rounds, Individuals maintained their initial 




These differences in description scheme use yielded associated differences in rates 
of alignment (i.e., the tendency to re-use the same description type across adjacent 
descriptions), with Individuals showing higher alignment than Pairs. Although both 
Pairs and Individuals showed an overall increase in alignment as they played more 
rounds of the game, our data offer some suggestion that Pairs’ alignment was 
mediated by the layout in which they were playing: Pairs in the Regular layouts 
showed increased alignment as they played more rounds, but Pairs in the Irregular 
layouts did not (reflecting a switch from an initial preference for Concrete descriptions 
to a preference for Abstract descriptions).  
 
The regularity of maze layouts did not affect the overall time taken to complete the 
task.  However, Pairs who used more Abstract descriptions were significantly faster 
to complete the task than Pairs who used more Concrete descriptions; this was 
particularly the case for Pairs in Regular layouts. Individuals showed no significant 
differences in time taken to complete the task, for any of our measures. We now 
consider our results and their theoretical implications in turn.  
 
 
3.4.1 Referential contraction and the role of interaction 
 
We start by considering participants’ references to tangrams. Our task involved 
repeated references to the same tangrams in the same way as many previous studies. 
We found a pattern of effects that is consistent with previous findings. In particular, 
Pairs showed a canonical referential contraction effect (Barr & Keysar, 2002; Brennan 
& Clark, 1996; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Krauss & Weinheimer, 1964): 
Descriptions became shorter and simpler but maintained their core (usually a noun 
phrase) as the interaction unfolded, i.e., an indefinite description such as “the one 
where the shape looks like its kinda sliding or skiding” [sic] in round 1 turned into the 
standard noun phrase “the sliding one” in round 3. In contrast, Individual participants 
showed no referential contraction and maintained the same references they had been 
using on round 1, verbatim in most cases, until the end of the game. This disparity 
between the behaviour of interacting Pairs versus Individual participants replicates 
previous findings (Branigan et al., 2011) in the context of a more complex task, and 




Importantly, Pairs’ tendency to contract their tangram references was not affected by 
alignment or misalignment in their position descriptions. A Pair could be transiently 
misaligned, i.e., in the process of abandoning a concrete description scheme and 
moving towards an abstract one, while at the same time maintaining their coordinated 
referential contraction process by converging on the same tangram descriptions 
(reflected in the absence of a correlation between alignment rate and tangram 
description length).  This pattern reflects an interesting dual processing of different 
semantic stimuli, where participants can process, contract, and converge on one set 
of referential expressions (in this case, the descriptions of the tangrams themselves) 
while at the same time misalign and diverge on a different set of expressions (in this 
case, the descriptions of the tangrams’ positions).  
 
The marked differences between Pairs’ and Individuals’ behaviour on tangram 
description can be explained with respect to the absence of feedback in the Individual 
condition, and the associated provisionality of the Individuals’ references. In 
interacting Pairs, references are proposed by one of the speakers and confirmed 
(explicitly or implicitly) by their partner as the interaction unfolds, establishing a 
conceptual pact (Brennan & Clark, 1996). This confirmation determines the certainty 
of the common ground between the speakers, allowing them to build over that ground 
by either shortening or simplifying the expressions (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986). In 
this sense, references for an Individual speaker who has no feedback from their 
assumed partner are always provisional, lacking the basis for shortening or simplifying 
as the comprehension and acceptance of their expressions is not ratified by an 
addressee. We note that this lack of confirmatory feedback could also explain the 
lengthening of individuals’ descriptions in the first round, as the basis for reducing 
descriptions during a round is the simplification of the task by virtue of an agreement 
between speakers on the figure-description pairing, which is confirmed in the Pairs as 
both speakers select the same figure. The next description will then be constructed 
from the pool of remaining tangrams.  Even though both Pairs and Individual 
participants were instructed to physically remove the tangrams from the maze after 
description, only Pairs seemed to benefit from this as they can be certain their 
previous description had been understood. Individuals, lacking confirmation of the 
success of their past descriptions, seemed to put more effort (in terms of number of 




3.4.2 The influence of context in the emergence of conventional references 
 
Our results provide striking evidence that the perceptual context of interaction can 
significantly affect the linguistic choices of speakers. Participants who were playing 
on mazes with differing layouts (Regular or Irregular) initially adopted different 
description schemes, responding to specific properties of those contexts. In the 
Regular layout condition, where the mazes were characterized by an ordered, grid-
like appearance, participants overwhelmingly chose Abstract descriptions to refer to 
specific positions; in the Irregular layout condition, in contrast, where the mazes were 
characterized by irregular protrusions and salient elements, participants were more 
likely to opt for Concrete descriptions.  
 
Both choices made use of the perceptual salience of the context, indicating an 
interaction between participants’ need for mutual understanding and their individual 
evaluation of the context’s properties. Perceptual salience is generally assumed to 
emerge from general properties of the object at hand, hence speakers looking at the 
maze could assume that any other person looking at the same maze would perceive 
the same elements to be salient, and therefore that those elements should be 
particularly relevant in communication (Tarenskeen et al., 2015). Perceptual salience 
therefore acted as a common base or pre-linguistic common ground for the 
establishment of references. In speakers’ initial choice of description schemes, this 
perceptual common ground modulated the salience of the different scheme choices, 
by linking the salient properties of the context with a description that reflected that 
salience. 
 
Each description scheme is furthermore associated with a particular mental model of 
the maze, which becomes ‘agreed upon’ when communication is effective (Anderson 
and Garrod, 1987; Garrod and Anderson, 1987). However, these mental models do 
not arise directly from participants’ visual perception of the maze, but rather from an 
interpretation of the maze’s layout in a way which highlights a specific aspect or 
property. That is, two players sharing a description scheme are not only sharing a 
linguistic description but also choosing to focus on a specific property of the maze as 




Our results suggest this adaptation or ‘fit’ between description schemes and maze 
layouts was taken into account by our participants, as they evaluated the best way to 
convey their position to a (co-present or future) partner in a specific context. As 
speakers usually aim for efficient descriptions that would require minimal expansion 
or repair (considering both the Maxim of Quantity; Grice, 1975, and the influence of 
perceptual salience; Brennan & Clark, 1996), these different maze layouts might 
create different fitness landscapes, each favouring specific description schemes over 
others. However, in contrast to the fixed and unchanging pressures that the concept 
of ‘landscape’ would suggest, the pressures from the context in our task are not static 
but also evolve, highlighting new alternatives. 
 
Our results show that both interacting Pairs and Individual participants were 
significantly affected by physical context, but Pairs were more likely than Individuals 
to use Abstract descriptions, irrespective of Layout. This difference in description 
scheme choice might be related to Pairs’ difficulty in ensuring a common interpretation 
of salient features of the maze when using Concrete description schemes, as the 
salience of these features can only be assumed to be shared by partners, and must 
be ratified in each description exchange. In contrast, Abstract schemes require no 
such repeated ratification once the system is shared by both speakers. Individual 
speakers, who do not receive external ratification of their descriptions, rely on the 
consistency of their descriptions to ensure comprehension by their future (imagined) 
interlocutor, and would therefore favour those description schemes that provided the 
best fit for their given layout. 
 
 
3.4.3 Change from concrete to abstract description schemes: who, how and 
why? 
 
Our results showed that participants working in Pairs used more Abstract description 
schemes as they advanced through the game, even if they had not used Abstract 
descriptions in their initial exchanges. In particular, participants in Irregular layouts, 
who initially used more Concrete than Abstract descriptions, migrated towards 
Abstract descriptions after the first round; that is, they abandoned their original 




As Garrod and Doherty (1994) predicted, the conflict arising from choosing to follow 
the precedent description scheme versus choosing to switch to a more salient scheme 
had the effect of transiently reducing the degree of inter-speaker coordination in 
interacting pairs. Overall, speakers’ production of aligned or misaligned descriptions 
was mainly affected by round number, reflecting the fact that both Individual speakers 
and interacting Pairs became settled on a particular scheme after playing a few 
rounds. However, whereas this effect was equivalent for both Layouts in the Individual 
condition, Pairs results suggest participants in Regular layouts maintained higher 
alignment levels than participants in Irregular layouts. As Pairs in Regular mazes 
tended to maintain their original description schemes and therefore to align 
increasingly as they moved forward in the game, this pattern is consistent with Pairs 
in Irregular mazes tending to abandon their original schemes –and in this process 
locally misaligning with their partner– in order to subsequently converge again on a 
new scheme. 
 
Two issues arise from the analysis of this migration: Why did participants abandon an 
established convention? And how was this movement performed in the context of 
dialogue? The interactive alignment account assumes that communication is 
successful if communicators come to understand relevant aspects of the world in the 
same way as each other (Garrod & Pickering, 2009). However, success in real life 
dialogue comes not only from a common understanding of the world, but also from 
coordination between the interacting partners and the world. An interacting couple 
could achieve perfect alignment in their conceptualisations, and at the same time 
completely fail in terms of the joint action being performed, in the same way that a 
pair of dancers could match their steps perfectly, and yet –if they failed to follow the 
tempo of the music– fail in the joint action of the dance itself. As in Mills (2014), our 
results show that the most highly coordinated dyads (measured in terms of the time 
they took to successfully solve a maze) did not necessarily use the same semantic 
model in the last turns of the game that they had used in the first turns. This flexibility 
implies that coordinated dyads are not mechanically repeating the schema used in 
their earliest interactions, but rather adapting to their changing circumstances, even if 
this means de-coupling temporarily. In this sense, a successful interaction will 
maintain coordination at a higher (task) level even at the expense of the lower 




In our experiment, the appropriateness or ‘fit’ of a description scheme with respect to 
a specific maze layout generated an initial contextual pressure, but the repetition of 
the task made some schemas more efficient than others over time, creating an 
additional and competing pressure. Pairs (but not Individuals) adapted to this new 
pressure by migrating towards a type of schema that could be more easily applied to 
new mazes or new positions in the same maze, namely Abstract schemas. In this 
sense, the language used in the Pairs adapted to its circumstances of use (Lupyan & 
Dale, 2016), where a system that facilitated repeated interaction was needed. 
 
Why did Pairs show this adaptation over time, but Individuals did not? We propose 
that this adaptation was facilitated by the dynamics of dialogue, where a participant 
has the opportunity to evaluate the ease of comprehension and contextual 
applicability of their partner’s descriptions, and to apply that evaluation to their own 
descriptions if they correspond to the same schema, through pairing of 
comprehension and production (Pickering & Garrod, 2013). Thus dialogue affords an 
opportunity for ‘situated reflection’, whereby members of an interactive team can 
reflect on their own performance by observing their partner’s actions (Shirouzu, 
Miyake, & Masukawa, 2002). As Keysar & Henly (2002) noted, speakers usually 
overestimate the effectiveness of their own utterances; however, the comprehension 
process that occurs when participants evaluate their partner’s contribution can help 
facilitating the evaluation of the description scheme they themselves are using. 
Misyak and colleagues (2016) suggested that speakers engage in a joint inference 
process, where the consideration of both their own and their partner’s perspective 
allows them to jointly change their current conventions, dynamically adapting to the 
communicative and contextual needs of the pair. Crucially, this process would not be 
available for Individual speakers. 
 
An alternative explanation for the shift from Concrete to Abstract schemes in terms of 
expertise seems less consistent with our findings. Under such an explanation, 
Concrete schemes might be considered as simpler, and Abstract schemes as more 
specialized and complex (Healey, 1997, 2008). The shift to Abstract schemes found 
in Pairs might thus arise from participants’ increasing expertise in the task of providing 
position descriptions. However, this explanation does not accord well with our overall 
pattern of results: Expertise can be accumulated by both Individual participants and 
Pairs, and so we would expect to see a similar switch to an alternative description 
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scheme in the Individual players, contrary to our findings. Moreover, a majority of the 
Pairs used Abstract description schemes from the first round, which contradicts the 
idea that Abstract schemes require some form of training. While it could be argued 
that Pairs had twice the number of opportunities for introducing change than 
Individuals7, the evidence suggest confirmatory feedback is crucial if a previously-
used conceptualisation is to be dismissed. Even if the process by which an individual 
introduces a referential change could involve deliberate innovation (and in that sense 
be available for both Individual speakers and interactive Pairs), the crucial aspect of 
adaptation seems not to be innovation per se, but the possibility of abandoning a 
previously used conceptualisation, which is crucially made available by feedback. 
 
The fact that Individual speakers showed little change throughout the game in terms 
of their position descriptions is compatible with more than one account. An alignment-
based explanation would predict self-monitoring to act as a source of alignment within 
the speaker’s own language processing system, as their linguistic output is examined 
for consistency between the intended output and the form actually produced. 
Individual speakers’ consistency could also be explained in terms of cognitive 
economy, hence egocentric processing, as the introduction of a different perspective 
when this was not required by the task would certainly imply more processing effort. 
An audience design explanation (i.e., based on considerations of a partner’s mental 
states) would similarly predict consistency, as the speakers’ model of a future 
interlocutor cannot be contrasted with an actual co-present interlocutor, and is 
therefore fixed as an idealized model in their evaluation of the task. 
 
Overall, our results are compatible with a ‘language game’ account (Wilkes-Gibbs and 
Clark, 1992; Brennan and Clark, 1996), where the particular history of interaction of 
each pair is considered. According to the language game framework, speakers go 
through a process of negotiation where a specific conceptual pact is agreed on, but 
which is provisional or open to change as the interaction unfolds. As such, references 
are chosen considering ahistorical factors (precedence, salience, lexical availability), 
but also adapt to changing (historical) circumstances (Brennan & Clark, 1996). 
Individuals, lacking interactive feedback, also lack an externally contrasted history 
                                               
7 However, Individual participants’ results are not consistent with this view, as there is no 
pattern of change even in the third round of the experiment, while alignment is higher on 
each new round played, suggesting the maintenance of the same description schemes 
throughout the game. 
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3.4.4 From pairs to communities 
 
The process by which a linguistic convention is established and perpetuated in time 
through dialogue can be linked to the process by which a language’s lexical and 
syntactic elements are established and/or transformed over a historical timescale. 
However, the mechanisms by which change at the local interaction level affects (or is 
transformed into) change in the community at large, and from there to ‘language’ itself, 
are not obvious. 
 
The conventions literature suggests that the selection of a linguistic variant in pairwise 
interaction is shaped mainly by the local effects of precedence and salience. But as 
our results suggest, the same processes are also open to the influence of the 
adaptation of that variant to the communicative task, which affects salience 
judgements by influencing the speakers’ perception of their context: Speaking about 
a position as an X-Y coordinate highlights specific properties of the environment, 
whereas speaking about it as “the very end of the tail” highlights different properties. 
Adaptation to context could therefore link the selection of linguistic variants in pairwise 
interaction and their conventionalization in a community, by providing a stable 
pressure acting over different interactions and speakers. 
 
The link between pairwise interactions and the community level of language change 
is directly addressed by Garrod and Doherty (1994), who argued (in line with Lewis, 
1969/2002) that speakers turn to the schema they have most frequently encountered 
in the past when they face a new interaction. In this sense, the influence of their past 
interactions would be additive, with previously encountered variants competing with 
respect to the proportions of use in which they have been experienced. However, the 
description schemes emerging from the communities in Garrod and Doherty (1994) 
are not conventional in Lewis’ terms, as there is no need for beliefs about the 
behaviour of other members of the community. As speakers do not need to be aware 
of the existence of a community at all to align on the most frequently encountered 
variant (though beliefs can modulate this tendency; see Branigan et al., 2011; Fehér, 
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Wonnacott, & Smith, 2016), Garrod and Doherty posit a more mechanistic 
explanation, where the global level emerges out of the sum of pairwise interactions. 
 
Our results suggest, however, that alignment and frequency of use do not act alone 
in determining which variants will be adopted by a speaker, but that their content or 
‘value in context’ also plays a role. Tamariz et al. (2014), using data from an artificial 
language experiment, explained the process by which these conventions form as a 
consequence of the interplay between two biases:  the tendency to re-use an existing 
variant, and a preference for better (i.e. simpler or more communicatively functional) 
variants. The interplay between the two biases leads individuals to retain their own 
previously used variant unless they encounter a superior variant in terms of content8, 
in which case this new variant would be adopted. Under this account, communicative 
interaction, and in particular the evaluation of the communicative utility of alternative 
communicative tokens, is crucial to the spread of new variants and the formation of 
population-level conventions. Similar processes can be identified in our experiment. 
Participants in Pairs tended to align on the same description scheme variant, 
determined in the first place by the individual evaluation of the descriptions’ properties 
against the context. However, as the interaction progressed, participants identified a 
superior variant in terms of its appropriateness in context and ease of use in repeated 





Alignment has been considered to be the main driver in the establishment of 
conventional references. However, as our results show, participants need to take into 
account more than just their partner’s contributions when interacting in a given 
context. Both Individuals and Pairs of speakers produced references that were 
adapted to their context of use, but only interacting Pairs were able to dynamically 
                                               
8 The content value of an item in Tamariz et al.’s model is defined intrinsically, since the 
model does not include context as a factor; however, we can assume that, in real 








switch from an established reference to a new alternative when the task demanded a 
change. For alignment to act as a source of situated coordination, speakers need to 
consider both linguistic interaction and content functionality in order to reach an 








Chapter 3 Appendix.  Emergence and adaptation of referential conventions 









In his time-honoured essay, David Lewis (1969/2002) argued that pairs of speakers 
cannot establish a fully-fledged convention, even if they consistently choose the same 
alternative and agree on their common use over time. In his proposal, the establishment 
of a linguistic convention requires a community of speakers, where even if an individual 
speaker does not abide to the convention, the belief that other members of the group 
will still hold it should make the convention prevail. By comparison, the behaviour of an 
interacting pair would be bound to the individual choices of the speakers, as each 
instance of use that differs from the local convention acts as precedent for a new 
alternative that could potentially replace the previous choice. 
 
Garrod and Doherty (1994) showed experimentally how these differences modulated 
speakers’ choice of description schemes in a maze game. In their experiments, 
communities showed ceiling levels of alignment in their reference choices after playing 
a few rounds of the game, reflecting the establishment of a convention. Pairs, on the 
other hand, were pervious to external factors, like the salience of a specific maze 
layout, that lead them to locally modify their choices. Even in the most aligned pairs, the 
local conventions established were vulnerable. Moreover, the experiments of Garrod 
and Doherty (1994) show that explicit beliefs about the existence of a community are 
not required for the establishment of linguistic conventions, as their participants were 




Considering this tendency to rapidly converge on a conventional choice, we might 
assume communities would be less inclined to switch to a different alternative, as a 
community speaker would not necessarily change their production when faced with a 
reference that deviates from the norm. However, we need to consider there is no 
previous research showing communities converging on anything other than the most 
abstract description scheme choices, therefore our experimental setup might not 
generate any convergence onto other schemes that would allow us to test this 
hypothesis. 
 
In this pilot experiment, we applied the maze game paradigm described in Experiment 1 
to small communities: participants, distributed into 8 4-people groups, played each 
round of the game with a different participant from the same group, creating a miniature 
network where all participants had interacted with each other by the end of the game. In 
all other aspects, the design and procedure remain the same as in the main 
experiment. 
 
Even though the results included in this appendix should be comparable with those 
from Experiment 1, the low number of groups that could be tested determined that they 








32 participants took part in the experiment, distributed into 8 4-people micro-
communities. 18 participants were females and 14 were males; their mean age was 
22.71 years; all were University of Edinburgh students who took part in the experiment 
for payment. All participants were native English speakers. Participants read and signed 





3.7.2  Materials 
 











Participants came to the experimental lab in groups of 4 people. We ensured 
participants did not know each other in advance. They were given verbal and written 
instructions together, then seated in individual sound-proofed booths equipped with a 
network computer. They were informed they might play with either the same or a 
different partner in each round of the game. They were told they could communicate 
freely through the online chat tool, that they would exchange descriptions of the figures 
and their positions, and that they should aim to make the figure and its position 
identifiable to their current partner. 
 
In each round, 2 interacting pairs were formed in each group, with the software 
connecting the two participants in each pair in one chat line. The chat box for each 
participant showed the number assigned to their current partner, and displayed their 
unfolding dialogue. At the end of each round, participants’ screens showed a message 
asking them to wait while they were connected to their next partner. The overall design 
of the interaction sequence ensured that each participant played with a different partner 
from the same group in each round, thereby at the end of the game each participant 
had played with all other participants in their group (see Table 3.6). In all other aspects, 






1 1 & 2  -  3 & 4 
2 1 & 3  -  2 & 4 
3 1 & 4  -  2 & 3 





Coding of participants’ responses was similar to Experiment 1. Participants were 
assigned a group number according to the group they played at. Alignment was 
considered with respect to the descriptions of the two participants in direct interaction at 





We used generalised linear models to estimate the effects of our experimental variables 
over participants’ description scheme use. We fitted binomial mixed models with the 
variables Layout (factor, Irregular vs Regular) and Round (numeric, 1 to 3), and (unless 
otherwise specified) with a full random structure as per our design, including random 
intercepts for participant nested in Group, and a random slope for Group over Round 
number. 
 
Choice of description scheme 
 
Using a full model with Layout (Irregular vs Regular) and Round number (1 to 3), plus 
their interaction, Round number had a significant effect over participants’ use of 
Abstract or Concrete descriptions: participants used more Abstract descriptions with 
more rounds played (χ2=10.26, p=0.001). Layout did not have a significant effect over 
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participants use of Abstract or Concrete descriptions: Participants descriptions did not 
vary significantly whether they were playing on an Irregular or a Regular layout 
(χ2=0.63, p=0.43). The interaction between the two variables was similarly not 




Fig 3.8 Mean description scheme use, per group. Facets show Irregular (left) and Regular 
(right) maze layouts. Description scheme is coded as Concrete (0) or Abstract (1), whereas 
mean per group is calculated as the numeric mean of all descriptions made by the participants in 









Table 3.7 Results of model of description scheme use 
Predictor Log-odds Betas SE X² and p values 
Intercept 1.8772 0.5482 - 
Layout 0.8502 1.0684 0.63, p=0.43 
Round 2.3500 0.6858 10.26, p=0.001** 
Layout * Round -0.6987 1.1436 0.33, p=0.56 
Log-odds betas, Standard Error, Chi-squared and P-values from Generalized Mixed Model fitted 
using mixed function from the afex package. Intercept represents grand mean at Round 1. 
Model is fitted with deviation-coded variable Layout (Irregular vs Regular). Round is coded as a 





Alignment was measured considering each description produced in a pair, and 
comparing it against the previous description by the other participant in the pair. Our 
model included Layout and Round, plus their interaction, as fixed effects, and a random 
intercept per participant nested in Group.  
 
Model results show Round number had a significant effect over participants’ alignment: 
Participants descriptions were more aligned as they played more rounds (χ2=40.28, 
p=<0.0001). Maze Layout showed a marginally significant effect, with participants in 
Regular mazes using more aligned descriptions than participants in Irregular mazes. 








Fig 3.9 Mean alignment, per group. Facets show Irregular (left) and Regular (right) maze 
layouts. Alignment is coded as Not aligned (0) or Aligned (1), whereas mean per group is 














Table 3.8 Results of model of aligned descriptions 
Predictor Log-odds Betas SE X² and p values 
Intercept 1.9018 0.2175 - 
Layout 0.7649 0.3978 3.73, p=0.05+ 
Round 1.4830 0.3120 40.28, p=<0.0001*** 
Layout * Round 0.8912 0.6234 2.41, p=0.12 
Log-odds betas, Standard Error, Chi-squared and P-values from Generalized Mixed Model fitted 
using mixed function from the afex package. Intercept represents grand mean at Round 1. 
Model is fitted with deviation-coded variable Layout (Irregular vs Regular). Round is coded as a 





Tangram description was measured in number of words per description, considering all 
utterances that referred to the same tangram in a round as pertaining the same 
description (therefore, a description could be co-constructed by both members of a pair, 
and usually it was). Within each round we measured the description length of the 1st to 
5th tangram described; the 6th tangram was typically not described or referred to as 
“the last one”, since it was by that point the only remaining tangram. 
 
We ran a linear mixed-effects model to predict the (log-transformed) number of words 
used per tangram description, with Round number, Layout, and Tangram number (1 to 
5) and their interactions as fixed effect predictors. Random structure included a random 
intercept for Pair nested in Group, and a random intercept for Group (a random slope 
for Group in Round number was initially fitted, but discarded after the model results 
showed it to account for no variance and to be perfectly correlated with the intercept). 
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Tangram description length was found to decrease with Round number (χ2=41.91, 
p=<0.0001) and Tangram number (χ2=14.39, p=0.0002): Participants’ descriptions were 
shorter with each round played and each new tangram described. The interaction 
between both variables was also significant: Tangram description length had a stronger 
decrease with each new tangram described in Round 1, compared to Rounds 2 and 3 














We modelled the total time each Group took to complete a round as a function of the 
Layout they were assigned to, their mean Abstract description use, and Round number, 
plus their interaction. Round number was the only significant predictor, with Groups 
taking an average of 6.4 minutes less to complete a round with a one unit increase in 
Round  number (F(7,16)=7.592, p=0.0004, R²=0.667). 
       
All Groups took significantly less time to complete a round as they advanced in the 
game, with no differences between Layout conditions nor Use of Abstract descriptions 
(but consider all groups showed high values of Abstract description use). 
 
 




3.9  Discussion 
 
Overall, our experiment aimed at understanding the similarities and differences 
between the behaviour of individuals, pairs, and small communities of speakers with 
respect to their referential adaptation. In the main experiment we compared individuals 
and pairs, and in this appendix we included 4-people groups. Participants in these 
groups played one round with each of the other participants in their group, therefore 
forming an emergent community by the end of the third round.  
 
The results showed high levels of Abstract description use from the first round and a 
steady increase per round, with a massive switch towards using exclusively Abstract 
descriptions by round 2 (all but one group showed more than 85% of Abstract 
description use on round 2). There were no significant differences between Layouts, 
with participants playing in Irregular and in Regular mazes showing similarly high levels 
of Abstract description use.  
 
The high levels of Abstract description use across Layout conditions might be related to 
participants’ evaluation of the concurrent demands of the task: on one hand, different 
groups of participants were facing different maze layouts; on the other hand, they were 
facing the common need to communicate with different people in each round of the 
game they played. Our results suggest the demands of the communication task were 
perceived as more pressing than the differential demands of the maze layouts, with 
participants across layouts choosing a more systematic approach to the task. 
 
Participants were informed they might play with different people in each round before 
the beginning of the game, which might explain why groups in Irregular layouts show 
higher levels of Abstract description use in round 1, compared to Pairs and Individual 
participants. However, it was in round 2 when they had to face the need to 
communicate with a new participant after having established a system in round 1. In 
this situation, a description scheme that simplified the communication of positions in the 
maze by establishing a set of rules with an invariable interpretation might have 




A comparison between the behaviour of Individuals, Pairs, and Groups, suggests that 
the need for communication, especially when it is actually demanded and not just 
imagined, appears as the biggest driver of referential adaptation. Speakers will aim for 
the reference that best fits their communicative needs, which can exert differential 
pressures over them depending on the nature of the communicative situation. An 
Individual only imagining a communicative situation might perceive this pressure to be 
minor, as she has no information that could guide her production other than her own 
evaluation of it. A Pair of interacting speakers might be guided by both their own needs 
and their partner’s, slowly adapting their production to fit the communicative scenario; 
and a Group of speakers might be rapidly driven to find a system that allows them to 













Most theories of language production agree in that speakers will tend to reuse the 
references that have been established during dialogue instead of switching to an 
alternative. In previous chapters, however, we have shown that context changes, 
lexical differentiation, or production needs might cue speakers to abandon 
previously used choices. In this chapter, we will report two experiments aimed at 
further investigating two suggested drivers of referential change: context changes, 
and participant role differences.  
 
Experiment 1 showed how interacting speakers adapted to a demanding task by 
switching towards an alternative referential expression that would allow them to deal 
with the task in a more efficient way. In a maze game task that was repeated three 
times, interacting Pairs of participants used increasingly more abstract descriptions 
as they moved through the game, compared to Individual participants. However, the 
experiment also showed that, across Interaction conditions, participants were more 
likely to use Abstract descriptions as they advanced in the game, suggesting 
production experience affects the referential choices of not only interacting pairs, but 
also individual speakers.  
 
Moreover, experimental research has pointed out that the rate of linguistic change in 
interacting pairs might be much higher than the rate of change in individual 
speakers, suggesting pairs would adapt faster than individuals (Smith & Wonnacott, 
2010; Smith et al., 2013). Indeed, Experiment 1 showed that, while Pairs adapted at 
a higher rate, Individual speakers, who were producing descriptions for an imagined 
future participant, also tended to use more Abstract descriptions as they advanced 
in the task. Could it be that individual speakers would reach similar levels of 
adaptation in a more demanding environment? Specifically, would a changing 
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perceptual context push Individual participants into adaptation rates similar to those 
of interacting Pairs?  
 
Experiment 2 was aimed at testing the effects of context change in the referential 
adaptation of Pairs and Individual speakers. We designed a task in which both 
Individual speakers, producing descriptions to an imagined future participant, and 
interacting Pairs of speakers were presented with an irregular maze, in which they 
would play the first 3 rounds of the game. After this, they would play 3 more rounds 
in either 1) the same irregular maze they saw in the first round, 2) a different 
irregular maze, or 3) a different regular maze. The experiment aimed at identifying 
whether a changing perceptual context would promote speakers’ linguistic 
adaptation, comparing the influence of a maintained vs a changing context in the 
referential adaptation of Pairs and Individual speakers. 
 
On the other hand, while our first experiment suggested interaction is one of the 
main drivers of linguistic adaptation, it did not address the question of what the 
specific features of interaction are that would facilitate the adaptation of referential 
choices to the communicative circumstances. In Experiment 3, we focused on the 
roles of the participant role of the interlocutors, and the previous interaction with a 
particular partner, as potential relevant factors in this adaptive benefit of interaction. 
Discussing the benefits of dialogue for comprehension, compared to monologue, 
Fox-Tree and Meyer (2008) suggested that the higher number of perspectives 
presented in most dialogues was key in producing output that was easier to 
understand. However, Branigan et al. (2011) contested this view and suggested 
grounded descriptions are easier to understand independently of the number of 
perspectives used in a conversation, pointing to a bigger role of feedback and 
addressee-centred design in creating references that are a better match for the 
communicative situation. Considering that perspectives that are easier to 
understand are probably well adapted to the communicative task they are aimed to 
fulfil, we can ask whether participants who take part in dialogue would be as likely to 
change their references to adapt to the demands of the task as participants who 
only witness the dialogue without taking part.  
 
On the other hand, Brennan and Clark (1996) suggested interacting speakers that 
maintained the same partner after a context change were less likely to adapt to the 
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new context by abandoning their previously used (but overspecific in the new 
context) descriptions, compared to speakers that interacted with a new partner after 
the context change. This suggests speakers with a new partner should be more 
likely to abandon a previously used reference if they believe that a different 
alternative would be better suited to the task, as the link that was established 
between the old partner and the precedent should not necessarily be extended to 
the new partner1. Considering this, we can ask whether speaking to the same or a 
different partner would affect speakers’ likelihood of switching to a more adaptive 
alternative.  
 
Experiment 3 used a maze game task that presented participants with three different 
interaction conditions. In a Director-Matcher setup, participants played a first round 
as either Matchers or Overhearers, and 3 successive rounds as Directors with either 
the Director of the first round as Matcher, or a new participant. The experiment 
aimed at identifying 1) whether having access to different perspectives in dialogue is 
enough to yield an adaptive advantage, or whether direct involvement in the 
interaction is required, and 2) whether interacting with a different partner makes 
speakers more likely to switch to more adaptive referential choices than interacting 
with the same partner as previously. 
 
Overall, this chapter will aim at clarifying the role of two of the most likely drivers of 
linguistic adaptation, context change and participant role differences, in the 
adaptation of speakers’ referential choices.  
 
 
4.2 Experiment 2: Relationship between context change and linguistic 
change 
 
Speakers use context as a background for communication in language production 
and comprehension. If two speakers are co-present, the fact that they can both 
attend to objects and situations in their common context is treated as a basis for 
reference, particularly if they can both assume the other person is actually attending 
                                               
1 The discussion whether these effects can be attributed to conceptual pacts being 
established between the speakers, or to memory cues linking the identity of the partner to 
the previous uses of the reference, has been hotly debated in the past decade (Metzing & 
Brennan, 2003; Horton & Gerrig, 2005; Horton, 2008; Brown-Schmidt, 2011). 
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to them (Clark & Marshall, 1981; Clark & Brennan, 1991). As such, context change 
has the potential of promoting referential change: from the strong pressure to 
specify a reference that comes from the addition of new elements in the same 
category than the target item (e.g. other shoes added to a context where just one 
shoe was present; Brennan & Clark, 1996), to the more subtle pressure of a change 
in the function of an item in context (Ibarra & Tanenhaus, 2016), the addition of new 
information to the conversation in the form of a context change might guide the 
abandonment of previous referential choices. 
 
Experiment 1 showed how different perceptual contexts promoted the use of 
different description schemes that were initially better adapted to deal with salient 
features in these contexts. Regular maze layouts, which highlighted the maze’s 
underlying grid structure, promoted the use of more abstract description schemes, 
while irregular maze layouts, with their indentations and protrusions, promoted the 
use of more concrete and idiosyncratic descriptions. We aimed to exploit this 
differential effect in the design of an experiment that would present participants with 
a context change. In Experiment 2, participants would begin playing in an irregular 
layout, which should promote the use of concrete conceptualisations, and would 
thereby be distributed into one of three conditions: A Same Maze condition, where 
they would continue playing in the same maze layout (acting as a no-change 
baseline), a Different Irregular condition, where they would switch to a different 
irregular maze layout, and a Different Regular condition, where they would switch to 
a regular maze layout.  
 
Considering the results of Experiment 1, we expected participants in Pairs to 
increase their use of Abstract descriptions more than Individuals as they advance in 
the game, across Same Maze and Different Maze conditions, as interaction should 
promote higher levels of adaptation. Also, we expected participants in the two 
Different Maze conditions to increase their use of Abstract descriptions more than 
participants in the Same Maze condition, as exposure to different maze layouts 
should create a stronger demand for a description scheme that can adapt to these 
different contexts. Moreover, differences between the two Different conditions might 
also be noticeable, as a Regular maze layout should present a more explicit 
reference to the underlying grid structure that is common to all mazes, compared to 
a new Irregular layout. Additionally, the difference between Same and Different 
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Maze conditions might be greater in Individuals than in Pairs, considering Individuals 
should not be as moved to switch to a new alternative in a non-changing context (as 
the results of Experiment 1 showed), while Pairs might switch in both changing and 
non-changing conditions as a result of their interaction and the emergence of an 








76 participants, comprising 26 Pairs of participants (39 females, 13 males; mean 
age 21.2 years) and 24 Individuals (18 females, 6 males; mean age 21.6 years), all 
University of Edinburgh students, took part in the experiment for payment. All 
participants were native English speakers. Participants read and signed an informed 
consent form before taking part in the experiment. 
 
9 Pairs and 8 Individuals were assigned to the Same maze condition, 8 Pairs and 8 
Individuals to the Different Irregular condition, and 9 Pairs and 8 Individuals to the 





We used two irregular mazes and one regular maze from the maze set created for 
experiment 1. As described in Chapter 3, maze regularity was calculated according 
to a neighbourhood-use metric, which defined regularity as the proportion of 
occupied vs empty space surrounding each maze square. According to this 
definition, a highly regular maze is a maze where most occupied squares are 
surrounded by other occupied squares, while an irregular maze is a maze where 
occupied squares are surrounded by a combination of other occupied squares and 
empty spaces. As such, an irregular maze is characterised by salient protrusions 




One irregular maze (maze 1, on the left in Fig. 4.1) was used for the first 3 rounds, 
across conditions; the remaining 3 rounds were played in either the same irregular 




Fig 4.1 Mazes 1 and 2 (irregular, regularity scores 0.672 and 0.668) and 3 (regular, 
regularity score 0.864) 
 
 
In each round of the game, the corresponding maze was presented, with 6 tangram 
figures randomly distributed across the maze squares. These tangram figures were 
the same as reported in experiment 1, chosen through an online survey to ensure 





Fig 4.2 Tangram set 
 
Participants provided descriptions using a text-based chat tool (based on the DiET 
chattool software, Healey & Mills, submitted) which was configured to show one turn 
of dialogue at a time. This restriction was intended to roughly simulate the fading 
property of spoken dialogue, and to ensure participants would maintain a continuous 
interaction, instead of delivering all their information in one turn. Each participants’ 
chat window displayed information about the typing status of the other participant (if 
available), remaining round time, and text of the current dialogue turn. Turns did not 
fade until the next turn by any participant was submitted. 
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The experiment software presented the mazes and tangrams and recorded 





Our design included 2 Interaction conditions: Individuals vs Pairs (between-
participants); 3 Context conditions: Same Maze, Different Irregular, Different 
Regular (between-participants); and 6 rounds (within-participants). However, as the 
first 3 rounds were played in the same maze layout across participants, and only in 
the last 3 rounds were they split into the different Context conditions, most analyses 
were performed as 2 x 3 x 2, considering the 2 blocks of the game (rounds 1 to 3 vs 





Participants came to the lab in pairs; we ensured that members of a pair did not 
know each other in advance. They were randomly assigned to Interaction and 
Context conditions (Individual vs. Pairs, Same maze vs Different Irregular vs 
Different Regular); they were informed of the Interaction condition they were to take 
part in, but not of the Context condition2. They were given verbal and written 
instructions together, then seated in individual sound-proofed booths equipped with 
a network computer. In the Individual condition, participants were told that they 
would be providing written descriptions for a future participant to follow, and that 
they should aim to make each figure and its position individually identifiable. In the 
Pairs condition, participants were told they could communicate freely through the 
online chat tool, that they would exchange descriptions of the figures and their 
positions, and that they should aim to make the figure and its position identifiable to 
their partner. 
 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three Context conditions: a Same 
Maze condition, where they played 6 rounds in the same irregular layout; a Different 
                                               
2 This implies that all differences in participants’ performance per Context condition in rounds 
1 to 3 are by definition random, as there was no difference in their tasks up to that point. 
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Irregular condition, where they played the first 3 rounds in an irregular maze layout, 
and the next 3 rounds in a different irregular layout; and a Different Regular 
condition, where they played the first 3 rounds in an irregular maze layout, and the 
next 3 rounds in a regular layout (see Fig. 4.1). All participants played a total of 6 
rounds. Task procedure remained the same as in Experiment 1 in all other aspects. 
 
 
4.2.1.5 Coding of transcripts 
 
Participants’ responses in terms of description scheme and alignment were coded in 





We will analyse participants’ responses in two subsections: 1) Choice of description 
scheme (Abstract or Concrete descriptions), and 2) Alignment (use of the same 
description scheme as previous turn, per Pair/Individual). 
 
 
4.2.2.1 Choice of description scheme 
 
Our experiment presented Pairs and Individual participants with the same initial 
context: an irregular maze in which they had to describe specific locations for either 
a concurrent or an imaginary future partner to identify. All participants played three 
rounds in this irregular layout. In the second half of the game, participants switched 
or maintained their maze layout according to the Context condition they were 
assigned to: Same Maze, Different Irregular (a new irregular layout), or Different 
Regular (a new regular layout). 
 
Descriptive statistics (Table 4.2, see also Figs. 4.3 and 4.4) show that participants 
across Interaction conditions and Contexts increased their use of Abstract 





Mean use of Abstract descriptions 
Context Interaction Block N Abstract mean SD SE 95% CI 
Same maze Individuals 1 163 0.626 0.485 0.038 0.075 
Same maze Individuals 2 162 0.698 0.461 0.036 0.071 
Different Irreg Individuals 1 125 0.352 0.48 0.043 0.085 
Different Irreg Individuals 2 117 0.538 0.501 0.046 0.092 
Different Reg Individuals 1 141 0.454 0.5 0.042 0.083 
Different Reg Individuals 2 141 0.56 0.498 0.042 0.083 
Same maze Pairs 1 479 0.91 0.286 0.013 0.026 
Same maze Pairs 2 372 0.992 0.09 0.005 0.009 
Different Irreg Pairs 1 553 0.41 0.492 0.021 0.041 
Different Irreg Pairs 2 430 0.572 0.495 0.024 0.047 
Different Reg Pairs 1 426 0.561 0.497 0.024 0.047 
Different Reg Pairs 2 358 0.782 0.413 0.022 0.043 
Table 4.1 Mean use of Abstract descriptions and associated descriptive statistics 
(description scheme use is coded as 0 (Concrete) and 1 (Abstract), numeric mean is derived 
from participants’ total description use), per first and second blocks of the game (rounds 1 to 
3 vs 4 to 6), per Context condition. N represents the total number of descriptions that were 
produced and coded in each condition. 
 
 
We used logistic multilevel regressions (lme4 package in R, Bates et al., 2015) to 
analyse participants’ use of description scheme according to the changes in their 
task context. Initially, we included Interaction (Individuals vs Pairs), Context (Same 
maze vs Different Irregular maze vs Different Regular maze) and Round number or 
Block (rounds 1 to 3 vs 4 to 6) as fixed effects, plus their interaction. The random 
structure was the maximal structure justified by our design (following Barr et al., 
2013), including random intercepts for Pair/Individual and for Participant nested in 
Pair (to account for the initial variation between pairs and between subjects), and 
random slopes for Pair/Individual over Round number or Block (to account for the 
differential effect of task experience over the different Pairs or Individual 




Fig 4.3 Proportion of use of Abstract vs Concrete descriptions, per Interaction condition and 





Fig. 4.4 Numeric mean of use of Abstract description schemes per round. Description 




parameter against a model without that parameter, using the function mixed in the 
afex package (Singmann et al., 2017). 
 
Using a full model with Interaction condition (Individuals vs Pairs), Context (Same 
maze vs Different Irregular vs Different Regular), and Block (First vs Second), plus 
their interaction, Block had a significant effect over the use of Abstract or Concrete 
descriptions, with participants using more Abstract descriptions in the second block 
vs the first block, across Interaction conditions and Contexts (χ²=12.81, p=0.0003): 
in the second block, the odds of participants using Abstract descriptions were 36% 
higher than in the first block3. We used deviation-coded contrasts to code for the 
different layout Contexts (Same maze considered as baseline), and compared 
participants’ output in the first 3 rounds of the game (first block, same irregular maze 
across conditions) with their output in the last 3 rounds (second block, different 
mazes per condition) (see Table 4.2).  
 
Neither the interactions, nor the main effects of Context and Interaction condition 
were significant: Participants’ likelihood of using Abstract descriptions did not vary 
significantly depending on whether participants played in the same or a different 
maze (χ²=0.56, p=0.45), across blocks; nor between Individuals and Pairs (χ²=0.94, 
p=0.33). 
 
Considering that the interaction between conditions was not significant in the full 
model, and the presence of an important numeric difference in the mean use of 
Abstract descriptions between Interaction conditions (particularly in the first block, 
see Table 4.1), we ran a second model without the interaction term. In this simpler 
model, both Different Context conditions (Different Irregular and Different Regular) 
were significantly different from the Same maze condition, considering the first 
block: Participants in the Different Irregular and Different Regular conditions were 
significantly less likely to use Abstract descriptions in the first block of the game, 
compared to participants in the Same maze condition (χ²=10.70, p=0.005). Block 
also had a significant effect: Participants in the Same maze condition were more 
likely to use Abstract descriptions in the second block of the game, compared to the 
first block (χ²=14.24, p<0.001). 
 
                                               
3 Participants’ mean use of Abstract descriptions in block 1 vs block 2: 0.552 vs 0.690. 
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Table 4.2 Results of model of description scheme use 
Predictor Log-odds Betas SE X² and p values 
Intercept 0.45144 0.77826 - 
Interaction  1.51428 1.54959 0.94, p=0.33 
Context   -1.44599 1.92482 0.56, p=0.45 
Block    3.34482 0.92994 12.81, p=0.0003*** 
Interaction * Context -0.09049 3.83053 0.00, p=0.98 
Interaction * Block 1.64976 1.73112 1.02, p=0.31 
Context * Block -0.18740 1.96444 0.01, p=0.92 
Interaction condition * Context * 
Block 
3.23208 4.01971 0.69, p=0.41 
Log-odds betas, Standard Error, Chi-squared and P-values from Generalized Mixed Model 
fitted using mixed function from the afex package. Intercept represents grand mean at First 
block. Model is fitted with deviation-coded variables Interaction (Individuals-Pairs) and 
Context (Same Maze vs Different Irregular vs Different Regular).  
  
 
Overall, our results suggest participants across conditions increased their use of 
Abstract descriptions as they played more rounds of the game, but that this increase 
was not significantly different whether they were playing individually or in pairs, nor 
across the different layout contexts. Specifically, playing in the same or a different 
maze layout did not significantly modify participants’ use of Abstract vs Concrete 
descriptions. Moreover, the presence of an initial difference in the use of Abstract 








First round differences 
 
We ran an additional model to assess whether initial random differences between 
conditions might have influenced the pattern of results, using only data from the first 
round of the game (summary statistics in Table 4.3). The model included Interaction 
condition and Context as fixed effects, plus their interaction, along with a random 
intercept for Participant nested in Pair. The model revealed a significant effect of 
Context condition over the use of Abstract descriptions in the first round: 
Participants in the Same Maze condition were significantly more likely to use 
Abstract descriptions than participants in the Different Regular and Different 
Irregular conditions (χ²=8.90, p=0.01), across Interaction conditions. Neither 
Interaction condition (χ²=0.93, p=0.33) nor the interaction between Context and 
Interaction (χ²=0.28, p=0.87) were significant.  
 
Mean use of Abstract descriptions 
Context Interaction mean 
Same maze Individuals 0.702 
Different Irregular Individuals 0.176 
Different Regular Individuals 0.378 
Same maze Pairs 0.838 
Different Irregular Pairs 0.381 
Different Regular Pairs 0.5 
 
Table 4.3 Mean use of Abstract vs Concrete descriptions per Context condition, round 1. 
 
 
4.2.2.2 Alignment  
 
We used a logistic multilevel regression model to analyse participants’ alignment in 
their descriptions according to the changes in their task Context and Interaction 
condition. We included Interaction (Individuals vs Pairs), Context (Same maze vs 
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Different Irregular maze vs Different Regular maze) and Block as fixed effects, plus 
their interaction. The random structure was the maximal structure justified by our 
design, including random intercepts for Pair/Individual and for Participant nested in 
Pair (to account for the initial variation between pairs and between subjects), and 
random slopes for Pair/Individual over Block (to account for the differential effect of 
task experience over the different Pairs or Individual participants) (Barr et al., 2013).  
 
Using a full model with Interaction condition (Individuals vs Pairs), Context (Same 
maze vs Different Irregular vs Different Regular), and Block (First vs Second), plus 
their interaction, Block had a significant effect over participants’ alignment in 
description use, with participants using more aligned descriptions in the second 
block vs the first block, across Interaction conditions and Contexts (χ²=16.37, 
p=<.0001). The odds of participants using aligned descriptions were 3.6% higher in 
the second block of the game, compared to the first block (but consider high 
alignment scores in the first block, Table 4.5). We used deviation-coded contrasts to 
code for the different layout Contexts (Same maze considered as baseline), and 
compared participants’ output in the first 3 rounds of the game (first block, same 
irregular maze across conditions) with their output in the last 3 rounds (second 
block, different mazes per condition). For participants in Pairs, alignment was coded 
considering their partner’s last description; while for Individuals, it was coded 
considering their own previous description.  
 
Our results suggest the Context manipulation did not affect participants’ alignment, 
considering the first and the second blocks of the game (χ²=0.51, p=0.47). 
Interaction showed a significant main effect: Individuals were more aligned than 
Pairs throughout the game, across Contexts (χ²=7.12, p=0.008). However, this was 
to be expected due to the nature of the coding of their output, as each description 
was compared against the interlocutor’s previous description in Pairs, and against 









Table 4.4 Results of model of aligned descriptions 
Predictor Log-odds Betas SE X² and p values 
Intercept 3.2332 0.3393 - 
Interaction  -1.5516 0.6030 7.12, p=0.008** 
Context   -0.1981 0.7175 0.08, p=0.78 
Block     3.1577 1.0773 16.37, p=<0.0001*** 
Interaction * Context -0.3217 1.4309 0.05, p=0.82 
Interaction * Block 1.0521 1.2412 0.65, p=0.42 
Context * Block 0.8599 1.5136 0.33, p=0.57 
Interaction condition * Context * 
Block 
2.5591 3.0233 0.72, p=0.40 
Log-odds betas, Standard Error, Chi-squared and P-values from Generalized Mixed Model 
fitted using mixed function from the afex package. Intercept represents grand mean at First 
block. Model is fitted with deviation-coded variables Interaction (Individuals-Pairs) and 

















Mean use of Aligned descriptions 
Context Block Interaction mean 
Same maze 1 Individuals 0.961 
Same maze 2 Individuals 0.87 
Different Irregular 1 Individuals 0.941 
Different Irregular 2 Individuals 0.897 
Different Regular 1 Individuals 0.932 
Different Regular 2 Individuals 0.922 
Same maze 1 Pairs 0.94 
Same maze 2 Pairs 0.989 
Different Irregular 1 Pairs 0.773 
Different Irregular 2 Pairs 0.821 
Different Regular 1 Pairs 0.833 
Different Regular 2 Pairs 0.885 
 
Table 4.5 Mean use of aligned descriptions (description scheme use is coded as 0 (Not 
aligned) and 1 (Aligned), numeric mean is derived from participants’ total description use), 





Context change has been identified as an important driver in reference adaptation 
and change (Brennan & Clark, 1996; Van Der Wege, 2009; Horton & Gerrig, 2002): 
even though speakers tend to reuse their reference choices, they are more likely to 
change them if a new context, new environmental features, or new goals, make the 
previous choice less appropriate. As Ibarra & Tanenhaus (2016) have suggested, a 
reference that has been used in interaction reflects a temporary agreement on how 
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to conceptualise an object in a particular context and with informational needs, and 
therefore it makes sense that the same conceptualisation will no longer be required 
if these context and informational needs change.  
 
In this experiment, we asked participants to describe and navigate a maze game 
playing either in the same maze layout throughout the task, or in different mazes in 
the first and second blocks of the task. Our results suggest participants across 
Same Maze and Different Maze conditions used more Abstract descriptions as they 
advanced in the game, with a significant difference between the first and the second 
blocks of the game, across Interaction conditions. Our Context manipulation did not 
have a significant impact on participants’ referential adaptation, with no significant 
differences in use of Abstract or Concrete descriptions for participants in the Same 
or Different Maze conditions.  
 
While the Same Maze condition showed higher levels of Abstract description use, 
compared to the two Different Maze conditions (though not statistically significant), 
this difference might be derived from their higher use of Abstract descriptions in 
round 1 and across the first block of the game, a fact that cannot be explained by 
any experimental manipulation, as participants were given identical instructions and 
played otherwise identical tasks up to round 3. Moreover, these high initial levels of 
Abstract description use in the Same maze condition for both Individuals and Pairs 
of speakers might have influenced their adaptation patterns, especially in the case 
of the Pairs, who were using more than 80% of Abstract descriptions already in the 
first round. 
 
As all Context conditions show similar levels of switch towards Abstract description 
schemes as participants advance in the game, we might tentatively conclude that 
the emerging pressure created by the repetition of the task appeared to the 
participants to be stronger than the pressure from the context change, causing them 
to use more Abstract descriptions that eased the effort of the task independently of 
whether they were playing in the same or a different context (though consider the 
initial difference in description scheme use). 
 
Unlike in Experiment 1, in Experiment 2 both Individuals and Pairs of participants 
showed similar levels of switching towards Abstract descriptions. Two different 
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explanations might be suggested for this difference. On one hand, the fact that 
participants in Experiment 2 were aware they had to play 6 rounds of the task might 
have caused them to search for alternatives that could ease their effort earlier on in 
the game. This information might have provided an egocentric motivation for the 
switch that was not present in Experiment 1, where only 3 rounds were played. On 
the other hand, the impact that the context change had on participants’ evaluation of 
the task might be easier to process individually than in pairs, as speakers in 
interaction would require to update their coordination procedures to the new 
circumstances. This would also explain the fact that Individuals in the Same Maze 
condition showed almost identical levels of Abstract description use in the first and 
second blocks of the game, while Individuals in the Different conditions showed a 
steep increase towards more Abstract descriptions as they played more rounds. 
Even though these differences are not statistically significant, they might suggest 
Individual speakers are more likely to adapt their references in a more challenging 
context, a point that remains to be further explored. 
 
Overall, Experiment 2 did not provide significant evidence of an effect of a context 
change in speakers’ switch towards different referential alternatives. Participants 
used more Abstract descriptions as they advanced in the game irrespective of 
whether they were playing in the same maze layout as before or a new layout, 
suggesting that the context changes provided by the different layouts were not 
considered by the participants to provide significant additional pressures. 
Specifically, the results suggest the emergent pressure derived from the repetition of 
the task had a strong influence on participants across conditions, overshadowing 
any minor impact the context change might have had on the adaptation process.  
 
Further research is needed in order to understand how context change as an 
adaptation pressure would interact with other sources of reference determination. In 
particular, a more diverse task, where different referents need to be described, could 
help unravelling the effects of the repetition of the task and context changes, as the 
repetition of the description schemes in the maze game creates an experience effect 






4.3 Experiment 3: Participant role in referential adaptation 
 
Previous research has suggested pairs of interacting speakers are much more 
dynamic than individuals in terms of evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of 
their references and adapting accordingly: they will eliminate superfluous elements 
from their descriptions (Krauss & Weinheimer, 1964, 1966; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 
1986); they will refine and abstract their graphical symbols (Garrod et al., 2007); and 
they will switch towards easier-to-use systems in repetitive tasks (Experiment 1).  
 
At the same time, other research has suggested that, when speakers are asked to 
evaluate their own production, they tend to overestimate their effectiveness, 
implying they believe their references to be much more precise and appropriate than 
they actually are (Keysar & Henly, 2002). The overall picture suggests speakers 
gain a better perspective on their own production when interacting with a partner, 
and that the dynamic evaluation that is implied in each instance of the interaction 
allows them to act over this production, modifying what is needed to reach a balance 
between effort and effectiveness. However, interacting speakers are also driven 
towards alignment and conventionalisation, whereby an agreed-upon reference will 
continue to be used by both interlocutors, acting as a pairwise convention to 
designate a given item.  
 
What is it about interaction that facilitates adaptation? Some accounts suggest 
pairing of production and comprehension could be part of the answer: if two 
speakers are aligned in interaction, they can evaluate the effect of their production 
choices as these same choices will be repeated back to them by their interlocutor, 
creating an opportunity for the comprehension, as addressees, of the same 
references they originally used as speakers (Pickering & Garrod, 2013). Other 
accounts have put emphasis on situated reflection: Interacting partners gain higher-
level understanding of the task compared to individuals, as they get the opportunity 
to observe their partner’s attempts at solving the task from a more detached, 
omniscient position (Shirouzu et al., 2002). In this account, the comprehension 
process is crucial, as it allows the speaker to understand the effect of the linguistic 
choices from the point of view of the addressee, which should allow her to choose 




The interactive alignment account assumes communication is successful if 
communicators come to understand relevant aspects of the world in the same way 
as each other (Garrod & Pickering, 2009). So, if one speaker comes to ‘see the 
world’ in a different way, he should promote a change in the current convention 
which reflects this new conceptualisation. Considering that a pairwise convention 
will always be susceptible to change, as there is no community that would maintain 
the convention if an individual chooses a different option (Lewis, 1969/2002), the 
new perspective that the speaker has acquired should make its way into their 
discourse, potentially replacing their previous conceptualisation.  
 
But do speakers need to engage in interaction to gain these adaptability benefits, or 
would witnessing an interaction be as beneficial? In other words, would exposure to 
a dialogue, including the multiple exchanges that might be needed to reach a 
common perspective in understanding, be as useful as actually taking part in the 
interaction to be able to adapt and switch to a ‘better’ conceptualisation? In an effort 
to understand what is it about dialogue that makes it ‘better’ than monologue in 
terms of comprehensibility, Fox-Tree and Mayer (2008; see also Fox-Tree, 1999) 
designed a task that presented participants with descriptions by either individual 
speakers or interacting pairs, crucially controlling for the number of perspectives that 
each fragment introduced (e.g. a fragment with one perspective would talk about a 
tangram conceptualised as “a chicken” either in a dialogue between two people or in 
a monologue; while a fragment with two perspectives would refer to it as either “a 
chicken” or “a winged person”, either by two speakers in dialogue, or by the same 
speaker in different moments of a monologue).They found that the number of 
perspectives alone accounted for the benefit in comprehension, independent of 
whether the fragment came from one or two speakers. However, a similar study by 
Branigan et al. (2011) found that grounded descriptions (that is, descriptions that 
had been accepted by both speakers in a dialogue) were better in terms of 
comprehension even when they presented a single perspective, suggesting the 
interaction process that leads to grounding served as a kind of ‘quality control’ for 
the comprehensibility of these descriptions. 
 
The identity of their interacting partner should also be relevant in the speaker’s 
decision to maintain or abandon a referential precedent. Experimental work has 
shown that speakers are more likely to maintain sub-optimal references when 
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speaking to the same partner as before, compared to a new partner (Brennan & 
Clark, 1996). Similarly, Yoon and Brown-Schmidt (2014) showed that speakers were 
more likely to reconceptualise their descriptions (by adding new, different content 
words, compared to their previous descriptions) when addressing a new partner, 
compared to speakers addressing the same partner as before. Considering the 
likely role that the experience of their previous interaction played in the decision to 
modify their descriptions, we could also ask whether speakers would be more likely 
to adapt if they were talking to a new partner, compared to talking to the same 
partner as before. 
 
We designed Experiment 3 with the aim of establishing whether having full access 
to a dialogue was as good as participating in it to drive adaptation to description 
schemes that were better fitted to solve a task4. The experiment further set out to 
establish whether speakers would be as likely to adapt and switch to a better 
perspective when speaking to the same partner as in previous rounds of the game, 
compared to speaking to a new partner.  
 
Our task used the maze game in an atypical way: pairs of participants were 
distributed into Director or Matcher roles, with the Director guiding the Matcher to 
the positions of figures that were only visible in the Director’s maze. After the first 
round, the roles would be reversed for the next 3 rounds, thereby controlling for who 
was the main person responsible for the production of position references in each 
round. Participants were divided into three Participant Role conditions: a Same 
Partner / Matcher condition, where the Matcher of the first round would play as 
Director in rounds 2 to 4, with the same partner they had in the first round as 
Matcher; a New Partner / Matcher condition, where the Matcher of the first round 
would play as Director in rounds 2 to 4, with a new participant as Matcher; and a 
New Partner / Overhearer condition, where an Overhearer in the first round (who 
had been ‘witnessing’ the interaction of an independent pair) would play as Director 
in rounds 2 to 4, with a new participant as Matcher. 
                                               
4 A caveat to this design is that overhearers have been found to have problems in 
understanding and interpreting referential descriptions (Schober & Clark, 1989). However, in 
our experiment the setup is highly similar for speakers in interaction and for participants 
observing the interaction, as the written chat medium prevents other non-linguistic factors 
from influencing understanding. Moreover, as the Overhearers only witness the interaction in 
the first round (without being asked to complete the task themselves), their ability to identify 
the exact positions described is not tested, allowing them to evaluate the speakers’ use of 
different description schemes in more general terms. 
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We expected participants to be less likely to adapt their referential expressions if 
talking to the same partner, compared to a new partner, as both alignment and 
conventionalisation are more likely to occur if the same interacting partner is 
maintained. Moreover, we expected participants to adapt more when talking to a 
new partner if they had the opportunity to interact directly with a partner in the 
previous round, compared to only overhearing the interaction of other participants. If 
the grounding process is as important as the perspectives that are produced in an 
interaction for the generation of ‘better’ references, being a part of that process 
should bear a stronger benefit, in terms of the evaluation that the individual can 
make of the ‘fit’ between the description scheme that is being used, and the task. 
Overall, we expected participants in Condition 2 (New Partner / Matcher) to adapt 
more by switching to Abstract description schemes than participants in Conditions 1 
and 3, and participants in Condition 3 (New Partner / Overhearer) to adapt more 








74 participants, comprising 43 females and 31 males (mean age 21.9 years), all 
University of Edinburgh students, took part in the experiment for payment. All 
participants were native English speakers. Participants read and signed an informed 
consent form before taking part in the experiment, and were given a debrief handout 
at the end. 
 
11 pairs of participants were assigned to the Same Partner / Matcher condition, 10 
trios of participants were assigned to the New Partner / Matcher condition, and 11 










The experiment used two different mazes: an irregular maze, for round 1, and a 
regular maze, for rounds 2 to 4 (Fig. 4.5), both defined according to our regularity 
measure (described in section 2.1.2 and in Chapter 3). Both mazes had the same 
number of squares (±1). In each round of the game, the same maze was presented 
to both participants in a pair. The participant in the role of Director was presented 
with a maze that had 6 common geometric figures randomly distributed in the 
maze’s available squares, while the participant in the Matcher role was presented 
with the same maze without any figures, and with a legend on the side of the maze 
that showed the 6 figures in a random order, numbered from 1 to 6 (Fig. 4.6). 
Participants in the Overhearer condition (round 1) received the same maze that was 












Fig. 4.6 Regular maze (rounds 2 to 4) from Director (left) and Matcher (right) points of view. 
 
Participants interacted through a text-based chat tool which was configured to show 
one turn of dialogue at a time. This restriction was intended to roughly simulate the 
fading property of spoken dialogue, and to ensure participants would maintain a 
continuous interaction, instead of delivering all their information in one turn. Each 
participants’ chat window displayed information about the typing status of the other 
participant, remaining round time, and text of the current dialogue turn. Turns did not 
fade until the next turn by any participant was submitted. In the Overhearer setup, 
the same chat window delivered the transcript on the interaction as playback, 
maintaining the timing of the original dialogue. As the chat displayed the 
participant’s name in each turn of the dialogue in all conditions, the output the 
Overhearer would see was very similar to the output each interacting participant 
received. 
 
The experiment software presented the mazes and figures, and recorded 
participants’ typed utterances and other keyboard activity. The experiment was 





Our design included a Participant role condition: 1. Same Partner / Matcher, 2. New 
Partner / Matcher, and 3. New Partner / Overhearer (between-participants); and 4 
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rounds (within-participants). As the differences between Participant role conditions 
were apparent from the first round, all analyses are performed as a 3 (Participant 





Participants came to the lab in pairs or trios; we ensured that members of a pair or 
trio did not know each other in advance. They were randomly assigned to a 
Participant role condition (1. Same Partner / Matcher, 2. New Partner / Matcher, 3. 
New Partner / Overhearer). They were given verbal and written instructions 
together, explicitly stating which role each of them was going to be performing in 
each round of the game, and then seated in individual sound-proofed booths 
equipped with a network computer. They were told they could communicate freely 
through the online chat tool, and that their joint goal was to make the two mazes 
look exactly the same. To do this, the Matcher was required to provide the Director 
with the order of the figures, and the Director was to provide the Matcher with 
positions for those figures. The written instructions given to the Director included an 
example designed to prime participants to use Concrete descriptions, such as “The 
heart is two up and two left from the starting point”. This example was absent in the 
Matcher’s instructions; as such, the Director was directly primed to use Concrete 
descriptions, but the Matcher was only primed to use whichever description scheme 
the Director decided to use. 
 
All participants played a total of 4 rounds. The first round was performed on an 
irregular maze. After completing the first round, participants would swap roles, with 
the Matcher of the first round becoming Director for the next 3 rounds, and either the 
Director of the first round (in Condition 1) or a new participant (Conditions 2 and 3) 
becoming Matcher (Fig. 4.7). The swapping procedure was performed automatically 
by the software. 
 
In Condition 3, a participant would ‘witness’ the interaction of a previous pair in 
round 1 (randomly chosen from first round games in Conditions 1 and 2), by having 
the full transcript of their dialogue delivered one turn at a time in their chat window, 
while the corresponding Matcher’s maze configuration was presented in their 
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screen. After the transcript playback was completed, the participant would receive a 
new maze, becoming Director for the following 3 rounds, with a new participant (who 
had been waiting in a different booth) performing as Matcher.  
 
Condition 1 (Same Partner / 
Matcher) 
Condition 2 (New Partner / 
Matcher) 
Condition 3 (New Partner / 
Overhearer) 
 
A              B 
 
A              B 
 
A             B      C 
B              A B              C C             D 
 
Fig. 4.7 Distribution of participants per Condition. 
 
 
4.3.1.5 Coding of transcripts 
Participants’ responses in terms of description scheme used and alignment were 





We will analyse participants’ responses in two subsections: 1) Choice of description 
scheme (use of Abstract or Concrete descriptions per dialogue turn), and 2) 
Alignment (use of the same description scheme as the previous turn, per Pair). 
 
 
4.3.2.1 Choice of description scheme 
 
Our experiment presented participants with a variation of the traditional maze game 
task, where they were asked to perform different roles (Director, Matcher, or 
Overhearer) according to the Condition they were assigned to and the round they 
were playing. Summary statistics show participants used more Abstract descriptions 




We used logistic multilevel regressions (lme4 package in R, Bates et al., 2015) to 
analyse participants’ use of description scheme according to these changes in their 
participant roles. We included Participant Role condition and Round number as fixed 
effects, plus their interaction. The random structure was the maximal structure 
justified by our design (following Barr et al., 2013), including random intercepts for 
Pair and for Participant nested in Pair (to account for the initial variation between 
pairs and between subjects), and random slopes for Pair over Round number (to 
account for the differential effect of task experience over the different Pairs). P-
values were obtained through likelihood ratio tests for each parameter against a 
model without that parameter, using the function mixed in the afex package 
(Singmann et al., 2017). 
 
Mean use of Abstract descriptions per round 
Maze No Condition N Abstract mean sd se ci 
1 Matcher/Same Partner 148 0.311 0.464 0.038 0.075 
1 Matcher/New Partner 74 0.514 0.503 0.058 0.117 
1 Overhearer/New Partner 114 0.386 0.489 0.046 0.091 
2 Matcher/Same Partner 123 0.642 0.481 0.043 0.086 
2 Matcher/New Partner 64 0.688 0.467 0.058 0.117 
2 Overhearer/New Partner 108 0.537 0.501 0.048 0.096 
3 Matcher/Same Partner 98 0.745 0.438 0.044 0.088 
3 Matcher/New Partner 49 0.857 0.354 0.051 0.102 
3 Overhearer/New Partner 70 0.686 0.468 0.056 0.111 
4 Matcher/Same Partner 92 0.652 0.479 0.05 0.099 
4 Matcher/New Partner 41 0.854 0.358 0.056 0.113 
4 Overhearer/New Partner 76 0.658 0.478 0.055 0.109 
Table 4.6 Mean use of Abstract descriptions and associated descriptive statistics 
(description scheme use is coded as 0 (Concrete) and 1 (Abstract), numeric mean is derived 
from participants’ total description use), per first and second blocks of the game (rounds 1 to 
3 vs 4 to 6), per Context condition. N represents the total number of descriptions that were 




Using a full model with Participant Role condition (1. Same Partner / Matcher, 2. 
New Partner / Matcher, 3. New Partner / Overhearer), and Round (1 to 4, as 
numeric predictor), plus their interaction, Round had a significant effect over the use 
of Abstract or Concrete descriptions, with participants using more Abstract 
descriptions with an additional round played, across Participant Role conditions 
(χ²=9.47, p=0.002): with a 1 round increase, the odds of participants using Abstract 
descriptions increased by 24%. 
 
Our results suggest the Participant Role manipulation did not affect participants’ use 
of Abstract or Concrete descriptions: Participants use of Abstract or Concrete 
descriptions did not vary significantly according to the Participant Role they were 
assigned to (χ²=0.58, p=0.45). Specifically, use of Abstract or Concrete descriptions 
in Participant Role conditions 2 and 3 was not significantly different from condition 1 
(we used deviation-coded contrasts to code for the different Participant Role 
conditions, with Same Partner / Matcher considered as baseline). 
 
 
Table 4.7 Results of model of description scheme use 
Predictor Log-odds Betas SE X² and p values 
Intercept -3.5411 0.6058 - 
Participant Role 1.1262 1.5005 0.58, p=0.45 
Round  2.5073 0.7071 9.47, p=0.002** 
Participant Role * Round -0.1998 1.7753 0.01, p=0.91 
Log-odds betas, Standard Error, Chi-squared and P-values from Generalized Mixed Model 
fitted using mixed function from the afex package. Intercept represents grand mean at 
Round 1. Model is fitted with deviation-coded variable Participant Role (Same Partner / 
Matcher vs New Partner / Matcher vs New Partner / Overhearer). Round is coded as a 










Even though the increase of Abstract description use was numerically smaller in 
condition 3, where the participant had only witnessed the interaction in round 1 





We used a logistic multilevel regression model to analyse participants’ alignment in 
their descriptions according to the different Participant Role condition they were 
assigned to, and the number of rounds they had played. We included Participant 
Role condition (1. Same Partner / Matcher, 2. New Partner / Matcher, 3. New 
Partner / Overhearer) and Round number (1 to 4, as a numeric predictor) as fixed 
effects, plus their interaction. The random structure was the maximal structure 
justified by our design, including random intercepts for Pair and for Participant 
nested in Pair (to account for the initial variation between pairs and between 
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subjects), and random slopes for Pair over Round number (to account for the 
differential effect of task experience over the different Pairs of participants).  
 
In a full model, which predicted Alignment scores from Participant Role condition 
and Round number, Round number had a significant effect over Alignment. 
Participants produced more aligned descriptions as they played more rounds, 
across Participant Role conditions (χ²=15.86, p=<.0001): with a 1 round increase, 
the odds of participants aligning to the previous description increased by 20% (Table 
4.8). Participant Role condition was not associated to significant differences in 
Alignment scores, with participants in the two New Partner conditions (conditions 2 
and 3) not behaving significantly different from participants in the Same Partner 
condition (χ²=0.10, p=0.75). Proportions of aligned and not aligned descriptions are 
shown in Fig. 4.9. 
 
 
Table 4.8 Results of model of aligned descriptions 
Predictor Log-odds Betas SE X² and p values 
Intercept 0.6775 0.5730 - 
Participant Role 0.4092 1.2866 0.10, p=0.75 
Round  1.2109 0.3544 15.86, p=<0.0001*** 
Participant Role * Round -0.6857 0.7506 0.88, p=0.35 
Log-odds betas, Standard Error, Chi-squared and P-values from Generalized Mixed Model 
fitted using mixed function from the afex package. Intercept represents grand mean at 
Round 1. Model is fitted with deviation-coded variable Participant Role (Same Partner / 
Matcher vs New Partner / Matcher vs New Partner / Overhearer). Round is coded as a 













Previous research suggests participant role might be relevant in an individual’s 
commitment to conventional labels. While speakers and addressees usually 
converge on the use of the same references, which they hold as pairwise 
conventions, side-participants and overhearers might not be as committed to their 
use, as they didn’t have the same opportunities to ground those references as the 
direct participants. We designed an experiment that set out to test whether speakers 
would show different levels of referential adaptation (the likelihood of abandoning a 
referential precedent in order to switch to a new reference that is better adapted to 
the task/context) according to their participant role in the task. Using a variant of the 
traditional maze game with defined Director and Matcher roles, we asked 
participants to play successive rounds of the game with either the same partner they 
had played in the previous round, or a new partner. An additional condition had 
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participants overhearing the first round of the game, in order to become direct 
participants in the following rounds.  
 
Our results suggest our Participant Role manipulation was not strong enough to 
promote significant differences in speakers’ referential adaptation. Even though the 
New Partner / Matcher condition showed higher levels of switching to Abstract 
descriptions, the differences between conditions were not significant. Round 
number, on the other hand, had a significant effect across Participant Role 
conditions, suggesting an incremental effect of experience dominated the adaptation 
process.  
 
The numeric differences between our Participant Role conditions show a trend that 
partially follows the expected pattern of results. Condition 2 (New Partner / Matcher) 
shows the highest use of Abstract descriptions in rounds 2 to 4, in line with our 
prediction of more adaptation of speakers who had taken part in the dialogue and 
were interacting with a new partner. However, this difference might also be related 
to the higher initial levels of Abstract description use in Condition 2, which cannot be 
explained by task demands. As the proportion of Abstract descriptions used in a 
round is related to the proportion used in previous rounds, which grows as 
participants become more aligned throughout the task, a random initial difference is 
likely to have consequences in subsequent rounds. 
 
Overall, alignment scores were high across all Participant Role conditions and 
rounds, which can be partially explained by our use of a Director/Matcher paradigm 
where only one individual was required to describe positions in each round. As such, 
the task produced dialogues that were less flexible in their use of references than 
previous maze game experiments. Moreover, these high levels of alignment do not 
seem to be reflecting a fixed description scheme choice, as participants use of 
Abstract description scheme varied across rounds. Instead, they suggest 
participants were much more likely to switch to a different description scheme 
between rounds, rather than within rounds. Even though we cannot statistically 
compare these results with those of previous experiments, this pattern suggests 
adaptation in this experiment was the result of a more global evaluation process of 






The experiments described in this chapter set out to analyse the effect of two 
potential drivers of referential adaptation, context changes and participant role, on 
speakers’ change of reference choice. Experiment 2 used the maze game paradigm 
to present pairs and individual participants with either the same maze in each round, 
or different mazes in the first and second blocks of the game. Our results suggest 
this context manipulation was not enough to promote significant differences in 
participants’ referential adaptation, with participants across conditions using more 
Abstract descriptions as they played more rounds. Contrary to previous research in 
referential adaptation, our experimental manipulation did not render the previously 
used references overspecific or sub-optimal, as all mazes could potentially be 
solved with either Concrete or Abstract descriptions. As participants switched to 
more appropriate references in all conditions, our results seem to suggest that a 
stronger experimental manipulation would be needed to discriminate between 
adaptation to context in different interaction roles, and simple accumulation of 
experience.  
 
Experiment 3 used a variant of the maze game, where participants were assigned to 
a Director or Matcher role. Participants played a first round either as Matchers or 
Overhearers (witnessing the dialogue of a random independent pair), and the next 3 
rounds as Directors with either the same partner as in round 1, or a new partner. 
Our results suggest the Participant Role manipulation was not enough to promote 
significant differences in participants’ behaviour, with participants across Participant 
Role conditions increasing their use of Abstract descriptions as they played more 
rounds. As the numeric trends in our results seem to follow our predictions, with a 
more central role in the interaction (participant vs overhearer), and a new partner (as 
opposed to the same partner as before) both associated to more adaptation, we 
could assume a stronger manipulation might be able to determine whether different 
levels of involvement might impact speakers’ referential adaptation. Specifically, the 
number of rounds participants played in either Matcher or Overhearer roles vs the 
rounds spent on Director role could be reversed, in order to create a task where the 
opportunity to change a referential schema comes after a longer history of 




Results from both experiments confirm participants are more likely to switch to 
Abstract descriptions as they play more rounds. Considering this effect has been 
replicated in most maze game studies (Garrod & Doherty, 1994; Healey, 1997; Mills, 
2014), it can be assumed that any differences our experimental manipulations might 
have generated were masked by this overarching effect. Future studies might be 
able to determine whether context changes and participant involvement might cause 
significant differences in speakers’ referential adaptation, considering a baseline 














The experiments covered in this chapter will address the question of the interplay 
between egocentric and audience-based factors in the use of linguistic precedents –
items that have already been used in the same communicative situation– in 
referential communication. As discussed in the previous chapters, even though in 
most dialogical settings speakers tend to repeat the linguistic choices they and their 
interlocutors have made in the past, there are several scenarios where they are 
likely to change these choices. Usually, these changes are produced to 
accommodate to a change in context, to respond to changing communicative needs, 
or to adapt to the requirements of the task (as in Experiment 1), but the influence of 
speaker’s processing needs as drivers of these changes has not been thoroughly 
investigated. In an attempt to shed some light on this topic, we will report two 
experiments that address the influences of participant role and context over 





The production of referential descriptions is a task speakers face on a daily basis. 
Even though extensive work has been carried out to explain the myriad factors that 
could have an influence in linguistic choices when producing a reference, the 
process by which speakers evaluate these different factors and weigh them in real-
life dialogue is still unclear. Particularly, speakers’ choice of either maintaining or 
abandoning a referential precedent –a description that has been used previously in 
the conversation– has mostly been looked at from a time-course perspective, where 
researchers have tried to determine which factors are available at which point in 
processing. However, even though researchers disagree on the availability of 
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audience-centred information at early stages in production, most studies agree with 
a role for some kind of model of the addressee’s perspective in the speaker’s 
processing of references, which is consistent with the evidence from natural 
language use in conversation (Horton & Gerrig, 2005; Arnold, 2008). In considering 
their addressee’s perspective, speakers need to evaluate the information they share 
and don’t share with them and how certain they are of this fact, in order to make a 
choice that is not only safe (to avoid having to incur additional turns or repair) but 
also efficient in terms of production resources. In the sections that follow we will 
review the role of egocentric and audience-centred perspectives on production and 
the factors that influence lexical choice, particularly common ground. Additionally, 
we will analyse the status of referential precedents from the speaker’s perspective, 




5.1.1 Self and other(s) in reference choice 
 
The use of egocentric and audience-centred information in speakers’ choice of 
references has been hotly debated since the publication of H.H. Clark and 
colleagues’ classic works on common ground (Clark & Marshall, 1981; Clark & 
Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Schober & Clark, 1989; Clark & Brennan, 1991; Wilkes-Gibbs & 
Clark, 1992). The authors proposed that speakers keep track of the information they 
mutually share with their interlocutor(s) and use this information to determine when 
to use a linguistic precedent and when new information is required. An opposing 
perspective was put forward by Keysar and colleagues (the ‘monitoring and 
adjustment model’ of Horton & Keysar, 1996; Keysar, 1997; Keysar, Barr, & Horton, 
1998; Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Paek, 1998; Barr & Keysar, 2002; Keysar & Barr, 
2005), who argued common ground is only accessed by the speakers as a 
secondary source of information, mainly to diagnose and correct coordination 
problems, with the bulk of the processing employing an egocentric perspective (see 
also Bard & Aylett, 2005). A third perspective proposed that what is traditionally 
thought of as common ground use in language processing can be better understood 
as the effects of general memory processes shaping the information available to 
speakers in dialogue, a proposal that does not require any appeals to guided 
perspective processing (Horton & Gerrig, 2005, 2016). 
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Hanna and Tanenhaus (2005) have more recently argued against a purely 
egocentric account, showing experimentally that the speaker’s perspective can be 
considered by the addressee from the very first moments of comprehension in 
object disambiguation tasks. In their work, participants are able to constrain the 
possible interpretations of ambiguous utterances by considering the perspective of 
the speaker, to whom only one interpretation is available. Additional work by Hanna 
and colleagues (Hanna, Tanenhaus, & Trueswell, 2003) has argued that the use of 
common ground or egocentric perspectives is flexible and probabilistic, a position 
that could explain the different patterns of results found by different research groups. 
 
To this point, most of the experimental work designed to discriminate between a 
main egocentric or other-centred influence on maintaining or changing referential 
choices has dealt with the consequences for listeners, who might or might not 
benefit from a same speaker advantage for maintained precedents, or a different 
speaker advantage for broken precedents (Metzing & Brennan, 2003; Kronmüller & 
Barr, 2015). From the speaker’s perspective, the interplay of these two factors has 
been studied looking at production choices, mostly addressing the differential 
production of appropriate vs under- or over-specified descriptions (Horton & Keysar, 
1996; Brennan & Clark, 1996).  
 
While Barr and Keysar (2002) showed that listeners expect the same labels to be 
maintained when referring to the same objects, as Brennan and Clark (1996) had 
predicted, it is not clear whether speakers would maintain overspecific labels due to 
their consideration of the listener’s expectations, or rather due to ease of processing 
of primed labels. Moreover, there is no evidence that speakers are aware of this 
potential benefit for the addressee in maintaining the same labels, nor of any benefit 
for themselves as a consequence of the benefits for the addressee. Further work by 
Galati and Brennan (2010) found that speakers attenuated the information they gave 
on a narration (using a lower amount of detail in descriptions of events and 
characters, and lower clarity of articulation), thereby lowering their own production 
effort, if talking to the same addressee for a second time, compared to talking to a 
new partner, suggesting some degree of audience-design, but also an egocentric 
motivation. Taken together, the evidence seems to suggest speakers consider 
preferentially their own needs, but that they are aware of the needs of their partners. 
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The question is, then, what does it take for them to take their partners’ needs into 
account. 
 
Regarding the commonality of precedents, work by Shintel and Keysar (2007) asked 
whether it was relevant for listeners to know that a precedent had been mutually 
established (in a conceptual pact fashion, that is, accepted in interaction by both 
speakers) to expect speakers to maintain it, and found that listeners expected 
precedents to be maintained independently of whether they were mutually known. 
Precedents serve as linguistic indices to the representation of the referent in 
memory, and that link, presumably faster and easier to retrieve than interpreting a 
full descriptive reference against context, should be highlighted in both speakers’ 
and listeners’ memories (Barr & Keysar, 2002). Following this question, we could 
ask whether it is necessary for speakers to know that a precedent has been 
mutually established to maintain it, or whether it is only necessary that they 
themselves used it (as recent work by Fukumura and Van Gompel (2012) seems to 
suggest). Section 5.1.3 will discuss these possibilities. 
 
 
5.1.2 Lexical choice and overspecification in dialogue 
 
When a speaker faces the task of providing a referential description for an 
addressee to identify this referent in a given context, several competing forces are 
likely to be involved. Firstly, the words she might choose appear with different 
frequencies in her language, so their availability in her mental lexicon will differ. 
Secondly, her own previous use of language might be influencing the activation of 
these words in her memory, causing some words to be more readily available for 
use in production or comprehension (Barr & Keysar, 2002). Thirdly, the context 
might make some word choices more or less likely to be used, considering a myriad 
of contextual factors like the addressee’s identity and their shared history, the 
expertise of the addressee in the topic, other items in context that might complicate 
target identification, cultural/group preferences, and so on. 
 
For most objects, the most readily available label should be the basic-level noun that 
uniquely defines it as a unit, such as chair, car, bird, etc., as opposed to 
superordinate-level nouns such as animal or furniture, and to specific, subordinate-
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level nouns such as convertible or sparrow (Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, and 
Boyes-Braem, 1976). According to Cruse (1977), the most common term that is 
informative enough to uniquely identify the referent should be considered unmarked, 
while other terms should be considered marked, and therefore their use explained 
by other properties of the context. However, this does not consider how experience 
might modulate the ‘default’ concept that is used by a speaker. Tanaka and Taylor 
(1991) showed how expertise on a topic affected the use of basic level labels, with 
experts on a given field using more specific labels to refer to items in that field (e.g. 
a bird-watching enthusiast using “starling” where most speakers would have used 
“bird”). We can assume that interaction and the speaker’s history of use of a label 
might similarly influence their label choice, with speakers being more likely to use 
non-basic level words depending on their cumulative history of interaction regarding 
that word and topic. 
 
In the course of a dialogue, the history of interaction between the interlocutors adds 
other sources of information to the lexical selection process. Lexical entrainment 
explains the repetition of the same word choices to refer to the same items. Lexical 
precedents are established as the speakers use specific words for specific referents, 
and conceptual pacts can be established as interlocutors agree to the use of a 
specific conceptualisation to refer to an object. As priming and frequency effects can 
affect lexical availability in general (Bates, Masling, & Kintsch, 1978), lexical 
precedents affect availability for that particular conversation, and for those particular 
interlocutors –though some discussion exists on how exactly this is to be 
understood, as described in the first part of this chapter. Moreover, reference-
meaning pairs that have been repeatedly used by a pair of interacting speakers 
become routinized for the purposes of their interaction, as the links between the 
words and the specific meaning they have been used to mean become stronger and 
more directly accessible (Pickering & Garrod, 2004; Garrod, 2011). 
 
According to Grice’s (1975) Maxim of Quantity, speakers should provide their 
interlocutor with as much information as needed to successfully identify their 
intended referent, but not more than is needed. In the absence of competitor 
objects, the reference to a common item will then likely correspond to the 
‘unmarked’ basic-level noun, in Cruse’s terms (e.g. “that’s my dog”), while the use of 
over- or underspecific information should be taken by the listener as an indicator of 
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a different meaning being implied (e.g. “that’s my Scottish terrier” signalling that I 
have other dogs, or “that’s my pet” highlighting my specific relationship to it). 
However, overspecification, defined as a speaker including more information than 
what would be needed to uniquely identify the referent but without a different 
communicative intention, is common in natural language use.  
 
Colour has been identified as the feature of objects most likely to be overspecified in 
descriptive statements (Tarenskeen et al., 2015; see also Sedivy, 1999, 2005). 
According to Rubio-Fernández (2016), the mention of the colour of an object, even 
when not necessary to establish a unique reference, might help facilitate object 
identification, as it usually rests on perceptual salience and contrast in context1. In 
spontaneous mention, Sedivy (1999) found that participants produced unnecessary 
colour adjectives in descriptive statements nearly half of the time, compared to 
scalar adjectives that were rarely produced when not required for contrasting 
purposes. Overspecification is also susceptible to priming, with speakers using more 
overspecific references after hearing or using an overspecific reference (particularly 
if the syntactic structure of the references is similar, and if the dimension being 
overspecified is the same) (Goudbeek & Krahmer, 2012). 
 
Even though in most contexts overspecification can be assumed not to be costly to 
the listener (though in specific contexts it can cause comprehension problems or 
delays, as in Sedivy, Tanenhaus, Chambers, & Carlson, 1999; Engelhardt et al. 
2011), speakers usually avoid producing redundant information, as the cost of 
production would be increased without a communicative payoff. However, if a 
specific description, like “the Scottish terrier” is used in dialogue in an appropriate 
context (e.g. where other dogs are present, rendering a basic-level label ambiguous 
in context), what should a speaker do when the context changes (i.e. no other dogs 
are present) and the use of a specific description is no longer justified? The speaker 
is faced with competing demands: on the one hand, she should avoid producing 
more information than is needed to uniquely identify the referent, and on the other 
                                               
1 Even though Engelhardt et al. (2011) found a detrimental effect for the comprehension of 
overspecific descriptions compared to noun-only descriptions, their results show that colour 
overspecification elicited reaction times that were less than half those of size 
overspecification, suggesting that even in contexts where more information could be 
detrimental, colour is much more easily processed than other dimensions. Moreover, their 
main pattern of results might be partially driven by their use of simple 2-object displays, 
where object identification is already at its lowest difficulty level (Rubio-Fernández, 2016). 
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hand, she should maintain the lexical precedent that was established with her 
interlocutor in the initial descriptions of the item. This was the question posed by 
Brennan and Clark (1996), who showed that a majority of speakers continued to use 
entrained descriptions even when these became overspecific for the current 
context2. Additionally, they found a difference in speaker behaviour according to the 
identity of their addressee: speakers continued using overspecific descriptions if 
they continued interacting with the same partner, but switched to basic-level labels if 
they were interacting with a new partner. 
 
Brennan and Clark discussed their results in terms of conceptual pacts: a speaker 
will maintain an overspecific description if they continue speaking to the same 
partner because they share a conceptual pact with them, and changing the 
conceptualisation they agreed on would signal to the partner that a change of 
meaning is implied (E. Clark, 1997). Inversely, they would abandon the overspecific 
descriptions if the partner with whom the conceptual pact was established is no 
longer present. However, even if no conceptual pact is established, speakers 
establish lexical precedents when they use a conceptualisation, such that they are 
primed to repeat the same conceptualisation when they are faced with the same 
referent. This fact might explain why more than half of Brennan and Clark’s 
participants retained their entrained overspecific descriptions even when they were 




5.1.3 What does it take to form a conceptual pact? 
 
Even though related, the terms common ground (Stalnaker, 1978; Clark, 1996) and 
conceptual pact (Brennan & Clark, 1996) are fundamentally different. While common 
ground refers to all the information that is common to both interlocutors and believed 
by them to be so, including the knowledge of the linguistic precedents they have 
used during the current conversation and previous exchanges, a conceptual pact 
implies more than mere adherence to a previously used linguistic precedent. It 
reflects the idea that a conceptualisation in dialogue, whether it is actively used by 
                                               
2 Complementary, Barr and Keysar (2002) found that listeners expected speakers to 
maintain referential precedents even when these became overspecific in a new context. 
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both speakers or only used by one and ratified (by action or omission) by the other, 
establishes an agreement between them that states that this, and not any other, is 
the conceptualisation that will be used to designate that item.  
 
Extending the classic example, if two speakers are discussing opposing views on 
abortion, with one speaking about “the foetus” and the other calling it “the baby”, the 
fact that they have used both conceptualisations is common ground between them, 
but no conceptual pact has been established. The mere belief that a 
conceptualisation has been used and understood does not establish a conceptual 
pact, as there has to be some sort of ratification of the acceptance of that specific 
conceptualisation by both interlocutors. 
 
Both everyday conversations and experimental scenarios like tangram games offer 
examples of this divergence. In dialogue, the fact that a specific perspective on an 
object has been understood does not necessarily mean that a conceptual pact has 
been established, as new subsequent perspectives might be brought to the 
conversation. Consider the following example (taken from Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 
1986): 
 
A. Okay, and the next one is the person that looks like they’re carrying 
something and it’s sticking out to the left. It looks like a hat that’s upside 
down. 
B. The guy that’s pointing to the left again? 
A. Yeah, pointing to the left, that’s it! (laughs) 
B. Okay. 
 
Even though the first perspective proposed by A is understood by B, the conceptual 
pact that had been established between them reflected a different conceptualisation, 
which is ratified in its status by both interlocutors once it is brought back to the 
conversation. This dialogue fragment shows that the conceptual pact is one of a 
number of possible conceptualisations, while at the same time holding a special 
status as an agreed-upon tool that stands not as a direct description of the referent, 
but as a link to the dyad’s past history of interaction.  
 
Unlike linguistic precedents, conceptual pacts are not merely accumulated, but 
actively established by the interlocutors. In tangram games, alternative 
conceptualisations can be proposed by a participant only as a consequence of 
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having understood a previous conceptualisation by their partner, as they would 
reflect a different or complementary view on something that has already been 
identified. Past descriptions or references can be discarded or ratified only if they 
are understood as descriptions of the item. 
 
A. Okay, the next one looks, is the one with the person standing on one leg 
with the tail. 
B. Okay. 
A. Looks like an ice skater. 
B. Yeah, okay. 
  (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986) 
 
Considering this, we could assume that in referring to any object there should be a 
difference in provisionality (i.e. certainty with which the reference will be reused), 
derived from the level of grounding that can be assumed from the reference. A 
mutually confirmed conceptual pact would correspond to the highest level of 
grounding, with the mere use of a reference with no feedback that could confirm or 
disconfirm its understanding and/or acceptance, at the bottom of the scale. This 
difference would imply that, as recent studies have shown (Van Der Wege, 2009; 
Brown-Schmidt, 2012), a speaker with higher grounding certainty should have a 
stronger basis for interactional processes that rely on the certainty of the established 
convention, like the referential reduction process that interlocutors engage in after 
they ground a specific perspective (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; see also Chapter 2, 
Literature Review). However, it would also imply that a speaker with lower grounding 
certainty should be less inclined towards these interaction-dependant processes, 
and specifically, that the degree of grounding of the speaker’s references should 
influence their reuse. Thus, we might ask how the addressee’s participant role (their 
degree of involvement in the dialogue) might affect the speaker’s certainty in her 
reference choices. This will be developed in the next section. 
 
 
5.1.4 Participant roles and co-presence heuristics 
 
An initial definition of who is and is not a participant in a conversation was proposed 
by Goffman (1974), differentiating an addressed participant from a ratified 
participant and from an overhearer. An addressee is defined as the individual to 
whom the speech is directed and who is expected to answer or give other forms of 
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feedback; while a ratified participant is still considered as part of the conversation 
but is not specifically addressed by the speaker. An overhearer, on the other hand, 
might or might not be acknowledged as present and/or encouraged to listen in.  
Research involving third parties in dialogue settings seems to vary in terminology, 
with some studies stating that silent individuals accessing the conversation are to be 
considered side-participants (Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark, 1992), and others describing 
any individual who is not a ratified addressee as an overhearer (Schober & Clark, 
1989). From the point of view of the speaker, there is a social obligation towards the 
ratified participants in the conversation that is not present with respect to the non-
ratified participants, overhearers or eavesdroppers (Clark, 1985). This social 
obligation entails that the utterances produced by the speaker must be designed 
with the intention of being comprehended not only by the addressee but also by all 
other ratified parties to the conversation, though not necessarily by outsiders. 
 
According to Schober and Clark (1989), overhearers should be at a disadvantage, 
compared to ratified participants, even if they are members of the same cultural 
group as the interlocutors, the interlocutors do not know each other in advance, and 
they have witnessed the conversation from the beginning. This disadvantage would 
derive from the nature of the grounding process, which requires actions by both the 
speaker and the listener3. However, even if there is no guarantee of understanding, 
most references to common objects should be considered understandable, in the 
absence of confounds or ambiguities. Following this argument, Wilkes-Gibbs and 
Clark (1992) stated that co-presence and attention to what is being said should be 
enough for an individual to be considered a participant in the conversation. It is 
implied in this statement that references are considered to be transparent enough as 
not to require negotiation to establish their meaning; however, it is not clear how the 
speaker is supposed to interpret this participant’s status. 
 
Co-presence heuristics serve to short-circuit an important part of the workload that a 
complete recursive inference process would require if we were to track the full 
amount of common ground we share with our interlocutor in real-time conversation 
(Clark & Marshall, 1981; Barr, 2005). Indeed, if people share the same context and 
                                               
3 While this might be true for complex dialogue situations where the need for clarification or 
repair requests is generally high (see Healey, De Ruiter, & Mills, 2018), for simpler 
exchanges the difference between being the addressee for whom speech is tailored, and 
being an overhearer who has access to the same information but cannot actively interact 
with it, might not be as big. 
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speak the same language, in the absence of additional difficulties they should be 
entitled to believe they will understand what is established in the conversation in a 
similar way, unless what has been said is not sufficient to achieve shared mental 
representations (Brennan, 2005). Different grounding criteria are said to be 
established by speakers in each communication circumstance, depending on their 
evaluation of how much information should be shared as baseline between them, 
and other contextual considerations such as the communication medium and the 
perceived difficulty of the referential task. 
 
Clark and Carlson (1982, see also Clark and Schaefer, 1989) proposed the Principle 
of Responsibility by which, after speakers have proposed a conceptualisation in the 
form of an utterance, the addressee needs to give positive evidence of its 
acceptance. After this process is completed, both interlocutors are assumed to be 
mutually responsible for their understanding of what was said. This agreement 
entails that the addressee is responsible for taking action when he has not 
understood the speaker, initiating a process of collaborative negotiation in order to 
reach understanding. The definition of positive evidence, in this context, includes all 
possible addressee actions that do not establish misunderstanding, such as 
continuing paying attention to the speaker, or any positive backchannels or 
feedback. A second Principle of Distant Responsibility was proposed by Clark & 
Wilkes-Gibbs (1986), to cover for those instances in which the speaker cannot 
obtain appropriate and timely feedback from their addressees, such as in writing, or 
video recording. According to this principle, speakers can self-repair or change their 
references according to their evaluation of their own output, without any input from 
the addressee. 
 
Linguistic feedback in the form of either full turns by the addressee or backchannels 
are considered by the speaker as evidence of understanding, with different types of 
backchannels being consistently interpreted as indicating different communicative 
demands that need to be fulfilled, and thus ‘steering’ the course of the speech in 
different ways (Tolins & Fox-Tree, 2014). Considering this argument, consistent 
affirmative feedback (“Yes, I know which one you mean”, “Got it”, “Done”, or even 
shorter recipiency markers like “Yup”, Bangerter & Clark, 2003) should be 
interpreted as signalling to the speaker that their descriptions are being understood 
as they are, and therefore are –all other things being equal– ‘good’ descriptions of 
140 
 
the target. For the speaker, this confirmation of the success of their utterances 
suggests that whatever strategy was employed in their planning and production was 
appropriate to both the addressee and the context where it was to be understood 
(Clark & Krych, 2004).  
 
It could be considered that the original addressee’s feedback might work as proof of 
‘general’ comprehensibility for the speaker, who might extend their positive (or 
negative) evaluation of the reference in use to all other hearers who shared the 
same context (considering that a grounded perspective may be thought to be 
objectively easier to understand; Branigan et al., 2011). In this line, Gorman, Gegg-
Harrison, Marsh, and Tanenhaus (2013) found that speakers used descriptions 
instead of names with a new addressee when informed that this addressee shared 
the same knowledge as a previous partner who was not aware of the object’s name, 
suggesting speakers were able to extend their model of the addressee’s knowledge 
to new interlocutors. Most studies so far (Brennan & Clark, 1996; Garrod et al., 
2007; Van Der Wege, 2009) have shown speakers’ descriptive choices are affected 
by their common history with their partner, such that they would be more likely to 
abandon previously used descriptions if they believe their current addressee does 
not share the history of use of that reference. In the following section, we discuss 
the design of two experiments, aimed at understanding the process by which 
speakers come to make referential decisions in the light of both their own production 
needs and their addressee’s status in the conversation. 
 
 
5.1.5 Experiment motivation and design 
 
How are the different factors that influence speakers’ choice of referential 
expressions (production costs, lexical availability, provisionality of the expression, 
identity of the addressee, etc.) weighed in real-life dialogue? To specify this 
problem, we ask how the cost of producing an overspecified reference (in terms of 
cost for the speaker, and assuming no significant costs for the listener, Metzing & 
Brennan, 2003), with either the same or different partners, is weighed against the 
cost of switching to a new basic-level label, which should be easier to retrieve and 
produce (as discussed in section 5.1.2). Initially, we can consider four factors that 




1) The strength of the precedent, that is, how many times it has been used and how 
strong is its association with the referent.  
 
2) The degree of provisionality of the description, derived from the feedback and role 
of the conversational partner in the establishment of the precedent 
 
3) The status of the conversational partner (new vs known partner) in the test phase 
(when the entrained descriptions are no longer justified by the context, as in 
Brennan & Clark, 1996, experiment 3) 
 
4) The production cost of the descriptions, derived from the number of descriptions 
to be produced, ease of production (availability of salient dimensions, word retrieval, 
actual production/articulation), and cost of switching. 
 
Brennan and Clark (1996, experiment 3) used a card sorting game with two stages 
to understand whether speakers maintained or changed previously entrained 
referential descriptions according to the identity of the interlocutor. In the first part of 
their experiment, participants sorted a set of cards where each of the target items 
was shown along with other items in the same category (i.e. a target dog with three 
other dogs in the set), requiring specific descriptions, and in the second part, they 
sorted a different set where the same target items were unique in their category (i.e. 
only one dog in the set). The participants varied in whether they would maintain their 
overspecific descriptions or not in this second part based on the identity of their 
interlocutor: if the interlocutor was the same as in the first part, participants kept the 
entrained terms even when this meant being over-informative in the current context 
(i.e. they kept on calling the dog card “white terrier” when “dog” was enough to 
identify the card in the new context), but they switched to basic-level terms if talking 
to a new interlocutor.  
 
However, their study also showed that speakers across conditions kept using the 
entrained descriptions when these became overspecific in context, with over 70% of 
use of overspecific descriptions in the first round of the second part of the 
experiment, even for speakers with a new partner. Even in the fourth round of the 
second part, after having completed 3 rounds in the new context, 40% of 
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descriptions in the New Partner condition were overspecific. Why were Brennan and 
Clark’s speakers not switching massively to more context-appropriate alternatives? 
The simplest explanation would be priming: participants’ use of entrained 
descriptions was maintained because the lexical precedents they had established 
primed them to keep on using the same labels upon seeing the same referents, with 
relative independence from their conversational partner. However, there is a 
formulation cost associated to producing longer descriptions than needed, especially 
if these include non-basic-level labels, as these labels are assumed to be less 
readily available than unmarked basic-level labels, and might be also considerably 
longer (e.g. “the small white terrier that’s sitting” vs “the dog”). How is this 
formulation cost weighed against the production cost of switching and using a new 
label? 
 
To test this Production Cost assumption, we manipulated both the number of 
descriptions that needed to be produced, and the availability of salient dimensions 
that would be potentially easy to produce, particularly colour (as we discussed in the 
previous section, colour is the most likely dimension to be spontaneously included in 
speakers’ descriptions). Overspecific descriptions should be more likely to be 
maintained if the salient colour dimension is available for description than if it is not 
(particularly when speaking to a new partner with whom there is no history of 
previous interaction), as colour is both easier to overproduce and not damaging for 
comprehension (Rubio-Fernández, 2016).  Overspecific descriptions should be also 
more likely to be maintained if the number of references to be produced is low, as 
the potential overall gain from switching to basic-level descriptions would be higher if 
the number of descriptions to be produced is high. In this evaluation, speakers 
would need to consider, on one hand, the formulation costs of their lexical 
precedents (which should be lower if the overspecified dimensions are more easily 
available), and on the other, the potential gain of switching to and using basic-level 
labels (considering both the availability of ‘unmarked’ basic-level labels and a 
cognitive cost of abandoning primed descriptions4).  
 
Brennan and Clark’s results showed a difference in the use of referential precedents 
depending on whether the current addressee was present or not in the conversation 
                                               
4 It is assumed here that speakers would be self-priming overspecification across references, 
causing them to either maintain overspecific descriptions or to switch to basic-level terms 
across all target items, as reported on Goudbeek & Krahmer (2012). 
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where these precedents were established. That is, they compared the maximum 
possible grounding, where the speaker had complete confidence that the addressee 
shared this precedent with them, with no grounding at all. How would speakers 
behave if they had less certainty that their interlocutor had accepted this precedent? 
Considering the discussion in section 5.1.4, we suggest the speaker should maintain 
their entrained references to a higher degree if talking to the same partner as 
before, who had provided positive feedback of their understanding and acceptance 
of the reference; to a lesser degree if talking to a partner who had only witnessed 
their previous reference use, providing no feedback of their understanding; and to 
an even lesser degree if talking to a new partner, who had not witnessed their 
previous reference use nor been co-present with them. 
 
To test this Provisionality assumption (the more certain the description’s shared 
status, the more it will be kept), we designed a referential task similar to Brennan 
and Clark’s, where a Director would describe a set of images to a Matcher, but 
including the figure of an Overhearer, who would have access to the conversation in 
the first half of the experiment without taking part in it and without being addressed 
in any way5. If provisionality affects the subsequent use of entrained descriptions, 
we should expect speakers to use less entrained descriptions when talking to the 
Overhearer in the second part of the experiment, compared to talking to the Same 
Partner they had in the first part. We should also expect speakers to use more 
entrained descriptions when talking to the Overhearer than when talking to a New 
Partner. 
 
We designed two experiments to cover these hypotheses. Both experiments used 
confederate participants to fulfil the Matcher and Overhearer roles (see section 
5.1.5.1).  Experiment 4 presented participants with a small 12-item display of 
images, with 2 target images that appeared along with other images of the same 
category in the first three rounds of the experiment, and alone in their category in 
the second three rounds. 6 images in the set were colour photographs of objects, 
                                               
5 In practical terms, our Overhearers are somewhat in between what Wilkes-Gibbs and Clark 
(1992) defined as ‘silent side-participant’ and ‘omniscient bystander’: while they are not 
considered part of the conversation nor addressed in any way, they can see all the Director’s 
movements and utterances through a duplicated-screen monitor, and they are seated in a 
separated position at the same table as the Director. In Wilkes-Gibbs and Clark’s study, 
results from participants interacting with partners who had been in either of these two 
conditions were significantly different from results from participants with new partners. 
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and the other 6 were black tangram figures. Participants played the 6 rounds of the 
game as Directors, with confederates taking the roles of Matcher and Overhearer. 
They were located in one of three conditions: A Same Partner condition, where they 
played the second half of the game with the same partner they had in the first half; 
an Overhearer condition, where they played the second half with the overhearer 
they had on the first half; and a New Partner condition, where they played the 
second half of the experiment with a new confederate Matcher. 
 
Experiment 5 presented participants with a larger 20-item display, with 4 target 
images that appeared along other members of the same category in the first half of 
the experiment, and alone in their category in the second half. 12 of these images 
were monochrome drawings of objects, and the other 8 were black tangram figures. 
Experimental conditions were the same as in Experiment 4.  
 
The structure of the experiments implies that there are two crucial points of 
measure: the first one is the difference between round 3 (the last round of the first 
half) and round 4 (the first round of the second half), as this is the point in which 
participants are faced with a new context, and with either the same or a different 
partner. The second measure is the difference between the rounds in the second 
half (4 to 6), as participants might choose a different reference after they have had 
time to process the new conditions (as in Brennan and Clark, 1996). 
 
As per our Production Cost assumption, we should expect participants to use more 
overspecific descriptions in Experiment 4, where the colour dimension is available 
and the number of items to be described is low, than in Experiment 5, where no 
dimension is salient in overall terms and the number of items to be described is 
higher.  
 
As per our Provisionality assumption, we should see a gradient of maintenance of 
overspecific descriptions in our Participant Role conditions, with participants using 
more overspecific descriptions in the Same Partner condition, less in the Overhearer 
condition, and significantly less in the New Partner condition. Moreover, we should 
see less switching to basic-level descriptions throughout the second half of the task 
(rounds 4 to 6) in the Same Partner condition, compared to the other two conditions, 
as the certainty of the ‘shared status’ of their initial descriptions should be highest in 
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this condition, and this evaluation should not change throughout the task. Both the 
Overhearer and the New Partner condition should show more basic-level 
descriptions throughout the second half of the task. 
 
 
5.1.5.1 Use of confederates 
 
Our experimental setup uses confederates in the roles of both Matcher and 
Overhearer; the Director was always a naïve participant. Even though some 
researchers have expressed concern over the use of confederates in dialogue 
conditions (Kuhlen & Brennan, 2013), our setup prevented the most common 
problems that their inclusion might cause, i.e. inadvertently shaping participants’ 
behaviour through verbal or nonverbal cues such as facial expressions, body 
posture, tone of voice, pauses, etc.; and participants guessing their confederate 
status. In our experiments, confederates were instructed to respond as naturally as 
possible to their interlocutor’s output, and (in the Matcher role) to avoid including any 
conceptually relevant information that had not been included previously by the 
Director when asking for clarification, opting instead for more general questions 
(such as “I don’t really get which one you mean”, or “Could you be a bit more 
specific?”). Moreover, the fact that almost all their verbal interaction was performed 
through a written chat reduced the possibility of non-verbal feedback that could 
escape the confederate’s conscious control. The specifications of the Overhearer 
role, where non-verbal feedback could have occurred, prevented this from 
happening, as the Overhearer was seated sideways from the Director’s position 
(thereby not in direct view), and instructed not to speak or communicate with the 
Director at all, unless addressed. In the few instances where the participant 
addressed the Overhearer (most of the time to share a joke, or to comment on the 
difficulty of the task), confederates were instructed to respond naturally and to say 
no more than what would be minimally necessary to complete the interaction in a 













We tested 30 students from the University of Edinburgh, 23 females and 7 males. 
Data from one participant was discarded as they did not follow the instructions (they 
supplied overly ornate descriptions that avoided mentioning what the item actually 
was). Participants were paid £5 for their time (usually between 25 and 35 minutes). 
Confederates were asked to inform the experimenter if they knew any of the 
participants; this did not occur. 10 participants were assigned to each experimental 
condition. 
 
Three female voluntary Research Assistants acted as confederates, with two of 
them playing the roles of Matcher and Overhearer alternately with each new 
participant, and a third playing the role of new Matcher in the New Partner condition. 
They were trained in how to respond to participants as explained in section 5.1.5.1, 
but did not receive any further instructions during the experiment, where they were 
treated as naïve participants. They were not informed of the hypotheses of the 





The experiment setup involved two sets of images, A and B, with 6 colour 
photographs of common objects and 6 monochrome tangram figures per set (Fig. 
5.1). In each A set, two common object images were targets, and these appeared as 
well on the corresponding set B. All object images in each A set belonged to two 
categories, with one target item and two fillers per category (e.g. one target dog and 
two other dog images). The target item was selected as being the closest example 
of a prototypical image for that category. The object images in set B included the 
two target items from set A, and 4 non-related images of common objects (a 
cushion, a cutlery set, a bird, etc.). The tangram images, included to distract 
participants from the changing figure/ground relationship of the object images in the 
two sets (as suggested in Brennan & Clark, 1996), were similarly distributed. Set B 
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included two tangrams from set A, and 4 non-related tangram figures that were new 
to participants. This distribution was similarly aimed at distracting participants from 
the change in context, promoting the alternative idea of a partial change across the 
board, where some images were maintained and some were changed. 
 
We designed 6 pairs of sets: 2 sets of dog and chair categories, 2 sets of leaf and 
shoe categories, and 2 sets of fish and mug categories. Set A was used in the first 3 
rounds of the experiment, and set B was used in the second 3 rounds. Set pairs 












Fig. 5.1 Set A example (top) and Set B example (bottom). 
 
 
Images were randomised in each round and displayed in two rows of 6 200x200 px. 
images each. A separate window showed a chat tool, similar to the ones on 
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commercial software (Facebook, Whatsapp). The chat window (Fig. 5.2) displayed a 
text at the beginning of each round which informed the participant of an image set 
being loaded, included to establish a specific time delay between rounds (2 
seconds). At the end of round 3, the participant was additionally informed that 
he/she would be playing the remainder of the experiment with either a) the Same 
Partner they had on the first part, b) the Overhearer they had on the first part, or c) a 
New Partner. This message included a longer delay of 6 seconds, to allow 
participants to notice the change in the image set. Participants could chat freely with 
their partner (however Matchers were instructed to keep their utterances brief and to 











The experiment had a 3x2 design, with factors Condition (Same Partner vs 
Overhearer vs New Partner, between participants) and Block (rounds 1-2-3 and 4-5-
6, within participants). However, the analyses were performed on either Round 4 






Participants came to the lab individually. Confederates entered the lab from an 
adjacent room 5 minutes before the scheduled time; if the participant came in after 
that, they were informed the confederates were the other participants that got to the 
lab a few minutes earlier, if the participant came in before that, the confederates left 
the adjacent room through an exit door and came to the lab through the main door, 
either individually or casually together. As soon as both the participant and the 
confederates were there, they were instructed to take their positions in the 
experimental setup; they were all treated like naïve participants throughout the 
experiment. The participant was seated in the Director’s position on the right side of 
a large desk with a network computer and a flat screen, while the Overhearer was 
seated on the left side of the same desk, with an additional screen that mirrored the 
display of the participant’s screen (Fig. 5.3). They were both informed that their 
screens were mirrored, meaning the Overhearer could see the Director’s images 
and chat (though the images were not numbered or highlighted in any way as the 
Director described them, so their identification rested on being able to interpret the 
descriptions correctly), but that the Overhearer was not to participate in the 
conversation nor to interact in any way with either the participant or the Matcher 
during the first part. Specifically, the participant was told the Overhearer would be 
observing their performance in the task so they could either perform the same task 
at a later point (in both the Same Partner and the New Partner conditions), or 
perform as Matchers in the second part of the task (in the Overhearer condition).The 
confederate Matcher was seated in a booth, with a network computer and a flat 
screen. In the New Partner condition, an additional confederate was instructed to 





Fig. 5.3 Task set-up. Top left: Director position. Top right: Matcher position. Bottom left: 
Overhearer position. The Overhearer had access to a screen that mirrored the display of the 
Director’s screen, but could not see the Director’s screen directly. 
 
 
Both the participant and the confederates were then handed a written copy of the 
instructions and asked to read it. The experimenter then took a moment to briefly 
summarise the procedure of the experiment, and to answer any questions 
participants might have had. At this point, participants were informed that they were 
going to play the second part of the experiment with either the same partner as on 
the first part (Same Partner condition), the overhearer they had on the first part 
(Overhearer condition), or a New Partner (New Partner condition). They were told 
the Director was to describe the set of images to the Matcher in order, in a simple 
and straightforward way, and that the Matcher was to place the corresponding 
images in the appropriate positions. They were also informed they could interact 
freely using the chat. After this, they were instructed to begin playing, and the 
experimenter left the room and went to the adjacent room. 
 
The Director’s display showed a 2x6 grid with the 12 images of a randomly chosen 
set A, in a quasi-random order that prevented the target images from being placed 
first or last in the array. The same display was showed through mirroring in the 
Overhearer’s screen. The Matcher’s display showed 2 2x6 grids, an empty grid on 
the top and a full grid on the bottom, with the 12 images of the same set A in a 
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random distribution. Both displays included a chat panel, divided into a bottom 
writing space and a top dialogue space, showing up to 4 lines of the preceding chat 
dialogue (see section 5.2.2). This chat panel showed both the dialogue between the 





Brennan and Clark (1996) defined three aspects that were crucial in their analysis of 
participants’ use of conceptual pacts: whether participants used the same 
description as in the previous round (a measure of lexical entrainment); whether 
they used basic descriptions or not (anything but a basic description would have 
been overspecific in the second half of the task); and whether their descriptions 
were reduced in length compared to the same reference in the previous round.  
 
We analysed and coded all target item responses for 29 participants in the 6 rounds 
of the experiment, considering three dichotomous measures:  
 
1) Same: Measure of lexical entrainment; whether the description of an item in a 
given round is the same as the description of the same item in the previous round. 
We defined ‘sameness’ as Brennan and Clark (1996), considering all content words 
in a description, and not considering hedges or modifiers, nor order, i.e. the fluffy 
dog that’s standing would be considered the same as the standing fluffy dog, but not 
the same as the fluffy dog.  
 
2) Basic: Measure of use of basic-level (unmarked, on Cruse’s (1977) terms) labels; 
whether the description of an item is the basic-level label associated with that item, 
i.e. dog, car, fish, etc. Basic-level descriptions should not be used in the first part of 
the experiment, as that would make identification impossible. 
 
3) Reduced: Measure of description length reduction; whether the description of an 
item is reduced in length (number of words, considering all content words) with 
respect to the description of the same item in the previous round. If the description 
was lexically different, it was nevertheless compared in number of words to the 
previous description for the same item. If a description of length=1 was followed by 
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another description of length=1, this second description (and any further length=1 
descriptions that followed) was excluded from the analysis, as by definition they 
can’t be reduced. Descriptions that were augmented (which occurred rarely, and 
mainly in Round 4) were excluded from the analysis.  
 
Considering the task procedure, the main measuring points are the first round of the 
second half, Round 4 (the point at which participants acknowledge both the new 
context and the fact they are interacting with either the same or a different partner), 





Considering the critical measure points described in the previous section, we 
selected our models to account for both the main point of change, Round 4, and the 
trajectory of change across the second half of the task, Rounds 4 to 6. In round 4, 
the change from a more complex to a simpler context where each target image was 
unique in their category rendered the previous references overspecific, as in this 
new context basic-level labels should have been sufficient to uniquely identify each 
referent (e.g. whereas in round 3 “the dog” would be insufficient to uniquely identify 
the target dog from the other dogs in the set, on round 4 such a description would 
be sufficient). Moreover, this was the point at which our experimental conditions 
were differentiated, with participants moving on to play with either the Same Partner 
as before, the Overhearer, who had witnessed their previous interaction, or a New 
Partner. On the other hand, the process of switching to a basic label might take 
place over more than one turn (e.g., reducing a label from “the fluffy white dog” to 
“the white dog” in round 4, but reducing it further to its basic form “the dog” in round 
5), as participants might need the experience of acknowledging the discrepancy 
between the level of reference that the context requires (in terms of amount of 
information provided), and the level of reference they are producing (as was the 
case in Brennan and Clark, 1996).  
 
We selected three Round 4 models, testing for the use of the Same description 
(compared to Round 3), Basic-level descriptions, and Reduced descriptions 
(compared to Round 3); comparing the output of our participants according to their 
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Condition (Same Partner vs Overhearer vs New Parter). We used logistic multilevel 
models (lme4 package in R, Bates et al., 2015) to evaluate the effect of Condition 
over our measured variables. For rounds 4 to 6 models, Condition was deviation-
coded. We initially included Participant, Image, and Image set, as random effects, 
but both Image and Image set proved to be close to null across models, and were 
therefore eliminated from the model structure. All p-values reported come from 
Likelihood Ratio Tests performed by fitting the full models using the mixed function 
in the afex package (Singmann et al., 2017). 
 
We also tested for effects across Rounds 4 to 6. For these models, we included both 
Condition and Round number, coded as a numeric predictor, plus the interaction 
between the two. Random effects structure was similarly reduced to a by-Participant 
intercept. For each variable, I will present the results of the Round 4 models first, 
followed by the results of the models for Rounds 4 to 6. 
 
Use of Same description - Lexical entrainment. Participants used a high 
proportion of previously used references in Round 4, in all conditions: 81.8% in 
Same Partner condition, 72.2% in Overhearer condition, and 61.1% in New Partner 
condition (see Fig. 5.4).  
 
Condition was not a significant predictor of the use of the same references in Round 
4: even though there was a numeric difference showing more use of entrained 
descriptions in the Same Partner condition and less in the New Partner condition, 
this difference was not significant (χ²=2.13, p=0.34).  
 
In Rounds 4 to 6, participants used increasingly more entrained descriptions as they 
advanced in the game, again with no significant differences between conditions. 
Round was a significant predictor of the use of the Same vs a Different description 
(χ²=6.00, p=0.01), across Conditions. Neither Condition (χ²=2.43, p=0.30) nor the 
interaction of Condition and Round (χ²=2.50, p=0.29) were statistically significant. 
 
Considering previous research (Brennan & Clark, 1996) and our own experimental 
predictions pointing to any differences between the Same Partner and the New 
Partner conditions being larger than the difference between any of those two 
conditions and the Overhearer condition, we ran a second model including only the 
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Same Partner and the New Partner conditions. This model showed a significant 
increase in the use of the Same descriptions with Round (χ²=5.70, p=0.02), across 
Conditions, but again no main effect of Condition (χ²=2.09, p=0.15), and no 
significant interaction between the two (χ²=1.77, p=0.18). 
 
 
Fig. 5.4 Proportion of use of the same description as in the previous round, Rounds 4 to 6, 




Basic level terms. The use of basic-level terms in Round 4 was low in all 
conditions, with no significant differences between Conditions (χ²=2.27, p=0.32). 
Participants in the Same Partner condition used 18% basic-level descriptions in 
Round 4, with 5.5% for both Overhearer and New Partner conditions (see Fig. 5.5).  
 
Considering rounds 4, 5, and 6, Round had a marginally significant effect over the 
use of more basic level terms, across Conditions (χ²=4.01, p=0.05): Participants 
were marginally more likely to use basic-level descriptions as they advanced in the 
game. There was no significant difference between Conditions (χ²=1.83, p=0.40); 
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Fig. 5.5 Proportion of use of basic-level vs overspecific descriptions in rounds 4 to 6 (second 




Reduced description length. The use of reduced-length descriptions in Round 4 
was low, with no more than 30% of reduced descriptions in any condition. There 
were no significant differences in reduction of description length between Conditions 
(χ²=0.80, p=0.67) (see Fig. 5.6). 
 
Considering rounds 4 to 6, neither Condition (χ²=0.58, p=0.75) nor Round (χ²=0.11, 
p=0.74), nor their interaction (χ²=1.85, p=0.40) were significant predictors of the use 
of more reduced descriptions: Participants maintained the length of their 






Fig. 5.6 Proportion of use of reduced descriptions per rounds 4 to 6, per Condition. 
Descriptions of length 1 that were preceded by another length=1 description were not 
considered, as they could not possibly be reduced; therefore the proportion of Maintained 
descriptions only considers those in which length>1. 
 
 
Additionally, we analysed overspecific target responses in round 4 to identify the 
type of overspecification they included, using three categories: Colour attribute, 
Overspecific (non-basic) noun, or Other (Fig. 5.7). In the Same Partner condition (10 
participants, 17 overspecified responses), 76.4% of overspecific responses included 
a Colour attribute, 17.6% an Overspecific noun, and 11.7% Other attributes. In the 
Overhearer condition (9 participants, 18 overspecified responses), 66.6% of 
overspecific responses included a Colour attribute, 27.7% an Overspecific noun, 
and 22.2% Other attributes. In the New Partner condition (10 participants, 16 
overspecified responses), 62.5% of overspecific responses included a Colour 
attribute, 25% an Overspecific noun, and 31.25% other attributes. Overall, 68.6% of 
overspecific responses included a Colour attribute, 23.5% an Overspecific noun, 
and 21.5% Other attributes (some responses included more than one 






Fig. 5.7 Percentages of overspecification type in Round 4, per Condition. Some responses 
included more than one overspecification category (e.g. “brown flat shoe”), therefore sum of 
percentages might be over 100.  
 
 
We also analysed the use of definite vs indefinite markers in round 4, to establish 
whether participants switched their mode of reference, even if they didn’t change 
their lexical choices. In the Same Partner condition, 29.4% of all descriptions 
included a definite marker (“the”), and no descriptions included indefinite markers 
(“a”) (raw frequencies in Fig. 5.8). In the Overhearer condition, 27.7% of all 
descriptions included definite markers, and no descriptions included indefinite 
markers. In the New Partner condition, 25% of all descriptions included definite 
markers, and 43.7% of descriptions included indefinite markers. The use of definite 
vs indefinite markers was significantly different between Conditions (proportional 












Results show participants across Participant Role conditions maintained their 
entrained descriptions throughout the second part of the experiment, where the 
context made these descriptions overspecific. They did so even in the New Partner 
condition, where the descriptions had not been used before in the context of that 
partner, suggesting an intrinsic motivation to maintain their use (Van Der Wege, 
2009). Round number was a marginally significant predictor of the use of more 
basic-level descriptions, with no significant differences between conditions, showing 
a slight increase in the use of context-appropriate descriptions over time. The use of 
entrained descriptions (same description as in the previous round) also increased 
with Round, showing participants across conditions tended to retain the description 
they had used previously. Taken together, results suggest most participants 
maintained the overspecified descriptions they were using throughout the second 
half of the experiment, with a reduced number of participants switching towards 




A more detailed analysis of the overspecific descriptions produced by participants 
revealed that colour was the most frequently overspecified dimension, with 
descriptions of the type colour adjective + noun being most frequent (more than 
60% of overspecified descriptions included colour adjectives, across conditions). 
Previous studies have found that colour is the aspectual dimension most likely to be 
overspecified in descriptive statements, likely due to its perceptual salience 
(Tarenskeen et al., 2015, Rubio-Fernández, 2016). Moreover, colour has been 
suggested to be intrinsically easier to describe than other object dimensions such as 
size, requiring low cognitive effort to be perceived (Pechmann, 1989; Viethen, 
Goudbeek, & Krahmer, 2012).  
 
Even though it cannot be proved that overspecification facilitated comprehension in 
this context, we can assume overspecification didn’t impair communication either 
(as in Gann & Barr, 2014), as most of the overspecific descriptions involved colour 
adjectives, which has been suggested as potentially improving identifiability of 
referents (Rubio-Fernández, 2016). In this sense, overspecification should not be 
communicatively costly for the speaker nor threaten communicative success. 
Indeed, Grodner and Sedivy (2011) showed that listeners rapidly adapted their 
expectations when interacting with a speaker that frequently overspecified their 
references without a contrastive intent, suggesting listeners are not troubled by 
overspecification, especially if it is speaker-consistent. Our results suggest speakers 
are highly sensitive to speaker-internal pressures, especially when this does not 
interfere with successful communication (Wardlow Lane & Ferreira, 2008). In this 
sense, the use of indefinite markers in Round 4 in the New Partner condition, absent 
in the other conditions, confirms that speakers were aware they were interacting 
with new speakers who didn’t share their precedents, but chose to use them 
anyway. 
 
Our results show a different pattern from Brennan and Clark’s (1996) study, who 
showed that a proportion of participants abandoned their overspecific descriptions 
over the course of the second part of the experiment, favouring basic-level labels. 
However, as their setup allowed free oral communication between participants, it is 
possible that feedback from the Matchers played a role in the Directors’ decision to 
switch to simpler labels (as their own discussion suggests). In our experiment, 
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feedback from (confederate) Matchers was limited both as the written medium 
prevented them from using anything other than full turns (eliminating the possibility 
of backchannels and other forms of feedback), and per design, as confederate 
Matchers were instructed not to comment unnecessarily on Directors’ responses. 
 
Another important difference between our experimental setup and Brennan and 
Clark’s is the number of items that needed to be described. A reduced set of items, 
as in our setup, implied that in the second part of the experiment only 6 items and 6 
tangram figures needed to be described in each round, lowering the overall 
processing difficulty of the task. In a similar 5-item display experiment, Gann and 
Barr (2014) found participants were likely to overspecify their descriptions 
independently of the identity of their interlocutor (same partner vs new partner), and 
without considering the availability of feedback. Even though their findings point to 
an impaired comprehension effect for overspecific descriptions, this effect might be 
related to the fact that they used monochrome stimuli, where the additional 
information given in the overspecified descriptions had to do with properties of the 
items that are less salient in context than colour, like the ‘meltedness’ of a candle 
(melted/unmelted), the type of a guitar (electric/acoustic) or the material of a 
garbage bin (metal/plastic). In our experiment, there should have been no 
‘referential penalty’ or extra processing cost (Wardlow Lane & Ferreira, 2008) 
associated to using overspecific references, especially considering the information 
most likely to be included in the overspecification –colour– could potentially help in 
the correct identification of the referents. 
 
Our results suggest that, when the reconceptualisation cost of switching, added to 
the potential gain of using basic-level labels, is perceived as higher than the 
formulation cost of maintaining overspecific references, speakers are not likely to 
abandon their entrained descriptions. If the number of items to be described is low, 
the formulation effort implied in producing previously-used overspecific labels can be 
perceived as lower than the cost of reconceptualisation that is implied in switching to 
basic-level labels. Moreover, in our experiment these overspecific descriptions were 
mostly composed as colour adjective + noun, which, considering the ease of 
production of colour adjectives, could imply that the extra formulation effort involved 




Under what conditions would speakers switch to basic references? The review of 
the literature suggested two factors that seemed to influence this decision: the ease 
of production of overspecific references, where availability of salient dimensions 
would lower formulation effort, and the overall production cost of the set of 
descriptions, where a lower number of descriptions to be produced would imply 
lower effort. We manipulated these two dimensions in the next experiment, by 
eliminating the most salient dimension for overspecification (colour), and increasing 
the number of items to be described. 
 
 





We tested 31 students from the University of Edinburgh, 17 females and 14 males. 
Data from two participants was discarded as they did not follow the instructions (one 
kept on asking unrelated questions to the Matcher and providing intentionally ‘funny’ 
descriptions, the other didn’t follow the description order and only described target 
items in one of the three first part rounds, referring to them as “the last x” the rest of 
the time). Participants were paid £7 for their time (usually between 30 and 45 
minutes). Confederates were asked to inform the experimenter if they knew any of 
the participants; this did not occur. 10 participants were assigned to the Same 
Partner condition, 11 participants to the Overhearer condition, and 10 participants to 





As in Experiment 4, the experiment setup involved two image sets, A and B, this 
time with 12 monochrome drawings of common objects and 8 monochrome tangram 
figures per set (Fig. 5.9). We designed 2 pairs of sets, comprising four categories of 
objects each (dog, car, fish, shoe). A set A was used in the first 3 rounds of the 
experiment, and the corresponding set B was used in the second 3 rounds. Set 




All object images in set A belonged to the four categories, with one target item and 
two fillers per category (e.g. one target dog and two other dog images) (Fig. 5.10). 
The target item was selected as being the closest example of a prototypical image 
for that category. The object images in set B included the two target items from set 
A, and 8 non-related images of common objects (a jumper, a bicycle, a bee, etc.). 
Eight tangram images were included in each set, as in Experiment 4. Set B included 













Fig. 5.9 Set A example (top) and Set B example (bottom). Tangrams (not shown) were 







Fig. 5.10 Example of image set A, Matcher’s view. Director’s view includes only the two 
bottom (occupied) rows, in a different order. 
 
 
Images were randomised in each round and displayed in two rows of 10 120x120 
px. images each. All other materials were presented in exactly the same way as in 





As in Experiment 4, the analyses were performed on either Round 4 alone, or 





The procedure was identical to Experiment 4, with participants coming to the lab 
individually and interacting with a confederate Matcher in the first part, and either the 
same Matcher, a confederate Overhearer (who had witnessed the first part of the 
experiment in an additional mirrored screen), or a confederate New Matcher in the 







The coding procedure was identical to Experiment 4, with measures for Same vs 
Different descriptions (lexical entrainment), Basic vs Overspecific descriptions 






As in Experiment 4, we used logistic multilevel models (lme4 package in R, Bates et 
al., 2015) to evaluate the effect of Condition and/or Round over our measured 
variables. Condition was dummy coded, with Same Partner as base level. We 
initially included Participant, Image, and Image set, as random effects, but both 
Image and Image set proved to be close to null across models, and were therefore 
eliminated from the model structure. All p-values reported come from Likelihood 
Ratio Tests performed by fitting the full models using the mixed function in the afex 
package (Singmann et al., 2017); the function was used once to obtain the 
significance values of interactions and main effects, and again with a parameter 
specification to obtain the significance values of each level of the factors in the 
interaction. 
 
Use of Same description – Lexical entrainment. Condition significantly predicted 
the use of the Same terms (main effect of Condition χ²=14.32, p<0.001): 
Participants used the same terms in Round 4 (compared to Round 3) significantly 
more in the Same Partner condition than in the New Partner condition (χ²=8.65, 
p=0.003). The difference between the Same Partner and the Overhearer conditions 
was not significant (χ²=0.44, p=0.51).  
 
For Rounds 4 to 6, there was a significant interaction between Round and Condition 
(χ²=7.90, p=0.02). Moreover, Round had a significant main effect over the use of the 
Same or Different descriptions, with participants using more entrained descriptions 
with each Round played (χ²=5.0, p=0.03), across Conditions. Condition as a main 




 As the plot shows (Fig. 5.11), participants in the New Partner condition diverged 
from referential precedents in Round 4, and then maintained these new references 
in Rounds 5 and 6: The interaction was significant for the New Partner condition 
(χ²=5.50, p=0.02), but not for the Overhearer condition (χ²=0.01, p=0.91), compared 
to the Same Partner condition. The New Partner condition also differed significantly 
from the Same Partner condition across Rounds (χ²=10.36, p=0.001), while the 
difference between the Overhearer and the Same Partner conditions was not 









Basic level terms. Condition significantly predicted the use of basic terms in the 
first round of the second part (Round 4) (main effect of Condition χ²=9.97, p=0.007): 
Participants used significantly more basic level terms in the New Partner condition, 
compared to the Same Partner condition (χ²=4.61, p=0.03). There was no significant 
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difference between the Same Partner and the Overhearer conditions (χ²=0.79, 
p=0.37). 
 
Considering Rounds 4 to 6 (see Fig. 5.12), both Condition and Round were 
significant predictors of the use of more basic level terms (Condition χ²=7.86, 
p=0.02; Round χ²=4.82, p=0.03): Participants are more likely to use basic level 
terms with each new round played, across Conditions; and participants in the New 
Partner condition are more likely to use basic level terms (compared to the Same 
Partner condition, marginal effect χ²=3.79, p=0.05), across Rounds. Participants in 
the Overhearer condition are not significantly different from participants in the Same 
Partner condition, across rounds (χ²=0.55, p=0.46). The interaction between 









Reduced description length. Condition significantly predicted the use of reduced 
descriptions in Round 4 (main effect of Condition χ²=9.82, p=0.007). Participants 
reduced their descriptions more in the New Partner condition, compared to the 
Same Partner condition (χ²=5.17, p=0.02). There was no significant difference 




Fig. 5.13 Proportion of use of reduced descriptions in Rounds 4 to 6, per Condition. 
Descriptions of length 1 that were preceded by another length=1 description were not 
considered, as they could not possibly be reduced; therefore the proportion of Maintained 
descriptions only considers those in which length>1. 
 
 
Considering Rounds 4 to 6 (see Fig. 5.13), Condition significantly predicted the use 
of more reduced descriptions (χ²=9.24, p=0.010). Participants reduced the length of 
their descriptions more in the New Partner condition, compared to the Same Partner 
condition (χ²=6.42, p=0.01), while the difference between the Overhearer and the 
Same Partner condition was not significant (χ²=0.03, p=0.85). Neither Round 
(χ²=0.02, p=0.88) nor the interaction between Condition and Round (χ²=0.16, 
p=0.92) were significant. 
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Additionally, the analysis of definite vs indefinite markers in round 4 revealed a 
significant difference between Conditions (proportional test, χ²=22.11, p<0.001). 
Considering the descriptions using markers, 81.25% of descriptions in the Same 
Partner condition included a definite marker (“the”), and 18.75% of descriptions 
included indefinite markers (“a”) (raw frequencies in Fig. 5.14). In the Overhearer 
condition, 85.0% of descriptions included definite markers, and 15.0% descriptions 
included indefinite markers. In the New Partner condition, 21.73% of descriptions 




Fig. 5.14 Frequency of marker use in Round 4, per Condition.  
 
 
Experiments 4 and 5 comparison. We ran an additional model comparing across 
experiments at Round 4. The model included both Condition and Experiment, plus 
their interaction; and a random intercept for Participant. We tested for the use of 
Basic vs Overspecific description, and the use of Reduced or Augmented 
descriptions vs Maintained descriptions. Differences in the use of Same description 
could not be measured as the full model would not converge; however, model 
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results for the use of Reduced descriptions should give an approximate inverse view 
of the Same description results. 
 
Participants in Experiment 5 used significantly more Basic descriptions in Round 4 
than participants in Experiment 4, across Conditions (χ²=17.24, p<0.0001). There 
was also a marginally significant interaction between Condition and Experiment, 
reflecting the differences in the New Partner condition between both experiments 
(χ²=5.00, p=0.08). Condition had no significant main effect over the use of Basic 
descriptions (χ²=1.84, p=0.40). 
 
The use of Reduced descriptions was similarly affected by Experiment, with 
participants in Experiment 5 using significantly more reduced descriptions than 
participants in Experiment 4 (χ²=15.52, p<0.0001). Neither Condition (χ²=3.62, 





Results of Experiment 5 show participants’ choice of maintaining or abandoning 
entrained references in Round 4 varied according to the role their current partner 
had played in the past 3 rounds: In the Same Partner condition, where the partner 
had directly participated in previous rounds, participants kept their entrained 
references in higher proportion than in the New Partner condition, where the partner 
had not participated in previous rounds. However, in the Overhearer condition, 
where the partner had not participated in the references’ use in previous rounds but 
had witnessed their use (with this fact known to the speaker), participants also kept 
their entrained references, in a proportion that does not differ from the Same Partner 
condition. We found similar results in their use of basic-level labels: participants 
used significantly more basic-level terms in Round 4 in the New Partner condition, 
compared to the Same Partner condition, and with no significant differences 
between the Same Partner and the Overhearer conditions. They also increased their 
use of basic-level labels throughout rounds 4 to 6, across conditions. Their 
descriptions were also significantly reduced in Round 4 in the New Partner 
condition, compared to the Same Partner condition, again with this factor increasing 
throughout rounds 4 to 6 across conditions. As in all other measures, there were no 
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significant differences in reference reduction between the Same Partner and the 
Overhearer conditions.  
 
The difference between the New Partner and the Same Partner conditions in the 
use of the same terms in Round 4 as were used in Round 3 confirms that 
participants were switching to context-appropriate basic-level terms when they did 
not shared a precedent with their addressee, even though these previously used 
terms would have been perfectly understandable in the new context (it should be 
equally understandable to use “terrier” or “dog” to refer to an image of a terrier in the 
context of other objects, even though “dog” should be the unmarked term). In this 
sense, a strong priming-exclusive explanation can be ruled out, as participants were 
switching to basic-level terms even when they could have maintained the 
precedents they were using so far. This suggests speakers combine both sources of 
information: their own processing effort (considering availability, production effort, 
etc.), and their history of interaction with their partner. 
 
These results suggest that in a context where speakers had to produce a large 
number of labels, the reduction in production effort of using basic-level labels, plus 
the cost of switching, were lower than the formulation effort of using the same 
entrained precedents when these precedents were not shared with the current 
addressee in any way (as in the New Partner condition); considering also that the 
most commonly overspecified feature –colour– was not available for description. 
Moreover, the results in the Overhearer condition suggest that even marginal 
confidence in the addressee sharing a precedent is enough to tip the scale towards 
maintaining entrained precedents. As Exp. 4 suggested, maintaining lexical 
precedents can be considered the default option for speakers under low cognitive 
load, particularly as it can be safely assumed that the overspecified labels that were 
maintained were otherwise perfectly understandable by addressees both old and 
new. 
 
This cognitive load assumption can be further addressed if we analyse the 
comparison between experiments 4 and 5 in Round 4, showing participants’ first 
response to the change in both context and partner. Participants in Experiment 5 
use more Basic and Reduced descriptions in Round 4 across Conditions, 
suggesting the cognitive load of a larger item setup and the absence of the more 
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easily specified colour dimension had an effect on all participants independently of 
their partner, leading them to choose the most efficient alternative even when this 
meant abandoning an entrained reference.  
 
Even though provisionality could have affected the certainty that speakers had that 
their conceptualisation would be accepted by an Overhearer, as they had not 
agreed to that conceptualisation in any way, our results indicate that this was not the 
case, as we found no significant differences on any measure between descriptions 
produced in the Same Speaker and Overhearer conditions. This suggests our 
speakers did not require any form of confirmation or acceptance of the 
conceptualisation by the Overhearer, but rather understood that the fact that they 
had witnessed its successful use counted as proof of their participation in its 
establishment.  
 
Participants in both the Same Partner and the Overhearer conditions kept their 
referential precedents even when they were not only overspecific for the new 
context, but clearly referring to the previous context. One participant kept on calling 
an image of a fish “the biggest fish” even when there were no other fish in sight, 
showing that their use of the phrase could not count as a reference to the actual 
communicative context, but to the history of common interactions between the 
speakers. As scalar adjectives cannot be comprehended without a comparison class 
(Sedivy, 2005), it can be assumed the speaker considered the past context of the 
image to be the relevant comparison class. 
 
Another speaker, after using an overspecific, previously used reference in Round 4 
(“the flopped ears dog”), reconsidered her description and added “the only dog” in 
an additional turn immediately after. However, in the next two rounds, the speaker 
kept on referring to the image as “the only dog” (but did not do the same with “the 
bee” or “the plant”). This might be seen as an attempt to justify their move from an 
already established conventional phrase to a new one, by making their justification 







5.4 General discussion 
 
Researchers have debated over many years whether previously used referential 
choices are repeated mainly for the processing benefit of the speaker, or, as an 
audience-design mechanism, for the sake of the listener, who might expect these 
entrained references to be maintained. 
 
Our results showed that, in a reduced setup where the number of items to be 
described was low, participants retained their previously used descriptions when 
these became overspecific in context, even in the New Partner condition where the 
addressee had not been a part of the initial use of the reference (Exp. 4). However, 
in a larger setup where the number of items to be described was higher, and in the 
absence of the most easily overspecified colour dimension, participants retained 
their previously used descriptions only in the Same Partner and Overhearer 
conditions, and switched to context-appropriate basic-level descriptions when 
speaking to a New Partner (Exp. 5). Moreover, participants showed more adaptation 
to the new context in the more demanding Experiment 5 than in Experiment 4, using 
more Basic descriptions across the different Conditions. Both experiments showed 
no differences in participant behaviour between the Same Partner and the 
Overhearer conditions. 
 
Taken together, our results suggest speakers combine both egocentric and 
allocentric sources of information, driven by a tendency to retain referential 
precedents if this is not detrimental to communicative success, but finally defined by 
the weighing of production costs of the alternatives in hand. In our setup, this 
weighing measured the formulation costs of maintaining overspecific labels (which 
should be easier to retrieve due to priming, but longer to formulate) against the 
switching and production costs of abandoning these labels for basic-level terms 
(which should have been easier to produce due to their ‘unmarked’ status, but costly 
as they involved replacing an established reference with a new label). In the small 
setup of Experiment 4, the potential gain in production effort of using basic-level 
labels instead of overspecific descriptions appears not to have outweighed the cost 
of abandoning an entrained conceptualisation for a new one, and therefore 
participants did not switch to context-appropriate alternatives (consider also that the 
availability of the colour dimension lowered the formulation cost of overspecific 
173 
 
references). In the larger setup of Experiment 5, the potential gain of using basic-
level labels instead of overspecific ones appears to have been larger, as more 
references needed to be produced (and considering the most easily overspecified 
colour dimension was not available), causing more participants to switch to basic 
labels. However, participants switched to basic descriptions significantly more if 
there was no common history of use of the entrained descriptions between the 
speaker and the addressee. This differential behaviour suggests the common 
history of reference use between speakers is a factor in the weighing of production 
effort. 
 
The speaker’s evaluation of production effort might be, however, open to the 
influence of feedback. In Brennan and Clark’s (1996) experiments, participants’ 
responses were directly modified in response to verbal and non-verbal feedback, 
with participants being prompted to add more information if the Matcher didn’t 
confirm her understanding in a timely fashion: 
 
 
 Director: nine is a fish [1.5 s pause] 
    kinda green and pink 
 Matcher: done 
 
 
Participants also shortened their references if the Matcher interrupted them to signal 
they had already identified the intended meaning. 
 
Director: number 11 is a pair –it’s um, sorry, sorry, sorry, it’s a fish with 
*different colours* 
Matcher: *yeah* okay 
 [Thereafter, the director used ‘the fish’] 
 
 
In this sense, references in Brennan and Clark’s experiments were a product of both 
the speaker’s evaluation of production effort and the addressee’s communicative 
behaviour. 
In our experiments, speakers received no direct influences over their reference 
choices, both as a consequence of the communication medium, and of the design, 
as Matchers were instructed not to comment on the Directors’ choices other than to 
confirm or disconfirm their understanding. Moreover, as the target figures were all 
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simple images of common objects, neither overspecific nor basic-level labels should 
have compromised understanding in any way. In this sense, reference choices in 
our experiments can be taken to reflect more closely the speakers’ evaluation of 
production effort, which can include their evaluation of addressees’ needs. 
 
As speakers received no feedback from Overhearers that could led them to believe 
their descriptions were mutually accepted, nor interacted with them in any way 
(besides being co-present in the same environment, and knowing they could read 
the descriptions as they were produced), our results suggest the speakers’ choice of 
referential descriptions in the second part of the experiments in the Overhearer 
condition was motivated exclusively by their own evaluation of the communicative 
situation, and not by the influence of type or quality of feedback from the addressee. 
This is not the same as arguing no effect of feedback at all, as the positive feedback 
from the original addressee in accepting the references as valid might have been 
enough to lead the speaker to believe in the appropriateness of his/her descriptions 
in that context, an evaluation that could be extended to the appropriateness of those 
descriptions in general. These results are compatible with the idea of the speaker as 
an opportunistic evaluator, relying on feedback when available, and on self-
generated assessments of adequacy when feedback is not available (Gann & Barr, 
2014).  
 
Avoidance of other-prompted repair might also play an important role in this 
evaluation. Speakers try to be as informative as they need to be in order to be 
understood without the need to engage in an additional turn (Metzing & Brennan, 
2003). In the same spirit, they seem much less likely to underspecify than to 
overspecify referents, as the risk of having to incur in either repair and/or an 
additional turn would be too high (Ferreira et al., 2005). In general, speakers seek to 
minimize the chance of having to be induced to a repair by the interlocutor, opting 
instead for ‘safer’ alternatives that will be less costly in terms of collaborative effort, 
but above all less costly in terms of their own effort. In descriptive statements, the 
preferred form of reference should be the one in which the speaker presents an 
elementary noun phrase and the addressees accept it without taking an extra turn 




However, in our experimental setup the maintenance of the descriptions that were 
appropriate in the first part amounts to the generation of descriptions that are 
overspecific for the second-part context. In this sense, an explanation in 
acceptability terms is not enough to account for our results, as a basic-level label 
would have been perfectly comprehensible in the second-part context, for both old 
and new addressees. Moreover, the maintenance of overspecific descriptions on 
both the Same Partner and the Overhearer conditions in roughly the same amounts 
suggests that the speakers’ decision did not depend directly on feedback from the 
addressee that could ‘bind them’ to a conceptual pact. Their maintenance of 
overspecific descriptions is likely the outcome of an opportunistic evaluation 
process, where the speaker will consider the available evidence to determine 1) 
whether there is a risk of having to incur in repair in switching to a different 
alternative, and 2) the ‘net saving’ that could be made, in terms of production effort, 
by switching to basic-level labels (weighing of formulation vs switching and 
production costs). 
 
While Brennan and Clark (1996) showed that speakers with new partners 
abandoned their previous references over the course of the 4 rounds of the second 
part of their experiment, we found partial evidence that speakers stopped using a 
linguistic precedent immediately after considering a new addressee who did not 
share the previous reference, switching to appropriate basic-level terms, without any 
specific feedback from the addressee that would prompt them to do so (that is, 
immediately in Round 4). In applying this self-prompted adaptation (Barr & Keysar, 
2006), speakers are actively considering their partner’s participation in a common 
history without requiring specific feedback from the partner that could serve as a 
communicative cue to provide less information (which was argued in Brennan & 
Clark (1996) to be one of the drivers of speakers’ switching to basic-level terms). If 
the addressee is believed to have (at least) accessed the previously used reference, 
as in our Overhearer condition, this increases the risk that a repair or second turn 
might need to be employed, as priming might have pushed that reference to easier 
accessibility in memory than a basic-level term. 
 
As in Gann and Barr (2014), our speakers did not switch to context-appropriate 
terms after feedback from their interlocutor cued them to do so, but out of their own 
evaluation of the communicative situation. Even though it could be suggested that 
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the significant effect of Round number over the use of basic-level terms reflects an 
effect of feedback, our confederate Matchers were instructed not to give any 
feedback until the description by the speaker was finished, and not to give negative 
feedback unless they would not understand the description if they were hearing it for 
the first time, which would not happen if these descriptions were overspecified. In 
this sense, the evaluation of the communicative context is performed solely by the 
speaker, with nothing more than basic confirmatory feedback from the addressee. 
 
Taken together, our results seem to agree with a constraint-based model (Hanna & 
Tanenhaus, 2005), where different constraints act in parallel providing evidence that 
is evaluated probabilistically. These constraints can include both the evaluation of 
egocentric effort in the weighing of alternatives, and the consideration of an 
addressee’s perspective, acting together in the determination of referential choices. 
Even though our results do not provide evidence either in favour or against 
conscious processing involved in this evaluation process, the immediate switch to 
basic-level labels in round 4 in the New Partner condition of Experiment 5 seems to 
suggest a decision made voluntarily by the speaker as a consequence of the 
change in partners, and not as part of a gradual process that might be seen as 
unconscious (see Branigan, 2006; Horton & Gerrig, 2005). It remains to be 
understood whether it is the switching process that captures conscious resources in 
an otherwise unconscious procedure, or if the whole process engages some degree 





The production of lexical precedents in referential tasks has been shown to be 
affected by the status of the addressee: if the addressee had taken part in previous 
uses of these references, precedents were more likely to be maintained than if the 
addressee was new to the communicative situation. In the two experiments 
reviewed in this chapter, we have shown that other factors are equally important in 
referential production. If the potential gain in production effort that is obtainable from 
switching to basic-level labels is not enough to outweigh the ease of formulation 
implied in maintaining primed references, speakers will not abandon their 
precedents, even when interacting with new partners. In the inverse situation, 
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speakers might abandon their precedents, but this choice will be mediated by the 
status of the addressee: even if the current addressee only witnessed the previous 
the interaction, this will be enough for speakers to retain their entrained choices in 
the same way as if they were talking to the partners with whom the references were 
first established. Our results shed light on the complexity of the weighing of 
production factors in reference choice, pointing towards an eminently egocentric 
process that is crucially defined by the history of interaction between the speaker 
and the addressee. 
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While the reuse of referential precedents is the most likely choice of speakers in most 
communicative situations, the experiments described in this thesis have shown that 
there are several scenarios where speakers will abandon an entrained reference, 
switching instead to a new alternative. Specifically, I sought to understand the 
influence of two factors over this referential adaptation process: the perceptual 
context, and the participant role of speakers and hearers. The perceptual context 
refers to all the elements that surround the interaction to which the speaker (and 
usually the hearer) has direct (i.e. non-linguistic) access, including the task context. 
Depending on the specific communicative situation, the perceptual context might 
constitute a sort of ‘pre-linguistic common ground’ (Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark, 1992) that 
the interlocutors can consider as shared when planning and producing an utterance.  
 
The participant role of speakers and hearers refers to the degree of centrality and/or 
accountability of the individuals involved in the interaction. While the speaker and the 
addressee are central to the interaction and can be held accountable for the 
understanding of all references that have been mutually accepted in the conversation, 
side-participants who are not directly addressed might not share the same degree of 
understanding, while overhearers who did not directly participate in the interaction nor 
were acknowledged as participants have been described as not sharing the same 
discourse record as acknowledged participants (Branigan, 2006). 
 
The experiments presented in this thesis have shown that both factors influence 
referential adaptation. The influence of context was not only significant in the 
speakers’ initial evaluation of the communicative situation, but also as a consequence 
of their production and comprehension experience, with participants changing their 
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reference choices after having the experience of using an alternative description in 
context. This experience effect suggests speakers are constantly evaluating the fit 
between their linguistic production and the context where this production will be 
understood. Participant role, on the other hand, was shown to influence speakers’ 
referential choices only in its most contrasting version –that of a known interlocutor 
with whom the references were previously established, vs a new interlocutor with no 
common interaction history with the speaker.  
 
However, while our results show both factors influence referential adaptation, they 
also suggest this influence is subtle and immersed in a complex dynamical process. 
Even though the perceptual context might be assumed to exert a strong pressure over 
speakers’ choices, the experiments show that this influence might be overridden by 
production factors or communicative demands. In this sense, these results call for 
careful consideration of the experimental setup and stimuli used by experiments 
looking to address this issue, as what appears as a stable response in one context 
might not be so certain in a slightly different setting (see, for example, the differences 
between Experiments 4 and 5). Similarly, the results of our overhearer conditions 
(Experiments 3, 4, and 5), in which no significant differences were found between 
participants talking to or performing as overhearers compared to main speakers or 
addressees, suggest differences between participant roles might appear only in 
specific conditions, particularly in situations where the difficulty of the task gives extra 
relevance to any minor advantage in individual terms, and might be unnoticeable in 
simpler referential tasks. 
 
As a whole, the research summarised in this thesis was successful in describing 
referential adaptation –a neglected aspect in the literature on reference production– 
and establishing two of the main factors that influence its appearance. Moreover, it 
contributed to the current discussion on the articulation of speaker-centred and 
audience-centred factors in reference production, showing how both influences are 
weighed in an experimental task, and how minor differences in contextual factors can 









This thesis proposed an exploration of the factors of the context and the interaction 
that would potentially influence speakers’ reference choice, particularly the perceptual 
context and the participant role of the individuals involved in the interaction. I designed 
five experiments that would address these factors, comparing speakers in different 
interactive and non-interactive settings in their reuse or adaptation of reference 
choices.  
 
Chapter 2 presented a review of the literature surrounding the reference production 
process, going from the factors that influence the initial selection of a conceptual 
perspective for a reference, to the consequences of the reuse of a reference both 
locally in an interacting pair, and across communities of speakers. The chapter 
discussed how repetition can be considered the default option in most reference use, 
as it facilitates both production and comprehension, easing the cognitive load of the 
speaker due to routinization of its local meaning. Moreover, it showed how the reuse 
of references can be linked to the emergence of linguistic conventions, and on a 
broader scale, to language change, as each instance of reuse adds to the strength of 
the emergent convention. 
 
Experiments 1 to 3 in Chapters 3 and 4 used the maze game (Garrod & Anderson, 
1987) to address the influence of the perceptual context and the interactivity of the 
setting in participants’ reference choices. The experiments share a pattern of 
adaptation to the repetition of the task, with speakers using more abstract descriptions 
–which are more efficient when facing the need to repeatedly refer to positions in one 
or more mazes– as they played more rounds of the game. Experiment 1 showed that 
speakers’ initial description choice was influenced by the layout of the maze, with 
more concrete and idiosyncratic descriptions being preferentially used in irregular 
mazes, and more abstract descriptions mainly used in regular mazes. Moreover, the 
likelihood of participants maintaining this initial choice, or adapting instead to the 
repetition of the task, switching to abstract descriptions, was linked to the possibility 
of interaction in their experimental condition: Participants working in interactive pairs 
adapted to the circumstances of their interaction, using more abstract descriptions as 




In Experiments 2 and 3, I explored specific aspects of the task context that could 
influence referential adaptation. Experiment 2 addressed the interaction between 
context change and adaptation, presenting pairs and individual participants with either 
the same irregular maze across rounds, or different irregular or regular mazes. In the 
task, all participants started playing in the same maze layout, facing different context 
conditions after completing the first round. The results revealed this context 
manipulation did not influence participants’ referential adaptation; however, 
participants across conditions adapted to the repetition of the task by using 
progressively more abstract descriptions as they played the game. Experiment 3 
addressed the relationship between participant role in the interaction and referential 
adaptation, by distributing participants into different participant role conditions where 
they could either play with the same partner throughout the task, or with a different 
partner in the second half of the experiment. While the different participant roles did 
not significantly influence participants’ referential adaptation, the results showed that 
task experience was again a factor in the use of more abstract descriptions. 
 
Experiments 4 and 5, in Chapter 5, looked at the production of referential descriptions 
in a picture sorting task, where target images would appear along with other images 
of the same category in the first part of the task (e.g. a target dog with two other dogs 
in the set), and alone in their category in the second part of the task (e.g. the same 
dog with no other dogs in the set). As the references used in the first part became 
overspecific in the second part, participants could either maintain the previously used 
references, or switch to basic-level labels. Moreover, participants were distributed into 
three different conditions that determined their partner’s identity in the second part of 
the game: a Same Partner condition, where they maintained the same partner as 
before; an Overhearer condition, where they went on to play with the person who had 
been witnessing their interaction in the first half of the game; and a New Partner 
condition. Experiment 4 used a small set of colour pictures, and showed that 
participants maintained their entrained references even if they were interacting with a 
new partner who did not share the past history of use of these references. Experiment 
5 used a larger image set of monochrome pictures, showing that participants again 
chose to maintain their referential precedents unless they were interacting with a new 
partner who did not share these references, in which case they switched to basic-
level labels. Across the two experiments, participants were more likely to maintain 
referential precedents even when the context change made them overspecific; 
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however, the results of Experiment 5 show speakers are willing to abandon referential 
precedents in the right conditions, particularly if the formulation cost of these 
precedents is high. 
 
 
6.2 Discussion  
 
The production of a reference requires that the speaker performs a complex (but not 
necessarily conscious) evaluation of the contextual and historical circumstances of 
the interaction, in order to find a balance between production effort, informativeness, 
and the needs of the addressee. The main aim of this thesis was establishing under 
which conditions speakers would be likely to abandon a referential precedent –which 
can be considered the ‘default’ choice, as maintaining a precedent is regularly easier 
for both speaker and addressee to process than switching to a different option. I have 
conceptualised this process as referential adaptation, as the speakers abandoning a 
previously used reference are adapting to specific aspects of their circumstances of 
use by switching to what is perceived as a ‘better’ alternative in those circumstances. 
This preference for ‘better’ alternatives, which can be more efficient, or easier to 
produce, or easier to understand for an addressee, can be linked to the dynamics of 
language change in a population, where signs are selected according to their past 
use and functionality in context (Tamariz et al., 2014). 
 
Taken together, the experiments described in this thesis point to a tendency to retain 
previously used references that can be overcome in the right circumstances, 
particularly by speakers in interaction with a partner or in a demanding context. Even 
though Experiments 2 and 3 aimed at establishing which aspects of the interaction 
were particularly relevant for this adaptation process, the experimental manipulations 
did not succeed at identifying any differences in participants’ performance in individual 
vs. interactive settings, nor in participants with a central vs. a more peripheral role in 
the interaction. In these experiments, the changes in the perceptual context pushed 
all participants to adapt by switching to abstract reference schemes, which were a 
better fit for a variable scenario.  
 
On the other hand, Experiments 4 and 5 showed that, in a less demanding context, 
participants only adapted their references when the formulation costs of the 
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references they were previously using were high, that is, in the presence of a large 
number of items and without the most easily overspecified colour dimension; and 
when there was no common history of use of these references with the current 
partner. When the formulation cost of the precedents was lower, participants retained 
them, suggesting a conservative tendency defines the default reference choice. 
 
In general terms, these results seem to point towards a prominent role for egocentric 
processes that are crucially open to consideration of the addressee’s identity and 
needs. In this sense, it could be suggested that referential decisions are weighed in a 
formula that assigns more value to speaker-internal processes. However, this 
research did not present speakers with any situation where their decisions could be 
radically detrimental to communication, such as underspecifying a referent; and in 
that sense it should be noted that a least collaborative effort framework might still be 
used to explain these results. As both maintaining referential precedents and 
switching to a new alternative were valid options in terms of communicative 
effectiveness (i.e. both were able to convey the intended message, even if not with 
the same efficiency), speakers could prioritise lowering their production costs at a 
likely low cost for the addressee. 
 
 
6.3 Limitations and implications for future research 
 
This thesis used two different experimental paradigms in an attempt to establish the 
conditions in which referential adaptation can operate. While all of the experiments 
described in this work showed some degree of referential adaptation, not all the 
manipulations that we set out to test specific aspects of this problem were successful 
in finding significant differences in speakers’ choices. On one hand, the variability of 
initial choices between individuals in the same condition in the maze game studies, 
which cannot be attributed to any experimental manipulation, had an impact on the 
experiments’ results, as these initial choices act as precedents for all subsequent 
descriptions. While Experiment 1 showed a consistent pattern of different description 
scheme choices in different maze layouts, in Experiments 2 and 3 the same initial 
maze layout was described using different description schemes. Even though this 
issue is informative on its own, as it suggests the impact of the perceptual context is 
subject to individual variation, the experimental setup I designed failed to consider 
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that the influence of the experimental conditions could be masked by these initial 
differences. 
 
In general terms, the experimental methods used allowed us to look only at the 
linguistic level of reference choice, that is, at the actual linguistic production of the 
speakers, but not at other more subtle cues of the processing and weighing of factors 
that could have influenced their choice. In this sense, it is likely that additional 
experimental methods –like eye-tracking, or timing of articulation in spoken dialogue– 
would be needed to gain a better understanding of the processes that lead to the 
actual articulation of a referential choice.  
 
Regarding the influence of the experiment design and methods, the results suggest 
significant differences in results might emerge from apparently minor differences in 
implementation, such as those between the setups of Experiments 4 and 5. This 
outcome points to the need to diversify the range of tests that are used in language 
production research, as subtle factors that are not considered or controlled might be 
influencing the patterns of results. In this sense, it is particularly interesting to notice 
how both the availability of perceptual dimensions and the number of descriptions to 
be produced in referential tasks could potentially radically alter speakers’ evaluation 
of their referential options. 
 
One of the areas where it could be suggested that the use of different methods might 
allow for the exploration of more subtle differences is participant role. This thesis 
showed that participant role differences were only associated to different referential 
outcomes in their most extreme form, that of a previously known partner with whom 
the references were initially established, versus a new partner who had no knowledge 
of these references nor had participated in the interaction before. More subtle 
differences, like that of a known partner versus an overhearer who was physically 
present in the scene but not involved in the interaction, were not associated to 
differences in reference choice. However, previous research had suggested the 
degree of involvement in the interaction and the access of individuals to task 
information should affect the linguistic choices of participants. Considering this, I 
believe looking at this issue with additional experimental methods, or with a more 
challenging task, might help defining the extent to which these different roles affect 
reference choice. Particularly, the use of more complex stimuli where a common 
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interpretation cannot be easily assumed might allow for a better understanding of 














Adank, P., Hagoort, P., & Bekkering, H. (2010). Imitation improves language 
comprehension. Psychological Science, 21(12), 1903–9.  
Anderson, A., & Garrod, S. C. (1987). The dynamics of referential meaning in 
spontaneous conversation: Some preliminary studies. In R. Reilly (Ed.) 
Communication failure in dialogue and discourse, 161–183. Amsterdam: 
Elsevier. 
Anderson, A., Garrod, S. C., & Sanford, A. J. (1983). The accessibility of pronominal 
antecedents as a function of episode shifts in narrative text. The Quarterly 
Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A, 35(3), 427–440.  
Ariel, M.  (1990). Accessing NP antecedents. London: Croom Helm. 
Arnold, J. E. (2008). Reference production: Production-internal and addressee-
oriented processes. Language and Cognitive Processes, 23(4), 495–527.  
Arts, A., Maes, A., Noordman, L., & Jansen, C. (2011). Overspecification facilitates 
object identification. Journal of Pragmatics, 43(1), 361–374.  
Bangerter, A., & Clark, H. H. (2003). Navigating joint projects with dialogue. 
Cognitive Science, 27(2), 195-225. 
Bard, E. G. & Aylett, M. P. (2004). Referential form, word duration, and modeling the 
listener in spoken dialogue. In J. Trueswell & M. Tanenhaus (Eds.) Approaches 
to studying world-situated language use: Bridging the language-as-product and 
language-as-action traditions, 173-191. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
Baronchelli, A., Felici, M., Loreto, V., Caglioti, E., & Steels, L. (2006). Sharp 
transition towards shared vocabularies in multi-agent systems. Journal of 
Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment, 2006(06), P06014. 
Barr, D. J. (2004). Establishing conventional communication systems: Is common 
knowledge necessary? Cognitive Science, 28(6), 937–962.  
Barr, D. J., & Keysar, B. (2002). Anchoring comprehension in linguistic precedents. 
Journal of Memory and Language, 46, 391-418.  
Barr, D. J., & Keysar, B. (2006). Perspective taking and the coordination of meaning 
in language use. In M. Traxler & M. Gernsbacher (Eds.) Handbook of 
Psycholinguistics (Second Edition), 901-938. London: Academic Press. 
Barr, D. J., Levy, R., Scheepers, C., & Tily, H. J. (2013). Random effects structure 
for confirmatory hypothesis testing: Keep it maximal. Journal of Memory and 
187 
 
Language, 68(3).  
Bates, D., Maechler, M., Bolker, B., & Walker, S. (2015). Fitting linear mixed-effects 
models using lme4. Journal of Statistical Software, 67(1), 1-48.  
Bates, E., Masling, M., & Kintsch, W. (1978). Recognition memory for aspects of 
dialogue. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 
4(3), 187. 
Behnel, M., Cummins, C., Sichelschmidt, L., & De Ruiter, J. (2013). Priming and 
conceptual pacts in overhearers’ adoption of referring expressions. 
Proceedings of the Cognitive Science Society, 35(35). Retrieved from 
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/2k5493g0#page-1 
Bock, J. K., & Warren, R. K. (1985). Conceptual accessibility and syntactic structure 
in sentence formulation. Cognition (Vol. 21). Retrieved from 
http://www.linguisticsnetwork.com/wp-content/uploads/Bock-Warren-1986.pdf 
Branigan, H. (2006). Perspectives on multi-party dialogue. Research on Language 
and Computation, 4(2-3), 153-177. 
Branigan, H. P., Catchpole, C. M., & Pickering, M. J. (2011). What makes dialogues 
easy to understand? Language and Cognitive Processes, 26(10), 1667–1686.  
Branigan, H. P., Pickering, M. J., & Cleland, A. A. (2000). Syntactic co-ordination in 
dialogue. Cognition, 75(B), 13–25.  
Branigan, H. P., Pickering, M. J., McLean, J. F., & Cleland, A. A. (2007). Syntactic 
alignment and participant role in dialogue. Cognition, 104(2), 163–197.  
Branigan, H. P., Pickering, M. J., Pearson, J., Mclean, J. F., & Brown, A. (2011). The 
role of beliefs in lexical alignment: Evidence from dialogs with humans and 
computers. Cognition, 121, 41–57.  
Brennan, S. E., & Clark, H. H. (1996). Conceptual pacts and lexical choice in 
conversation. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 22(6), 1482–1493.  
Brennan, S. E., & Hanna, J. E. (2009). Partner-specific adaptation in dialog. Topics 
in Cognitive Science, 1(2), 274–291.  
Brown-Schmidt, S., & Hanna, J. E. (2011). Talking in another person’s shoes: 
Incremental perspective-taking in language processing. Dialogue and 
Discourse, 2, 11–33.  
Brown-Schmidt, S., & Konopka, A. E. (2011). Experimental approaches to referential 
domains and the on-line processing of referring expressions in unscripted 
conversation. Information, 2(2), 302–326.  
188 
 
Brown-Schmidt, S. (2012). Beyond common and privileged: Gradient 
representations of common ground in real-time language use. Language and 
Cognitive Processes, 27(1), 62-89. 
Brown-Schmidt, S., Yoon, S. O., & Ryskin, R. A. (2015). People as contexts in 
conversation. Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 62, 59–99.  
Carmichael, L., Hogan, H. P., & Walter, A. A. (1932). An experimental study of the 
effect of language on the reproduction of visually perceived form. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 15(1), 73. 
Centola, D., & Baronchelli, A. (2015). The spontaneous emergence of conventions: 
An experimental study of cultural evolution. PNAS, 112(7), 1989–1994.  
Chartrand, T., & Bargh, J. (1999). The chameleon effect: The perception-behavior 
link and social interaction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76(6), 
893. 
Chartrand, T. L., & van Baaren, R. (2009). Human mimicry. Advances in 
Experimental Social Psychology, 41, 219–274.  
Clark, E. V., & Clark, H. H. (1979). When nouns surface as verbs. Language, 767-
811. 
Clark, E. V. (1987). The principle of contrast: A constraint on language acquisition. 
Mechanisms of language acquisition, 1, 33. 
Clark, E. V. (1997). Conceptual perspective and lexical choice in acquisition. 
Cognition, 64, 1–37.  
Clark, H. H., & Carlson, T. B. (1981). Context for comprehension. Attention and 
performance IX, 313-330. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Clark, H. H. (1985). Language use and language users. In Lindzey, G., & Aronson, 
E. (Eds.). Handbook of social psychology (3rd ed.). New York: Hillsdale, N.J.: 
Random House. 
Clark, H. H. (1996). Using language. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. 
Clark, H., & Brennan, S. (1991). Grounding in communication. In L. Resnik, J. 
Levine, and S. Teasley (Eds.) Perspectives on Socially Shared Cognition, 222–
233.Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.  
Clark, H. H., & Krych, M. A. (2004). Speaking while monitoring addressees for 
understanding. Journal of Memory and Language, 50(1), 62-81. 
Clark, H. & Marshall, C. R. (1981). Definite reference and mutual knowledge. In A. 
K. Joshi, B.L. Webber, & I. A. Sag. (Eds.), Elements of discourse 
understanding, 10-63. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. 
Clark, H. H., & Schaefer, E. F. (1987). Collaborating on contributions to 
conversations. Language and Cognitive Processes, 2(1), 19-41. 
Clark, H. H., & Schaefer, E. F. (1989). Contributing to discourse. Cognitive Science, 
189 
 
13(2), 259–294.  
Clark, H. H., Schreuder, R., & Buttrick, S. (1983). Common ground and the 
understanding of demonstrative reference. Journal of Verbal Learning and 
Verbal Behavior, 22, 245–258.  
Clark, H. H., & Wilkes-Gibbs, D. (1986). Referring as a collaborative process. 
Cognition, 22, l-39. 
Clarke, A. D. F., Elsner, M., & Rohde, H. (2013). Where’s Wally: the influence of 
visual salience on referring expression generation. Frontiers in Psychology, 4, 
329.  
Coco, M. I., Dale, R., & Keller, F. (2018). Performance in a collaborative search 
task: The role of feedback and alignment. Topics in Cognitive Science, 10(1), 
55–79.  
Croft, W. (2013). Evolution: Language use and the evolution of languages. In: 
Binder PM., Smith K. (Eds.) The Language Phenomenon. The Frontiers 
Collection. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer. 
Cruse, D. A. (1977). The pragmatics of lexical specificity. Journal of Linguistics, 
13(2), 153-164. 
Dale, R., Galati, A., Alviar, C., Contreras Kallens, P., Ramirez-Aristizabal, A., 
Tabatabaeian, M., & Vinson, D. W. (2018). Interacting timescales in 
perspective-taking. Frontiers in Psychology, 9, 1278.  
Degen, J., & Tanenhaus, M. K. (2015). Processing scalar implicature: A constraint-
based approach. Cognitive Science, 39(4), 667–710.  
Degen, J., & Tanenhaus, M. K. (2016). Availability of alternatives and the processing 
of scalar implicatures: A visual world eye-tracking study. Cognitive Science, 
40(1), 172–201.  
Dingemanse, M., Blasi, D. E., Lupyan, G., Christiansen, M. H., & Monaghan, P. 
(2015). Arbitrariness, iconicity, and systematicity in language. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 19(10), 603–615.  
Engelhardt, P., Bailey, K., & Ferreira, F. (2006). Do speakers and listeners observe 
the Gricean Maxim of Quantity? Journal of Memory and Language, 54(4), 554–
573.  
Engelhardt, P., Demiral, B., & Ferreira, F. (2011). Over-specified referring 
expressions impair comprehension: An ERP study. Brain and Cognition, 77(2), 
304–314.  
Fay, N., & Ellison, T. M. (2013). The cultural evolution of human communication 
190 
 
systems in different sized populations: Usability trumps learnability. PLoS ONE, 
8(8).  
Fay, N., Ellison, T. M., & Garrod, S. (2014). Iconicity: From sign to system in human 
communication and language. Pragmatics & Cognition, 22(2), 244–263.  
Fay, N., Garrod, S., & Roberts, L. (2008). The fitness and functionality of culturally 
evolved communication systems. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society B-Biological Sciences: Biological Sciences, 363(1509), 3553–3561.  
Fay, N., Walker, B., Swoboda, N., & Garrod, S. (2018). How to create shared 
symbols. Cognitive Science, 42, 241–269.  
Fehér, O., Wonnacott, E., & Smith, K. (2016). Structural priming in artificial 
languages and the regularisation of unpredictable variation. Journal of Memory 
and Language, 91, 158-180.  
Ferreira, V. S., & Dell, G. (2000). Effect of ambiguity and lexical availability on 
syntactic and lexical production. Cognitive Psychology, 40(4), 296–340.  
Ferreira, V. S., Slevc, R., & Rogers, E. (2005). How do speakers avoid ambiguous 
linguistic expressions? Cognition, 96(3), 263–284.  
Fox Tree, J. E. (1999). Listening in on monologues and dialogues. Discourse 
Processes, 27(1), 35–53.  
Fox Tree, J. E., & Mayer, S. A. (2008). Overhearing single and multiple 
perspectives. Discourse Processes, 45(2), 160–179.  
Fusaroli, R., Bahrami, B., Olsen, K., Roepstorff, A., Rees, G., Frith, C., & Tylén, K. 
(2012). Coming to terms: quantifying the benefits of linguistic coordination. 
Psychological Science, 23(8), 931-939. 
Fusaroli, R., Raczaszek-Leonardi, J., & Tylén, K. (2014). Dialog as interpersonal 
synergy. New Ideas in Psychology, 32(1), 147–157.  
Fusaroli, R., & Tylén, K. (2012). Carving language for social coordination: A 
dynamical approach. Interaction Studies, 13(1), 103–124.  
Fusaroli, R., & Tylén, K. (2016). Investigating conversational dynamics: Interactive 
alignment, interpersonal synergy, and collective task performance. Cognitive 
Science, 40(1), 145–171.  
Fusaroli, R., Tylén, K., Garly, K., Steensig, J., Christiansen, M. H., & Dingemanse, 
M. (2017). Measures and mechanisms of common ground: backchannels, 
conversational repair, and interactive alignment in free and task-oriented social 
interactions. In the 39th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society 
(CogSci 2017) (pp. 2055-2060). Cognitive Science Society. 
191 
 
Fussell, S. R., & Krauss, R. M. (1992). Coordination of knowledge in 
communication: Effects of speakers' assumptions about what others know. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62(3), 378. 
Fukumura, K., & van Gompel, R. P. (2012). Producing pronouns and definite noun 
phrases: Do speakers use the addressee’s discourse model?. Cognitive 
Science, 36(7), 1289-1311. 
Galantucci, B. (2005). An experimental study of the emergence of human 
communication systems. Cognitive Science, 29(5), 737–767.  
Galantucci, B., Rhodes, T., & Kroos, C. (2006). Rapidity of fading and the 
emergence of duality of patterning. In The Evolution of Language: Proceedings 
of the 6th International Conference (EVOLANG6), Rome, Italy, 12-15 April 
2006. 
Galantucci, B., & Sebanz, N. (2009). Joint action: Current perspectives. Topics in 
Cognitive Science, 1(2), 255–259.  
Galati, A., & Brennan, S. E. (2010). Attenuating information in spoken 
communication: For the speaker, or for the addressee?. Journal of Memory and 
Language, 62(1), 35-51. 
Gann, T. M., & Barr, D. J. (2014). Speaking from experience: Audience design as 
expert performance. Language, Cognition and Neuroscience, 29(6), 744-760. 
Garrod, S. (2011) Referential processing in monologue and dialogue with and 
without access to real-world referents. In: Gibson, E., & Pearlmutter, N. (Eds.) 
The processing and acquisition of reference. Cambridge, Mass. ; London: MIT 
Press. 
Garrod, S., Anderson, A., & Sanford, A. J. (1984). Semantic negotiation and the 
dynamics of conversational meaning. Glasgow Psychology Technical Report, 
(1). 
Garrod, S., & Anderson, A. (1987). Saying what you mean in dialogue: A study in 
conceptual and semantic co-ordination. Cognition, 27(2), 181–218.  
Garrod, S., & Clark, A. (1993). The development of dialogue co-ordination skills in 
schoolchildren. Language and Cognitive Processes, 8, 37–41.  
Garrod, S., & Doherty, G. (1994). Conversation, coordination and convention: An 
empirical investigation of how groups establish linguistic conventions. 
Cognition, 53, 181–215. 
Garrod, S., Fay, N., Lee, J., Oberlander, J., & Macleod, T. (2007). Foundations of 
representation: where might graphical symbol systems come from? Cognitive 
192 
 
Science, 31(6), 961–987.  
Garrod, S., & Pickering, M. J. (2007). Alignment in dialogue. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
Garrod, S., & Pickering, M. J. (2009). Joint action, interactive alignment, and dialog. 
Topics in Cognitive Science, 1(2), 292–304.  
Garrod S., & Pickering M.J. (2013) Dialogue: Interactive alignment and its 
implications for language learning and language change. In: Binder PM., Smith 
K. (eds) The Language Phenomenon. The Frontiers Collection. Berlin, 
Heidelberg: Springer. 
Giles, H., Coupland, N., & Coupland, J. (1991). Accommodation theory: 
Communication, context, and consequence. In H. Giles, J. Coupland, & N. 
Coupland (Eds.), Contexts of Accommodation (pp. 1–68). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Goffman, E. (1974). Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience. 
Harvard University Press. 
Gorman, K. S., Gegg-Harrison, W., Marsh, C. R., & Tanenhaus, M. K. (2013). 
What's learned together stays together: Speakers' choice of referring 
expression reflects shared experience. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 39(3), 843. 
Goudbeek, M., & Krahmer, E. (2012). Alignment in interactive reference production: 
Content planning, modifier ordering, and referential overspecification. Topics in 
Cognitive Science, 4(2), 269-289. 
Grice, H.P. (1975). Logic and conversation. In Cole et al. Syntax and semantics 3: 
Speech arts (pp. 41-58). Retrieved from 
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/ls/studypacks/Grice-Logic.pdf 
Grodner, D., & Sedivy, J. C. (2011). The effect of speaker-specific information on 
pragmatic inferences. In N. Pearlmutter & E. Gibson (Eds.) The processing and 
acquisition of reference. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. 
Hanna, J., Tanenhaus, M., & Trueswell, J. (2003). The effects of common ground 
and perspective on domains of referential interpretation. Journal of Memory 
and Language, 49(1), 43–61.  
Hanna, J. & Tanenhaus, M. (2005). The use of perspective during referential 
interpretation. In J. Trueswell & M. Tanenhaus (Eds.) Approaches to studying 
world-situated language use: Bridging the language-as-product and language-
as-action traditions, 133-152. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
193 
 
Haselow, A. (2018). Language change from a psycholinguistic perspective: The 
long-term effects of frequency on language processing. Language Sciences, 
68, 56–77.  
Hawkins, R. X., Frank, M. C., & Goodman, N. D. (2017). Convention-formation in 
iterated reference games. In Proceedings of the 39th Annual Conference of the 
Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society. 
Healey, P. G. T., Mills, G. J., Eshghi, A., & Howes, C. (2018). Running repairs: 
Coordinating meaning in dialogue. Topics in Cognitive Science, 10(2), 367–
388.  
Healey, P. G. T., Mills, G., & Eshghi, A. (2016). Co-ordinating understanding: The 
importance of negative evidence. International Journal of Psychology 51, 1040. 
Healey, P. G. T., & Mills, G. (2006). Participation, precedence and co-ordination in 
dialogue. In Proceedings of the 28th Annual Conference of the Cognitive 
Science Society (Vol. 320). Vancouver: Cognitive Science Society. 
Healey, P. G. T., & Mills, G. J. (2009, January). A Dialogue Experimentation Toolkit. 
In Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society (Vol. 
31, No. 31). 
Healey, P. G. T., & Mills, G. J. (submitted) A Dialogue Experimentation Toolkit. 
Retrieved from 
http://homepages.inf.ed.ac.uk/gmills/MillsHealey2013Submission.pdf 
Healey, P. G. T. (1997). Expertise or expert-ese?: The emergence of task-oriented 
sub-languages. Proceedings of the 19th Annual Conference of the Cognitive 
Science Society, 301–306. 
Healey, P. G. T. (2008). Interactive misalignment: The role of repair in the 
development of group sub-languages. Language in Flux, 13–39. 
Healey, P. G. T., Purver, M., & Howes, C. (2014). Divergence in dialogue. PloS 
One, 9(2), e98598.  
Herring, S. C. (1999, January). Interactional coherence in CMC. HICSS-32. 
Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Hawaii International Conference on Systems 
Sciences (pp. 13-pp). IEEE. 
Heyes, C. (2011). Automatic imitation. Psychological Bulletin, 137(3), 463.  
Horton, W. S. (2008). A memory-based approach to common ground and audience 
design. In I. Kecskes & J. Mey (Eds.) Intention, common ground, and the 
egocentric speaker-hearer, 189-222. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 
Horton, W. S., & Gerrig, R. J. (2002). Speakers’ experiences and audience design: 
194 
 
knowing when and knowing how to adjust utterances to addressees. Journal of 
Memory and Language, 47, 589–606. 
Horton, W. S., & Gerrig, R. J. (2005). Conversational common ground and memory 
processes in language production. Discourse Processes, 40(1), 1–35.  
Horton, W. S., & Gerrig, R. J. (2016). Revisiting the memory-based processing 
approach to common ground. Topics in Cognitive Science, 8(4), 780–795.  
Horton, W. S., & Keysar, B. (1996). When do speakers take into account common 
ground? Cognition, 59(1), 91–117.  
Horton, W. S., & Slaten, D. G. (2012). Anticipating who will say what: The influence 
of speaker-specific memory associations on reference resolution. Memory & 
Cognition, 40(1), 113–126.  
Hupet, M., & Chantraine, Y. (1992). Changes in repeated references: Collaboration 
or repetition effects?. Journal of Psycholinguistic Research, 21(6), 485-496. 
Hupet, M., Seron, X., & Chantraine, Y. (1991). The effects of the codability and 
discriminability of the referents on the collaborative referring procedure. British 
Journal of Psychology, 82(4), 449-462. 
Ibarra, A., & Tanenhaus, M. K. (2016). The flexibility of conceptual pacts: Referring 
expressions dynamically shift to accommodate new conceptualizations. 
Frontiers in Psychology, 7, 561.  
Imai, M., & Kita, S. (2014). The sound symbolism bootstrapping hypothesis for 
language acquisition and language evolution. Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 369(1651), 20130298–20130298.  
Isaacs, E. A., & Clark, H. H. (1987). References in conversation between experts 
and novices. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 116(1), 26. 
Itti, L., & Baldi, P. (2009). Bayesian surprise attracts human attention. Vision 
Research, 49(10), 1295–1306.  
Keysar, B. (1997). Unconfounding common ground. Discourse Processes, 24(2-3), 
253-270. 
Keysar, B., Barr, D. J., Balin, J. A., & Brauner, J. S. (2000). Taking perspective in 
conversation: the role of mutual knowledge in comprehension. Psychological 
Science, 11(1), 32–38.  
Keysar, B., Barr, D. J., Balin, J. A., & Paek, T. S. (1998). Definite reference and 
mutual knowledge: Process models of common ground in comprehension. 
Journal of Memory and Language, 39. 
Keysar, B., Barr, D. J., & Horton, W. S. (1998). The egocentric basis of language 
195 
 
use: Insights from a processing approach. Current Directions in Psychological 
Science, 7(2), 46-49. 
Keysar, B., & Henly, A. S. (2002). Speakers’ overestimation of their effectiveness 
monitoring and ambiguity. Psychological Science, 13(3), 207–212.  
Keysar, B., Lin, S., & Barr, D. J. (2003). Limits on theory of mind use in adults. 
Cognition, 89(1), 25–41.  
Keysar, B., & Barr, D. J. (2005). Coordination of action and belief in communication. 
In J. Trueswell & M. Tanenhaus (Eds.) Approaches to studying world-situated 
language use: Bridging the language-as-product and language-as-action 
traditions, 71-94. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
Knutsen, D., & Le Bigot, L. (2014). Capturing egocentric biases in reference reuse 
during collaborative dialogue. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 1590–1599.  
Knutsen, D., Le Bigot, L., & Ros, C. (2017). Explicit feedback from users attenuates 
memory biases in human-system dialogue. International Journal of Human-
Computer Studies, 97, 77–87.  
Krauss, R. M., & Weinheimer, S. (1964). Changes in reference phrases as a 
function of frequency of usage in social interaction: A preliminary study. 
Psychonomic Science, 1(1-12), 113-114. 
Krauss, R. M., & Weinheimer, S. (1966). Concurrent feedback, confirmation, and the 
encoding of referents in verbal communication. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 4(3), 343. 
Kronmüller, E., & Barr, D. J. (2015). Referential precedents in spoken language 
comprehension: A review and meta-analysis. Journal of Memory and 
Language, 83, 1–19.  
Kronmüller, E., Noveck, I., Rivera, N., Jaume-Guazzini, F., & Barr, D. (2017). The 
positive side of a negative reference: the delay between linguistic processing 
and common ground. Royal Society Open Science, 4.  
Kuhlen, A. K., & Brennan, S. E. (2013). Language in dialogue: When confederates 
might be hazardous to your data. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 20(1), 54-
72. 
Lakin, J. L., & Chartrand, T. L. (2003). Using nonconscious behavioral mimicry to 
create affiliation and rapport. Psychological Science,14(4), 334–339. 
Lewis, D. K. (2002). Convention : a philosophical study. Oxford, UK: Blackwell 
Publishing. (Originally published 1969). 
Lin, S., Keysar, B., & Epley, N. (2010). Reflexively mindblind: Using theory of mind 
196 
 
to interpret behavior requires effortful attention. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 46(3), 551–556.  
Louwerse, M. M., Dale, R., Bard, E. G., & Jeuniaux, P. (2012). Behavior matching in 
multimodal communication Is synchronized. Cognitive Science, 36(8), 1404–
1426.  
Lupyan, G., & Dale, R. (2010). Language structure is partly determined by social 
structure. PloS ONE, 5(1), e8559. 
Lupyan, G., & Dale, R. A. (2015). The role of adaptation in understanding linguistic 
diversity. Language structure and environment: Social, cultural, and natural 
factors, 287-16.  
Lupyan, G., & Dale, R. (2016). Why are there different languages? The role of 
adaptation in linguistic diversity. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 20(9), 649–660.  
McClung, J. S., & Reicher, S. D. (2018). Representing other minds: Mental state 
reference is moderated by group membership. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 76, 385–392.  
Metzing, C., & Brennan, S. E. (2003). When conceptual pacts are broken: Partner-
specific effects on the comprehension of referring expressions. Journal of 
Memory and Language, 49(2), 201–213.  
Mills, G. J., & Healey, P. G. (2006). Clarifying spatial descriptions: Local and global 
effects on semantic co-ordination. Proc. Workshop on Semantics and 
Pragmatics of Dialogue, 122–129. 
Mills, G. J. (2014). Dialogue in joint activity: Complementarity, convergence and 
conventionalization. New Ideas in Psychology, 32(1), 158–173.  
Misyak, J., Noguchi, T., & Chater, N. (2016). Instantaneous conventions: The 
emergence of flexible communicative signals. Psychological Science, 
0956797616661199.  
Oben, B., & Brone, G. (2016). Explaining interactive alignment: A multimodal and 
multifactorial account. Journal of Pragmatics, 104, 32–51.  
Paraboni, I., & van Deemter, K. (2014). Reference and the facilitation of search in 
spatial domains. Language, Cognition and Neuroscience, 29(8), 1002–1017.  
Paraboni, I., van Deemter, K., & Masthoff, J. (2007). Generating referring 
expressions: Making referents easy to identify. Computational Linguistics, 
33(2), 229–254.  
Pardo, J. S. (2006). On phonetic convergence during conversational interaction. The 
Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 119(4), 2382–2393.  
197 
 
Paukner, A., Suomi, S. J., Visalberghi, E., & Ferrari, P. F. (2009). Capuchin 
monkeys display affiliation toward humans who imitate them. Science, 
325(5942), 880–3.  
Pechmann, T. (1989). Incremental speech production and referential 
overspecification. Linguistics, 27(1), 89-110. 
Perfors, A., & Navarro, D. J. (2014). Language evolution can be shaped by the 
structure of the world. Cognitive Science, 38(4), 775–793.  
Perniss, P., Thompson, R. L., & Vigliocco, G. (2010). Iconicity as a general property 
of language: Evidence from spoken and signed languages. Frontiers in 
Psychology, 1(DEC), 1–15.  
Pickering, M. J., & Garrod, S. (2004). Toward a mechanistic psychology of dialogue. 
The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 27(2), 169-190; discussion 190-226.  
Pickering, M. J., & Garrod, S. (2006). Alignment as the basis for successful 
communication. Research on Language and Computation, 4(2–3), 203–228.  
Pickering, M. J., & Garrod, S. (2007). Do people use language production to make 
predictions during comprehension? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11(3), 105–
110.  
Pickering, M. J., & Garrod, S. (2013). An integrated theory of language production 
and comprehension. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 36(4), 329–47.  
Ratcliff, R. (1978). A theory of memory retrieval. Psychological Review, 85(2), 59. 
Rayner, K. (1998). Eye movements in reading and information processing: 20 years 
of research. Psychological Bulletin, 124(3), 372. 
Rogers, S. L., Fay, N., & Maybery, M. (2013). Audience design through social 
interaction during group discussion. PLoS ONE, 8(2), e57211.  
Rosch, E., Mervis, C. B., Gray, W. D., Johnson, D. M., & Boyes-Braem, P. (1976). 
Basic objects in natural categories. Cognitive Psychology, 8(3), 382-439. 
Rubio-Fernández, P. (2016). How redundant are redundant color adjectives? An 
efficiency-based analysis of color overspecification. Frontiers in Psychology, 7, 
153.  
Schegloff, E. A., Jefferson, G., & Sacks, H. (1977). The preference for self-
correction in the organization of repair in conversation. Language, 53(2), 361-
382. 
Schober, F., & Clark, H. H. (1989). Understanding by addressees and overhearers. 
Cognitive Psychology, 21, 211–232. 
Sedivy, J. (1999). Examining the discourse-based properties of adjectives in on-line 
198 
 
semantic processing. In Twelfth Annual CUNY Conference on Human 
Sentence Processing, New York. 
Sedivy, J. C. (2003). Pragmatic versus form-based accounts of referential contrast: 
Evidence for effects of informativity expectations. Journal of Psycholinguistic 
Research, 32(1), 3–23.  
Sedivy, J. (2005). Evaluating explanations for referential context effects: Evidence 
for gricean mechanisms in online language interpretation. In J. Trueswell & M. 
Tanenhaus (Eds.) Approaches to studying world-situated language use: 
Bridging the language-as-product and language-as-action traditions, 173-191. 
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
Sedivy, J. C., Tanenhaus, M. K., Chambers, C. G., & Carlson, G. N. (1999). 
Achieving incremental semantic interpretation through contextual 
representation. Cognition, 71(2), 109-147. 
Senay, I., & Keysar, B. (2009). Keeping track of speaker’s perspective: The role of 
social identity. Discourse Processes, 46(5), 401–425.  
Shintel, H., & Keysar, B. (2007). You sait it before and you’ll say it again: 
Expectations of consistency in communication. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning Memory and Cognition.  
Shintel, H., & Keysar, B. (2009). Less is more: A minimalist account of joint action in 
communication. Topics in Cognitive Science, 1(2), 260–273.  
Shirouzu, H., Miyake, N., & Masukawa, H. (2002). Cognitively active externalization 
for situated reflection. Cognitive Science, 26(4), 469–501.  
Shockley, K., Santana, M.-V., & Fowler, C. A. (2003). Mutual interpersonal postural 
constraints are involved in cooperative conversation. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 29(2), 326–332.  
Singmann, H., Bolker, B., Westfall, J., & Aust, F. (2016). afex: Analysis of Factorial 
  Experiments. R package version 0.16-1. https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=afex 
Slamecka, N. J., & Graf, P. (1978). The generation effect: Delineation of a 
phenomenon. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and 
Memory, 4(6), 592. 
Smith, K., Fehér, O., & Ritt, N. (2014). Eliminating unpredictable linguistic variation 
through interaction. Proceedings of the 36th Annual Conference of the 
Cognitive Science Society, 1461–1466. 
Smith, K., & Wonnacott, E. (2010). Eliminating unpredictable variation through 
iterated learning. Cognition, 116(3), 444–449.  
199 
 
Stalnaker, R. (1978). Assertion. Syntax and Semantics 9(3), 15-22 . 
Tamariz, M., Ellison, T. M., Barr, D. J., & Fay, N. (2014). Cultural selection drives 
the evolution of human communication systems. Philosophical Transactions of 
the Royal Society B-Biological Sciences: Biological Sciences, 281(June).  
Tamariz, M., Roberts, S. G., Martínez, J. I., & Santiago, J. (2018). The Interactive 
origin of iconicity. Cognitive Science, 42(1), 334–349.  
Tanaka, J. W., & Taylor, M. (1991). Object categories and expertise: Is the basic 
level in the eye of the beholder?. Cognitive Psychology, 23(3), 457-482. 
Tannen, D. (2007). Talking voices: Repetition, dialogue, and imagery in 
conversational discourse (Studies in Interactional Sociolinguistics). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Tarenskeen, S., Broersma, M., & Geurts, B. (2015). Overspecification of color, 
pattern, and size: salience, absoluteness, and consistency. Frontiers in 
Psychology, 6, 1703.  
Tolins, J., & Tree, J. E. F. (2014). Addressee backchannels steer narrative 
development. Journal of Pragmatics, 70, 152-164. 
Tollefsen, D., & Dale, R. (2012). Naturalizing joint action: A process-based 
approach. Philosophical Psychology, 25(3), 385–407.  
Trueswell, J. C., & Tanenhaus, M. K. (2005). Approaches to studying world-situated 
language use : bridging the language-as-product and language-as-action 
traditions. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
van Baaren, R., Holland, R., Steenaert, B., & van Knippenberg, A. (2003). Mimicry 
for money: Behavioral consequences of imitation. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 39(4), 393–398. 
van Deemter, K., Gatt, A., van Gompel, R. P. G., & Krahmer, E. (2012). Toward a 
computational psycholinguistics of reference production. Topics in Cognitive 
Science, 4(2), 166–183.  
Van Der Wege, M. M. (2009). Lexical entrainment and lexical differentiation in 
reference phrase choice. Journal of Memory and Language, 60(4), 448–463.  
Viethen, J., Goudbeek, M., & Krahmer, E. (2012, January). The impact of colour 
difference and colour codability on reference production. In Proceedings of the 
Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society (Vol. 34, No. 34). 
Vogels, J., Krahmer, E., & Maes, A. (2013). Who is where referred to how, and why? 
The influence of visual saliency on referent accessibility in spoken language 
production. Language and Cognitive Processes, 28.  
200 
 
Wardlow Lane, L., Groisman, M., & Ferreira, V. S. (2006). Don’t talk about pink 
elephants! Psychological Science, 17(4), 273–277.  
Wilkes-Gibbs, D., & Clark, H. H. (1992). Coordinating beliefs in conversation. 
Journal of Memory and Language, 31(2), 183-194. 
Wilkes-Gibbs, D. (1995). Coherence in collaboration: Some examples from 
conversation. Typological Studies in Language, 31, 239-267. 
Wilson, M., & Knoblich, G. (2005). The case for motor involvement in perceiving 
conspecifics. Psychological Bulletin, 131(3), 460. 
Winters, J., Kirby, S., & Smith, K. (2018). Contextual predictability shapes signal 
autonomy. Cognition, 176(March), 15–30.  
Yoon, S. O., & Brown-Schmidt, S. (2014). Adjusting conceptual pacts in three-party 
conversation. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 40(4), 919. 
Yoon, S. O., Koh, S., & Brown-Schmidt, S. (2012). Influence of perspective and 
goals on reference production in conversation. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 
19(4), 699–707.  
 
